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ABSTRACT 
 
Shengjun Zhu: ‘Go Up’, ‘Go West’, and ‘Go Out’: Changing Industrial Policy and Firm 
Strategies in China’s Apparel Industry 
(Under the direction of John Pickles) 
 
The rise of China’s export-oriented apparel industry since the 1990s has been driven 
largely by global sourcing practices intent on capturing the cost advantages of a development 
model predicated, in part, on unskilled or semi-skilled migratory labor flows linking western and 
central labor pools to coastal production sites. Until recently, the dominance of this model of 
development has fuelled growth in low-wage employment in the coastal regions and has 
provided few opportunities for economic and social upgrading. Since the early 2000s, coastal 
factories have increasingly had to confront difficulties generated by the increasing social and 
economic costs of this regionally concentrated low wage growth model. This research focuses on 
the role of the apparel industry in this process. It documents the major changes in organization 
and geographies of economic activity in the industry, and demonstrates how the central and local 
state, domestic and international capital, and Chinese and other Asian workers are shaping the 
changing organization and geography of China’s apparel industry. By focusing on a case study 
from China and a firm-level database on China’s apparel industry, the research pays particular 
attention to firm strategies and state policies that have arisen in response to upward pressure on 
wages from workers, increased materials and energy costs, and competition from other low-cost 
producers in Asia. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
Background 
The central question of this research is: how, since the early 2000s, the Chinese state and 
private firms are dealing with negative consequences of low-wage export-oriented production in 
apparel. Specifically, my research seeks to understand how, as competitive pressures increase, 
new government policies and emerging firm strategies are restructuring the geography and 
organization of the Chinese apparel industry in conflicting and/or complementary ways. This 
research builds on recent insights in economic geography and economic sociology on industrial 
relocation/delocalization, upgrading, governance, global value chains and global production 
networks (Bair, 2009; Coe et al., 2008a; Gereffi et al., 2005; Pickles and Smith, 2011). 
Following the Reform and Opening-Up Policies of the late 1970s, China has achieved 
dramatic economic growth and experienced three fundamental transformations: (1) from a 
planned to an increasingly market-based economy; (2) from a state-owned, collective economy 
to one with growing level of private ownership; and (3) from a partially closed economy to one 
oriented towards export markets (He and Zhu, 2007; Wei, 2001a). The combination of internal 
reforms and international demand led to a rapid expansion in private sector-led export growth 
(Gereffi, 1999, 2009)—the so-called BRING IN Policy—which in turn generated average annual 
GDP growth of approximately 9.8%, and export expansion of 12.4% annually throughout the 
1990s, growing to more than 20% a year in the 2000s before the outbreak of global financial 
tsunami in 2008 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011). Dependence on foreign trade 
(calculated as the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP) grew from 30% in 1980 to 60% 
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in 2008. China had become the leading global exporter in 774 items by 2005 and the world’s 
largest exporter with a world export share of 8% in 2009 (Inman, 2010; Yang et al., 2006). 
With the shift from import substitution to export-oriented strategies, producers dependent 
on low-wage and unskilled or semi-skilled labor and the leveraging of domestic advantages, 
including China’s large potential market and the comparatively low cost of its other factor 
inputs, land, electricity and other raw materials were able to expand their role in export markets 
(Gereffi, 2009). One notable example has been the apparel industry, which accounts for a 
considerable part of China’s economic growth and job creation during this period. China has the 
largest apparel industry in the world with more than 3.82 million workers in 2011, predominantly 
focused on assembly or OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturing) production for global buyers 
(Feenstra and Hamilton, 2006; Hamilton and Petrovic, 2006). Between 1995 and 2008, China 
more than doubled its share of global apparel exports from 15.2% to 33.2% (Gereffi and 
Frederick, 2010). Production and employment of the apparel industry have become heavily 
concentrated in the coastal regions of East and Southeast China (Fujita and Hu, 2001; He et al., 
2008; Wen, 2004).  
In recent years this model of industrialization has encountered serious limits. These limits 
are now forcing major changes in the organization and geography of economic activity in the 
industry (Wang and Mei, 2009; Yang, 2012). Most Chinese apparel factories have focused on 
assembly or OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturing) production supplying global buyers and 
few have been able to establish a strong position in high-value-added, high-tech, and high-end 
products (Feenstra and Hamilton, 2006; Hamilton and Petrovic, 2006). As with general 
manufacturing expansion, growth in apparel has been driven, at least until recently, by low wage 
and unskilled or semi-skilled workers who migrate from western and central to coastal regions 
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(Appelbaum et al., 2005; Arnold and Pickles, 2011). As billions of workers and consumers have 
become more direct participants in the global economy as workers and consumers (Gereffi, 
2009), this process has increasingly come to drive China’s rapidly changing economic geography 
creating upward pressure on wages and working conditions that are beginning to challenge the 
“China price” and the “race to the bottom” it has created (Appelbaum, 2004; Appelbaum et al., 
2005; Henderson and Nadvi, 2011). 
While China has traditionally been seen as a cheap labor pool, with an almost infinite 
supply of labor, workers have responded quickly to new opportunities, forcing wages up and 
encouraging better work by exiting low paying and low quality jobs (Drewry Supply Chain 
Advisors, 2007). Other factors have also been important, including labor shortages fuelled by 
low wages and poor working conditions, the appreciation of China’s currency, slackening global 
demand especially after the outbreak of the financial crisis and new regulations dealing with 
environment, labor law and an expanded role for corporate social responsibility (CSR). These 
factors have squeezed profit margins to such a degree that some manufacturers have been forced 
to shed labor or shut down altogether, creating a dilemma for policy makers particularly in 
regions that are highly dependent on the industry for employment (Wang and Mei, 2009).  
The “race to the bottom” that typified the “China price” and the rapid rise of China as a 
global supplier of clothing over the past decade is thus now changing in ways that are having 
profound effects on the industrial organization and spatial structure of production and 
employment, and will change the ways in which we understand China’s role in global and 
regional export markets in the coming years (Chan, 2010a, 2010b; Lee, 2007). In this research, I 
focus on the apparel industry and ask: as competitive pressures increase, how government 
policies and firm strategies are affecting the spatial patterns, organizational structure, and value 
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segments of the Chinese apparel industry. I shall focus on the interaction between the different 
and related roles of governments and firms and their complementary and/or conflicting effects in 
restructuring the geography and organization of the Chinese apparel industry. I seek to 
demonstrate that the model of inward investment, global sourcing, and export orientation is 
already undergoing fundamental restructuring, producing new geographies of production and 
employment, with the consequent need to re-assess the policy implications of China in the global 
production networks.  
The case of Ningbo 
The impact of the transforming business environment and the subsequent intensification 
of competitive pressures is especially marked in the main manufacturing centers of Chinese 
apparel industry, such as Zhejiang, Guangdong, and other coastal provinces. I have selected 
Ningbo city as the primary case study for this research (Figure 1). Ningbo is one of the biggest 
clothing industrial clusters in China—it produces around 1.3 billion pieces of apparel products 
each year, which accounts for 40% of the provincial production capacity and 12% of the national 
total domestic garment production (Li & Fung Research Centre, 2006). By the end of 2006, there 
were around 131,600 workers employed directly in Ningbo’s more than 2,000 apparel 
enterprises, accounting for about 5% of the national total (Ningbo Economy Committee, 2007). 
Major products manufactured in Ningbo includes men’s suits, knitted garments and children’s 
wear, which account for 44%, 65% and 76% of the province’s total production respectively  (Li 
& Fung Research Centre, 2006; Tan, 2006). 
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Figure 1 Location of Ningbo 
Source: compiled by authors 
 
The traditional Ningbo model was a system of production centered on family workshops 
and embedded in dense, historically rooted local institutions. Families typically formed the main 
productions units, relying on social networks and sale agents which bridged producers in Ningbo 
and domestic-oriented retailers in Shanghai (Chen and Zhang, 2008). Ningbo was a leading 
region in reforming its economy: when China was still dominated by state-owned enterprises, 
family business units and town and village enterprises had already become the backbone of 
Ningbo’s apparel industry. At this stage, development of its apparel industry was largely 
driven by its supplier-buyer links with Shanghai based on geographical and social proximity on 
the one hand, and its historical legacies of craft production and trading on the other (Chen and 
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Zhang, 2008). Ningbo’s apparel products began to penetrate the domestic markets, which were 
still dominated by central and regional planning and its shortage economy. 
Since the initiation of Reform and Opening-Up Policies in the late 1970s, Ningbo’s 
apparel industry has experienced two rounds of industrial restructuring. The first round, 
catalyzed by the Reform, was centered on a process of transformation from small 
family business units to real registered enterprises (shareholding enterprises or limited liability 
corporations) and a process of privatization from state-owned enterprises to private or joint-
venture enterprises. From 1980s to 1990s, the first generation of apparel enterprises emerged. As 
marketization, privatization and globalization deepened, firms also developed their own brands 
for domestic markets while taking on export contracts as global buyers increasingly relocated 
apparel production from Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea to mainland China. In 1990s, 
export-oriented production surpassed domestic-oriented production and soon comprised the bulk 
of Ningbo’s apparel industry. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, nearly two-thirds of Ningbo’s 
apparel firms export over 90% of their production, making Ningbo one of the largest apparel 
manufacturing and marketing bases in Asia  (Li & Fung Research Centre, 2006; Zhao and Gu, 
2009). This first round of restructuring was stimulated by an enormous increase in international 
demand for export goods, especially those dependent on low-wage and unskilled or semi-skilled 
labor and low-cost factor inputs. As a result,  Ningbo’s apparel firms quickly improved 
productivity, expanded their capacity and captured economies of scale, and tied their production 
process more closely to the demands of global buyers (Gereffi, 2009).  
In the mid-to late-2000s, this export-oriented, low-wage model started to be 
challenged by the rising cost of labor and labor shortages in China’s coastal region (Wang and 
Mei, 2009). Alongside the significant and rapidly changing labor market dynamics, other factors 
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have also been important, including the appreciation of China’s currency, slackening global 
demand especially after the effects of the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s and the global 
financial crisis of 2008, new environment regulations, the effects of China’s new Labor Law, and 
the spread of expanded Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) requirements in the industry (Li 
& Fung Research Centre, 2008; Yang, 2012). Dwindling international demand and rising 
production costs together formed an exogenous shock and further led to the second round of 
industrial restructuring in Ningbo’s apparel firms (Figure 2), as many more took advantages of 
the new opportunities generated by a booming domestic market to adjust to weakening export 
orders.  
 
Figure 2 Output and Export Delivery Value of Ningbo’s Apparel Industry  
Data Source: Annual Report of Ningbo’s Apparel Industry (2011)  
(Note: Export Delivery Value refers to the value of exported goods on delivery. It is an indicator widely used by the 
China Statistical Bureau.) 
 
This second round of restructuring has been characterized by a growing domestic-
orientation, particularly in new firms. As costs rose and competitive pressures increased, apparel 
manufacturers recognized the unsustainability of labor-intensive, low-value and low-end OEM 
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production, and sought to establish core competencies in high-value OEM, ODM and OBM 
production. Ningbo’s entrepreneurs either opted for upgrading to high-value OEM, ODM and 
OBM production after years of supplying global brands, or started new businesses directly with 
high-value OEM, ODM or OBM production. As a result, from the mid-to late-2000s a second 
generation of enterprises emerged whose characteristics were increasingly related to medium- 
and high-value production for domestic markets. In recent years, a third generation of enterprise 
is emerging. These focus on providing industrial intermediary services. They either receive 
orders from global brands and then outsource to competent subcontractors, or perform integrated 
product development, sourcing, shipping and logistics for global buyers. Their number and 
impacts are still limited, but their emergence signals a new way to participate in GVCs where the 
capture of rents is heavily dependent on the ability of an actor to pull apart the GVC, mediate 
transactions among its parts, and optimize each step.  
This evolution  of Ningbo’s apparel industry has been shaped by the broader context of 
economic regulations and policies; the parallel and linked transformation of other manufacturing, 
agricultural, and service sectors in the region; and by the ways in which locally rooted 
institutions operated under state socialism and continue to do so (see (Pickles and Smith, 1998) 
for a similar argument about post-socialist European transformations). First, firms benefit from 
labor pools and inter-firm synergies they have cultivated over time, resulting in complicated 
vertical and horizontal linkages within the cluster. Far from the independent producers assumed 
to typify many export processing platforms, Ningbo’s apparel enterprises emerged within 
locally-based intensely interwoven networks of trust and personal relationship (also see (Begg et 
al., 2005; Pickles, 1995, 1998) for analyses of these social networks in European socialist 
economies). Second, between the first and second round of industrial restructuring, the rapid 
9 
economic growth and export boom in Ningbo had been partly driven by China’s central 
government’s commitment to encouraging private sector-led export-oriented industrialization 
(He et al., 2008; Wei, 2000). Furthermore, China’s decentralization has also empowered local 
governments to get involved in shaping the regional economy as planners, developers and 
policy-makers, and some of them have become heavy-handed actors that are ever more 
convinced of the importance of their ‘steering’ role (He et al., 2008; Wei, 2001b; Wei et al., 
2007). The Ningbo Government has been especially active in pushing forward its apparel 
industry by offering generous financial and technological support to key enterprises, supporting 
the Annual Ningbo International Fashion Fair (ANIFF), and coordinating between large and 
small firms. Industry-based local institutions have flourished in recent years, exemplified by the 
Ningbo Garment Association (NGA). Established in 1998, NGA is one of the most 
influential business associations in Ningbo and it took over the running of the ANIFF since its 
initiation. In addition, it has been organizing visits of Ningbo’s apparel firm managers to 
successful enterprises in China and abroad each year, often including factory tours and 
experience exchange. It represents the apparel industry in negotiating resource allocation, as well 
as helping local firms to establish design centers and training facilities. NGA has also lobbied 
nationally and regionally for industry supports for land, bank loans, and tax rebates.  
Overview of the chapters 
Chapter 2, “Bring In, Go Up, Go West, Go Out: Upgrading, Regionalization and 
Delocalization in China’s Apparel Production Networks.” The rise of China’s export-oriented 
apparel industry since the 1990s has been driven largely by global sourcing practices intent on 
capturing the cost advantages of a development model predicated, in part, on unskilled or semi-
skilled migratory labor flows, linking western and central labor pools to coastal production sites. 
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Until recently, the dominance of this model has fuelled growth in low-wage employment in the 
coastal regions and has provided few opportunities for economic and social upgrading. Since the 
early 2000s, coastal factories have increasingly had to confront difficulties generated by the 
increasing social and economic costs of this regionally concentrated low wage growth model. 
Specifically, Chapter 2 focuses on the role of the apparel industry in this process. It documents 
the major changes in organization and geographies of economic activity in the industry, and 
demonstrates how the central and local state, domestic and international capital and Chinese and 
other Asian workers are shaping the changing organization and geography of China’s apparel 
industry. This chapter focuses particularly on firm strategies and state policies that have arisen in 
response to pressure to increase wages from workers, rising materials and energy costs and 
competition from other low-cost producers in Asia.  
Chapter 3, “Global, Regional and Local: New Firm Formation and Spatial Restructuring 
in China’s Apparel Industry.” Using a large firm-level dataset on new firm formation, this 
chapter shows the articulation of global, regional and local factors are shaping the new firm 
formation pattern and industrial relocation in interactional and collective ways. The econometric 
estimations indicate the ways in which and the extents to which these factors affect firm location 
choice are highly determined by firm-specific capability.  
Chapter 4, “Geographical Dynamics and Industrial Relocation: Spatial Strategies of 
Apparel Firms in Ningbo, China.” This chapter examines the diverse trajectories of firm 
relocation. As many studies on the driving mechanism of firm relocation have lagged or failed to 
disclose the full view, I develop a comprehensive tri-polar analytical framework, which allows 
me to analyze the diversity of trajectories of firm relocation in the global, regional and local 
context. The empirical analysis applies this framework to the apparel industry in the city of 
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Ningbo. Through an analysis of several case studies I show the articulation of global, regional 
and local factors are co-shaping firm’s relocation processes and the extent to which these factors 
affect firm’s spatial strategies is highly dependent on firm’s characteristic. The chapter also 
examines the opportunities for local suppliers generated by firm relocation.  
Chapter 5, “Process, Product, and Functional Upgrading in a Globalized and Localized 
World: Firm-level Evidence from China’s Apparel Industry.” In this chapter, I focus on one of 
the central analytical heuristics in GVC research: the concept of upgrading, particularly as it 
has been used to highlight paths for developing countries firms to ‘move up the value chain’ 
usually through the lenses of four categories—product, process, functional, and inter-sectoral 
upgrading. While process and product upgrading have been linked to ‘learning from 
global buyers’, the sources of capabilities that lead to functional upgrading, are conventionally 
understood to derive from local knowledge transmission and local institutional context. This 
chapter seeks to test these findings and it does so by using an empirical, firm-level approach to 
measure upgrading at the firm level, which allows me not only to evaluate the extent of 
upgrading in the industry as a whole and to compare its extent among individual firms and 
selected groups of firms, but also to differentiate and measure different types of upgrading (i.e., 
functional, process and product upgrading). Empirical results confirm that the heterogeneity of 
firms, complexity of the effects of global and local linkages over firm upgrading, and the wider 
historical, political, institutional, economic and social context have all played a critical role in the 
process of firm upgrading and its articulation with global and local factors. 
Chapter 6, “Upgrading in Apparel Global Value Chains: A Heuristic Analytical 
Framework.” Recent literature dealing with economic upgrading has increasingly been 
problematized as the limits of dualistic claims about economic upgrading and downgrading, and 
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assumptions about linear, unidirectional upgrading trajectories have been brought into question. 
As trajectories and sources of upgrading have changed in recent years, the model of the global 
value chain has itself been adjusted to focus on emerging and new power relationships and 
upgrading trajectories, particularly with its emerging focus on social as well as economic 
upgrading. After a discussion of some limits to the treatment of upgrading in the global value 
chain literature, the chapter interrogates three key assumptions in the GVC model of economic 
upgrading and the development models it works with. These assumptions have become more 
problematic with the further development of GVCs. They relate to how we understand functional 
upgrading and GVC success, the binary of high and low roads to upgrading, and differential 
learning paths that presuppose specific forms of agency for local and global actors. The chapter 
concludes by outlining a tentative analytical framework to better guide innovative empirical 
research and policy making. 
Chapter 7, “Path dependent and path breaking: An agent-based model of evolution, co-
evolution, and lock-in in a Chinese apparel cluster.” In recent years, former assumptions about 
the flexibility industrial clusters provide to firms within them has been questioned as inter-firm 
linkages have, in some cases, locked-in path dependent practices thereby increasing economic 
rigidities. Not only has the canonical path dependence model overlooked other trajectories of 
cluster evolution, but it also rarely pays attention to the role of individual agency in affecting 
path-dependent processes. In this chapter, I build on this critique which has largely been 
developed in evolutionary economic geography and explore how a cluster becomes progressively 
locked-in and how the knowledge-base of an industry becomes homogenized resulting in a loss 
of innovative dynamism and a slowdown in the growth, or even stasis, of the cluster. These 
rigidities and inflexibilities amongst a cluster’s firms become especially apparent once the cluster 
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is subjected to an external shock, leading to a round of far-reaching restructuring. The chapter 
then investigates some of the ways in which different kinds of agents are co-evolving in response 
to the external shock and the dilemmas it pose. It does so by portraying the co-evolution of 
governments and firms as a process fraught with tensions and divergences. 
Methodology 
Data sources 
One database on firm-specific economic and financial variables is central to the firm 
level analysis in this research: China’s Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF) (1998-2009). 
The study time period from 1998 to 2009 is critical in terms of the development of China’s 
apparel industry as well as its entire manufacturing. This time period is often described as a 
turning point laden with a variety of far-reaching events which have potentially transformed 
China’s apparel industry in fundamental ways, such as China’s entry into the WTO in 2001, the 
removal of quotas on apparel exports to the developed countries in 2005, the appreciation of 
China’s currency since 2005, and the emerging labor shortage and rising production costs along 
China’s coastal area since the early 2000s. The 2007/8 global financial crisis which has 
stimulated Chinese apparel restructuring, upgrading and relocation also falls into this time period, 
though its complete effects may take more than two or three years to be seen.  
The ASIF is administered by the National Bureau of Statistics of China and covers all 
Chinese industrial state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises with annual sales of 
5 million RMB or more. The database provides firm-level data on firm structure and operation, 
including firm identification, location, capital structure, total profits, total shipments, exported 
shipments, intermediary inputs, asset value, inventory, employment, sales value, type of 
investment, output, value added, R&D expenses, education and training of staff, and wages, 
social insurance, and benefits paid. This research will only focus on the apparel industry 
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(Number 18 two-digit industry in the Industrial Classification for National Economic Activities 
GB/T 4754-1994 and GB/T 4754-2002).  
Fieldwork 
The empirical study was undertaken based also on recent field investigation during the 
periods of 2011 and 2012. The interviews were carried out with four groups of agents to 
understand the firm’s geographical and organizational strategies in the face of intensified 
competitive pressures. A total of twenty-two face-to-face interviews were conducted with twenty 
firms. Each interview was with a senior manager, and was accompanied by a shop floor visit to 
see the plant in operation. In addition, two interviews were conducted with local government 
officials. Three interviews were conducted with representatives from the local apparel industry 
association (i.e. Ningbo Garment Association) and another two interviews with representatives 
from national apparel industry association (China National Textile & Apparel Council and China 
Textile Planning Institute of Construction). Moreover, four interviews were conducted with the 
leading scholars of the apparel industry in China, including professors from Peking University, 
Zhejiang Normal University and Zhejiang Textile & Fashion College. Each interviews lasted at 
least two hours, and those with key interviewees such as representatives from apparel association 
and government officials, and several leading entrepreneurs took half a day. Local government 
and apparel association were first contacted and interviewed, to understand the general structure 
of Ningbo’s apparel industry. After this, interviews with local apparel entrepreneurs were 
organized with the guidance of local government and apparel association.  
In the first hour of interview, I used a semi-structured method, conversed with 
respondents based on some prepared questions. The second hour of interview was conducted in 
an open-ended method with no predetermined questions. This informal and semi-structured 
interview methodology allowed respondents to transcend the confinement of researcher-
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dominated conversation and unconsciously mentioned something of importance. For example, 
the extent to which his/her firm was embedded into local cluster might highly depend on how 
close he/she was with other entrepreneurs in the same cluster. Discussion of such personal 
information cannot be explored thoroughly with predefined specific questions. Sometimes, 
entrepreneurs who were unwilling to evaluate their own geographical and organizational strategy 
if it was not a great success, however, would likely mention and judge other firms’ strategies. 
This enabled me to triangulate key information of one firm based on the comments from other 
entrepreneurs, and sometimes from government officials and apparel association representatives.  
The interviews were enriched with secondary information collected from sector-specific 
publications, company reports, and websites. This research was indebted to Ningbo Garment 
Association and Zhejiang Textile & Fashion College which generously shared materials and 
documents with us, such as Blue Book of Ningbo’s Apparel Industry and Annual Report of 
Ningbo’s Apparel Industry (2009-2012). The overview of Ningbo’s apparel industry presented 
above is based on these secondary materials, which also allowed me to triangulate between 
different sources and to verify information collected from interviews. 
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CHAPTER 2 BRING IN, GO UP, GO WEST, GO OUT: UPGRADING, 
REGIONALIZATION AND DELOCALIZATION IN CHINA’S APPAREL 
PRODUCTION NETWORKS 
Introduction  
In recent years, a great deal of research in economic sociology, political economy, 
international studies and economic geography has focused on the globalization, governance and 
rapidly changing geographies of Global Commodity Chains (GCCs), Global Value Chains 
(GVCs) and Global Production Networks (GPNs) (Bair, 2009; Gereffi, 1999; Gereffi et al., 2005; 
Henderson et al., 2002; Smith, 2012). These attempts to account for the shifting patterns of 
manufacturing and work and the state and its industrial and regional policies are seen to be 
playing an increasingly important role in mediating the potentially destabilizing effects of what 
Gereffi and Mayer (2006) refer to as the “governance deficit.” In this process, a reconsideration 
of the role of national industrial policies, trade policies and labor regulations is emerging. This is 
particularly the case in China, where, despite the apparent retreat of the state since its market-
oriented reforms, the state has continued to be an active participant not only in strategically 
critical industries such as the manufacture of transport equipment, but also in the “most 
globalized” and least protected industries such as apparel. In this chapter, I focus on the apparel 
industry and argue that – after a period of liberalization, globalization and marketization – state 
policies, social pressures on low-wage manufacturing and changing demands of different end 
markets are becoming important drivers of industrial upgrading in eastern China and crucial 
drivers of the relocation of low value-added segments of the industry to other regions and 
countries. 
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 I focus on these industrial and regional dynamics and the various adaptations the apparel 
industry is undergoing in response. The chapter documents some of the ways in which different 
levels of government and different kinds of firms are attempting to deal with these limits and the 
dilemmas they pose. It does so by focusing specifically on spatial and organizational responses 
including factory consolidation, plant closure, product, process chain upgrading and 
geographical relocation (Liao and Chan, 2011; Yang, 2012). I draw on fieldwork in China in 
2011 and 2012, interviews with firm managers, CSR officers, labor organizations, regional 
administration and central government officials and industry association officials, as well as 
firm-level data to assess spatial changes over time. I seek to demonstrate that the model of 
inward investment, global sourcing and export orientation is already undergoing fundamental 
restructuring, producing new geographies of production and employment, with the consequent 
need to re-assess the policy implications of China in global production networks. Section II 
contextualizes the development of the apparel industry in terms of a specific export-led model of 
industrialization (its spatial distribution, export, output value, employment and the temporal 
changes of these indicators), with a particular focus on the pressures that have cut manufacturers’ 
profit margins and are now forcing the government and manufacturers to implement new 
strategies to manage competitiveness and the social costs of growth. Section III outlines the 
emerging limits of this model of industrialization. Section IV deals explicitly with three policies 
and enterprise responses to these pressures: upgrading, westernization (or regionalization) and 
delocalization (or outsourcing). The chapter concludes with an analysis of the impacts of these 
policy initiatives on apparel production networks and global value chains. 
Bring in: export-led assembly and the rise of China in global apparel value chains 
The integration of the Chinese apparel industry into GVCs deepened greatly after 1990. 
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Between 1994 and 2010, despite declines in 1998 and 1999 as a result of the Asian Financial 
Crisis, China increased its apparel exports from US$24.3 billion to US$149.5 billion (Table 1). 
In the 1990s, apparel exports were driven largely by demand from US markets, but with entry 
into the WTO in 2001 and the removal of quotas worldwide after 2004, Chinese apparel exports 
expanded to all world markets. 
Table 1 Export of apparel products (1994-2010)
1
 
Year Exports 
(US$ Million) 
Import 
(US$ Million) 
% of total exports % of total imports 
1994 24,281 1,439 20.1% 1.2% 
1995 21,947 1,934 14.8% 1.5% 
1996 25,439 2,146 16.8% 1.5% 
1997 32,142 2,300 17.6% 1.6% 
1998 30,681 2,227 16.7% 1.6% 
1999 31,185 2,274 16.0% 1.4% 
2000 37,029 2,508 14.9% 1.1% 
2001 37,474 2,584 14.1% 1.1% 
2002 42,968 2,764 13.2% 0.9% 
2003 54,434 3,047 12.4% 0.7% 
2004 65,561 3,335 11.0% 0.6% 
2005 79,890 3,507 10.5% 0.5% 
2006 105,340 3,876 10.9% 0.5% 
2007 127,930 4,313 10.5% 0.5% 
2008 136,510 4,667 9.5% 0.4% 
2009 123,792 4,032 10.3% 0.4% 
2010 149,482 4,846 9.5% 0.3% 
Source: (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011) 
 
Between 1995 and 2008, China more than doubled its share of global apparel exports, 
from 15.2% to 33.2%, and it experienced a fivefold increase in the value of its apparel exports, 
from US$24 billion to US$120 billion. With expanded exports, dependence on specific markets 
was reduced (Gereffi and Frederick, 2010). Thus, while China’s top ten export destinations 
accounted for 91.5% of apparel exports in 1996, the top ten markets accounted for only 79.1% in 
                                                     
1
Data on exports of apparel products are calculated by adding up four categories of Textile and Apparel Articles: 1. 
Knitted or Crocheted Fabrics. 2. Articles of Apparel and Clothing Accessories, Knitted or Crocheted. 3. Articles of 
Apparel and Clothing Accessories, not Knitted or Crocheted. 4. Other Made Up Textile Articles; Sets; Worn 
Clothing And Worn Textile Articles; Rags Articles; Rags. These four labor-intensive sectors have increased faster 
than other categories of Textile and Apparel Articles and represented 76% of China’s export of Textile and Apparel 
Articles in 2010, compared to 71% in 1994. 
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2008. In 1996, Japan alone accounted for 32.6% of China’s apparel exports and the US and the 
EU-15 accounted for another 22% (Hong Kong’s 26.4% of exports was largely for re-export). 
While by 2008 the EU-15 and the US had become the top two export destinations, they then 
accounted for less than 40% of total apparel exports and exports to Japan had dropped from 32.6% 
to 14.7%.  
As the structure of China’s industry changed and as producers shifted their comparative 
advantages from low-wage labor and low-end technology to medium technology and higher 
quality goods, the apparel share of total exports, particularly manufacturing exports, continued to 
decline. As a share of total exports, apparel declined from 20.1% in 1994 to 9.5% in 2010 and the 
value of apparel imports (always relatively small) declined from 1.2% to 0.3%, but as an 
employment generator apparel remained important, accounting for more than 5% of employment 
in all industrial sectors in 2009. 
The resulting geographies of apparel manufacture and employment were shaped 
increasingly – at least until recently – by these shifts in global sourcing for export markets. 
Export production was concentrated in eastern coastal regions, with primary concentrations in 
Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Guangdong provinces and some outliers in regional centers 
such as those in central China along the Yangtze River (Figure 3). The three planning regions in 
Figure 4 – Western, Central, and Eastern – are China’s formal administrative planning regions. I 
introduce them here to provide a clearer picture of patterns of employment growth and 
change beyond the provincial level and to provide a name locator for the specific regions, some 
of which are referred to in the following sections. With regional concentration and the emergence 
of industrial clusters and city regions devoted to specific products, the demand for labor rapidly 
out-stripped local labor market capacities. As a result, manufacturers became increasingly 
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dependent on expanded flows of low-wage migrant workers from the countryside, particularly 
from inland regions. 
 
Figure 3 Spatial Distribution of Gross Industrial Output in Garments by County 
Source: Compiled by authors from China’s Economic Census in 2008. 
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Figure 4 Chinese Provinces and Centrally Administered Municipalities 
(Note: AH: Anhui, BJ: Beijing, CQ: Chongqing, FJ: Fujian, GD: Guangdong, GS: Gansu, GZ: Guizhou, GX: 
Guangxi, HEB: Hebei, HEN: Henan, HLJ: Heilongjiang, HN: Hainan, HUB: Hubei, HUN: Hunan, JL: Jilin, JS: 
Jiangsu, JX: Jiangxi, LN: Liaoning, NMG: Neimenggu (Inner Mongolia), NX: Ningxia, QH: Qinghai, SC: Sichuan, 
SD: Shandong, SH: Shanghai, SHX: Shaanxi, SX: Shanxi, TJ: Tianjin, TW: Taiwan, XJ: Xinjiang, XZ: Xizang 
(Tibet), YN: Yunnan, ZJ: Zhejiang) 
 
For many, this was a “race to the bottom” with intensification of the labor process, low 
wages, poor labor and environmental standards and weak enforcement of national and local laws 
(Appelbaum et al., 2005). For others, China is simultaneously engaged in a “race to the top,” 
with some enterprises aggressively trying to move up the value chain through investments in 
R&D, design and advanced manufacturing, with an emphasis on domestic innovation. This 
export boom – officially referred to as the BRING IN policy – was predicated on low-wage 
assembly production, but has quickly generated greater capacity, vertical and horizontal 
integration, higher utilization rates, product specialization, increasing familiarity with technology 
and large learning-by-doing effects. As a consequence, producers have been able to sustain 
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internationally competitive prices while offering progressively higher quality products in 
expanded economies of scope and scale.  
The limits of export-led, low-wage industrialization 
Since the early 2000s, factories in eastern China have increasingly confronted difficulties 
generated by this export-led low-wage growth model. The first dramatic transformation was 
driven by appreciation of China’s currency, inflation, increased raw materials costs, lack of water 
and electricity as industrial capacity expanded, and increasing labor costs and labor shortages as 
local and migrant workers shifted away from jobs with low wages and poor working conditions, 
prevalent in the industry. Export-oriented firms, in particular, found themselves 
squeezed between low contract prices, rising input costs and the struggles of migrant workers 
for better wages and working conditions, increasing numbers of whom have found it 
progressively easier to shift into other industries and occupations (Inagaki, 2006). According to 
the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of China, the average monthly salary for 
the country’s migrant workers reached 2,049 Yuan ($325) in 2011, up 21.2% from 2010 (China 
Daily, February 29, 2012). Currency exchange rates were also important with – in the case of 
Zhejiang province for example – every 1% rise in the value of the RMB leading to 3.19%, 2.27% 
and 6.18% declines in profit margins for cotton textiles, wool textiles and apparel, respectively 
(Global Textiles, December 1, 2004). As a result, in 2008, two thirds of textile and apparel 
enterprises in six provinces (including Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shandong) were operating with 
profit margins as low as 0.62%, and the profit margins for the remaining enterprises were only 6-
10%, with an average as low as 3.9% for all textile and apparel enterprises (First Financial Daily, 
March 27, 2008). 
The second transformation was driven by policy changes which indirectly increased 
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production costs. Labor costs have been affected by the 2008/9 new Labor Contract Law (LCL) 
and by China’s Social Compliance 9000 for the Textile & Apparel Industry (CSC9000T). These 
have extended labor rights, particularly concerning overtime, delayed wage payment and job 
security. As one firm manager in Ningbo commented: 
The new labor law did lead to a substantial increase of production costs, in particular for 
small firms which only do OEM production and work on low margins. They had 
difficulties in absorbing such costs as easily as firms doing OBM and ODM 
               (General Manager of Peace Bird, translated from Chinese) 
At the same time, the apparel industry has been confronted by more environmental regulations, 
particularly those based on the 2007 State Council Comprehensive Work Plan of Saving Energy 
and Diminishing Pollution, which increased the expense of pollution control for producers. 
Apparel manufacturers have also been hit hard by the third transition of the business 
environment; global demand declined, especially after the outbreak of the financial crisis and the 
foreign trade disputes and anti-dumping suits. China ranked first worldwide with 338 anti-
dumping cases between 1995 and 2005. Of the 169 anti-dumping cases concerning textile and 
apparel products between 1995 and 2007, 32 were against China, the highest number among all 
countries (Textile and Apparel Weekly, February 22, 2008). These problems, combined with 
upward pressure on wages, low labor productivity, and increasing demands from customers for 
higher quality, faster runs and expanded services, have squeezed the coastal apparel producers 
who expanded in the 1990s and early 2000s. They now face much tighter margins on contracts, 
challenges in managing workforce recruitment, retention, development and competition from 
other lower cost coastal areas, central and western regions of China, and other countries of 
southeast and south Asia (Interview, firm managers and industry association officials, Beijing 
and Ningbo, August 2012). As a result, export growth for garments fell sharply to 1.8% year-on-
year in the first three quarters of 2008, compared to 20.9% for 2007. 
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During the 1990s, apparel employment became increasingly concentrated in coastal 
regions (see Figure 5).
2
 Since the early 2000s, the pressures on coastal apparel manufacturers 
have forced drastic changes in firm behavior, leading to upgrading, expansion of operations to 
new products or centers or relocation to lower cost locations. Guangdong has succeeded in 
keeping its dominant position with about 12.8% of the market share in 1988 and 24.2% in 2007. 
Zhejiang nearly tripled its share, from 6.7% in 1988 to 17.2% in 2007. Jiangsu significantly 
increased its share, from 11.2% in 1988 to 17.1% in 2007 and maintained one of the dominant 
positions. The apparel industry in Shanghai was the first to experience these pressures, with 
some firms investing in new forms of product, process, functional or market upgrading and 
others relocating production to regions with lower costs. As a consequence, apparel employment 
in Shanghai declined from 603,000 in 1998 to 146,000 in 2007. As the 2007 map of employment 
shows, apparel employment has already started to shift westward to Henan and Jiangxi provinces. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
2
Longitudinal analysis of industrial employment in textiles and apparel has to take into account the administrative 
change between 1988 and 2007 when Chongqing was upgraded to a centrally administered municipality in 1997, 
adding an additional administrative region to the 30 spatial units that existed before 1997.  
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Figure 5 Temporal Changes of Distribution of Employment in Garments by Province 
Source: Compiled by authors from annual issues of China Industry Economy Statistical 
Yearbook 
 
China’s exceptional export performance in labor-intensive manufacturing (particularly 
apparel) has long been associated with the specific industrial organization and spatial structure 
typified by these coastal zones. The detailed division of labor and sectoral specialization in its 
apparel clusters and its supply chain cities (“sock cities” and “button cities”) produced locations 
that were efficient and dynamic centers of expanded and intensified production in large part 
because of the ways in which the agglomeration economies of their locally and regionally 
embedded institutions, thick labor markets and tacit knowledge and practices were able to foster 
dynamic growth, innovation and economic competitiveness. As apparel firms begin to struggle 
with some of the diseconomies of scale once offered by these locations, and increasingly 
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experience competition for workers and upward pressure on wages, different organizational and 
spatial strategies have emerged with some firms investing rapidly in various forms of industrial 
upgrading and labor market development, while others are moving out of these clusters and 
seeking to agglomerate in new geographies. The challenge facing the resulting delocalization of 
apparel production will be the extent to which new competitive advantages emerge or can be 
built in these new spaces, and the extent to which “thick ties,” embedded institutions and deep 
labor markets can be reproduced in the emerging geographies of production. Who is moving and 
who is staying, and to what extent is the re-institutionalization of new productive spaces being 
driven by firms and by government policy? 
Upgrading, regionalization and delocalization 
While most studies of GVCs and GPNs have focused on the diversity of forms of 
governance within the value chain, rather than on the role of state actions and government 
policies, recent work on GVCs and production networks has stressed the significant role that 
state action plays in the international, national and sub-national formation, constitution and 
restructuring of firms in global production networks (Gereffi et al., 2005). In this section I 
analyze upgrading, regionalization and delocalization strategies in the context of national 
economic regulation and policies. The state, in particular, has played an important role through 
national economic regulation and policies in shaping patterns of industrial upgrading, 
regionalization and delocalization (Coe et al., 2008a; Dicken, 2007; Liu and Dicken, 2006).  
GVC analysis defines “governance” as the functional integration and coordination of 
internationally dispersed activities (Gereffi, 1999) and often argues that the action and 
motivations of global buyers are the key causal forces in the organization of global contracting 
systems (Gereffi, 1999; Schmitz and Knorringa, 2000). While GVC analysis does not exclude 
27 
possibilities for local institutions to affect outcomes, state policies and institutional context 
have been under-estimated (Gereffi et al., 2005). Bair (2009) has argued that in such analyses 
institutional context was too often added later and still remains the least developed dimension of 
value chain analyses. Most recently, Adrian Smith (2012) has called for a much fuller 
engagement within GVC analysis with state theory and the role of institutional actors and 
regulations. Because globalization destabilized the governance of nation state and local 
institutions through its footloose sourcing practices, an increasing proportion of work for the 
global market took place in locations where governance capacities were weak, if developed at all 
(Mayer and Pickles, 2010). As a result, the absence of public and private regulation – the global 
“governance deficit” – has been the focus of much subsequent political, economic and non-
governmental analyses and interventions (Gereffi and Mayer, 2006). GPN analysis has been 
more explicit in its attention to the importance of institutional context and the whole range of 
factors that contribute to shaping global production and focuses on moving away from the firm- 
and chain-centered claims of GVC work, but even here the state is theorized in a limited sense as 
a single institutional ensemble wielding uneven forms of power over global production networks 
(Coe et al., 2004; Dicken and Henderson, 2003; Henderson et al., 2002).  
It is increasingly acknowledged that developing economies need to embed private 
initiatives in a framework of public action that encourages industrial restructuring, diversification, 
and technological dynamism beyond what private governance would generate on their own (Bair 
and Dussel Peters, 2006; Dussel Peters, 2008). This recognition is now particularly widely 
perceived in those countries where market-oriented reforms were taken the farthest and the 
disappointment about the outcomes caused by market failures is correspondingly the greatest. In 
China, the social consequences of low-value, low-wage export production have become 
28 
increasingly serious, forcing the central government and regional administrations to become 
more active in regulating the trajectories and geographies of change in the industry.  
After a period of liberalization during which the direct role of the state in shaping 
industrial locational and organizational decisions was diminished in apparel firms, government 
strategies are now playing an increasingly leading role in shaping industrial policy in labor-
intensive and low-value enterprises, pushing and encouraging them to relocate from the higher-
cost eastern regions to release space and resources for higher-value apparel and other industries 
while simultaneously encouraging economic development in less developed inland locations, 
particularly in areas from which migrant workers have been drawn. Thus, in addition to China’s 
continued commitment to encouraging inward investment (BRING IN policy), these adjustments 
have given rise to three broad additional state policies: upgrading (GO UP policy), 
regionalization or westernization (GO WEST policy) and delocalization (GO OUT policy). The 
GO UP policy refers to Chinese manufacturers that are being encouraged to upgrade production 
and working conditions in situ with the goal of branding Chinese goods for national and 
increasingly for international markets. The GO WEST policy refers to low-wage assembly 
industries that are being encouraged through subsidies, contracts, and infrastructural 
development to relocate to or expand in new lower-cost and less developed locations inside 
China (mainly, but not limited to, Western and Central provinces), often regions from which 
migrant workers have traditionally been drawn. The GO OUT policy refers to low-wage 
assembly work that is being encouraged to outsource to low-cost producing centers outside 
China, particularly under the auspices of emerging, large-scale Chinese manufacturers and 
network organizers. 
The business environment and government policy to support upgrading, regionalization 
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and delocalization have emerged as major drivers of industrial upgrading, regionalization, and 
delocalization in many traditional manufacturing and export hubs for apparel products, 
particularly in the coastal region. Manufacturers have responded in four ways (Figure 6).
3
 In the 
subsequent sections I describe each in turn. 
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Figure 6 Restructuring Strategies Adopted by the Export-oriented Apparel Firms 
Source: Compiled by Authors. 
 
GO UP: policies initiatives on industrial upgrading 
One of the key drivers of the complex regional production network dynamics is the role 
of industrial and value chain upgrading. Upgrading involves producers’ capability “to 
make better products, to make products more efficiently, or to move into more skilled activities” 
(Kaplinsky, 2000; Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2006: 1; Porter, 1990). It is an increasingly central 
                                                     
3
GO WEST here refers to one general tendency to expand or relocate from the Pearl River Delta (PRD), Yangtze 
River Delta (YRD) and Shandong Province to other lower cost regions, including intra-provincial shifting of 
production (e.g., to the outskirts of Guangdong and west across the Pearl River). This policy also covers the sub-
contracting and outsourcing of production to the informal sector and SMEs in less-developed areas inside China as 
firms attempt to lower their costs. Also within what I refer to as GO WEST the specific locational patterns of 
individual firms may, of course, be more complex. Besides these general trends, there are also reasons for factories 
in PRD to move to YRD or Jiangxi (go–north), while some factories prefer to relocate within or near to their 
existing locations. 
 
30 
element in shaping new geographies of production, as economic actors (countries, firms, workers 
and regional economies) shed low-value activities, and the social and economic problems they 
can generate, in favor of higher-value activities (Bair, 2005; Gereffi, 2005; Humphrey and 
Schmitz, 2002b; Ponte, 2002).  
Industrial upgrading is central to the state’s central planning mechanism. In China’s 
Eleventh Five-Year Plan, the upgrading and optimization of industrial structure ranks second 
among the main goals of economic development from 2006 to 2010, aiming at increasing 
industrial competitiveness through expanded R&D, branding, and expansion of tertiary industries, 
accelerating development of high tech industries, improving efficiency in energy use, 
encouraging independent innovation and supporting advanced technical education. Between 
2000 and 2005, the proportion of expenditure on R&D to the total GDP increased from 0.9% to 
1.3%. According to the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, more than 100 national engineering laboratories 
were to be built between 2006 and 2010. Education and skill training for labor are being 
promoted at both national and local levels. Many local governments also offer free training for 
migrant workers, such as the “Sunshine Project: Training for Labor Transferred from Rural Areas” 
(The State Council of the PRC, 2004). 
In order to variously support and compel apparel firms to upgrade, the Adjustment and 
Revitalization Plan of Textile and Apparel Industry released by the State Council in 2009, 
identified several adjustment and revitalization tasks for the textile and apparel industry in 2009-
11. These tasks included an increase in the export tax rebate rate from 14% to 15%, support for 
expansion of domestic consumption, new investments in autonomous innovation and 
independent brand development, support for key enterprises and consolidation in the small and 
medium-sized enterprise sector (SME), recapitalization schemes to replace outdated equipment, 
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optimization of the regional structure of production to promote industrial upgrading in the 
eastern coastal areas and enhanced credit and other financial support for SMEs. The Plan placed 
particular emphasis on building a strong textile and apparel industry to survive the financial 
crisis and shifts in global demand. 
As a result, in recent years apparel enterprises have rapidly been adopting new 
technologies and experimenting with product development, environmentally friendly methods, 
focusing more on brand building and product design and exploring international markets for 
higher value products and domestic markets to stabilize production runs (Mayer and Pickles, 
2009). One such company is the Hongdou Group. In 1980s, Hongdou began hiring engineers and 
technicians, and investing in new technology and product innovation. In 1993, it made the 
decision to extend its production capacity and industrial chain, producing suits, shirts and other 
apparel products of much higher quality and value. In 1995, Hongdou also adopted a strategy of 
chain upgrading by annexing capital intensive motorcycle and tire manufacturing enterprises, as 
well as investing 90 million Yuan in the pharmaceutical industry. Meanwhile, with growing 
skilled labor shortages, Hongdou changed its recruitment policy in its apparel factories. Instead 
of attempting to recruit skilled labor in increasingly tight labor markets, it built up its own Wuxi 
Hongdou Vocational School and trained workers internally. In addition, Hongdou upgraded this 
vocational school to Hongdou College so as to teach not only production and manufacturing 
tasks but also R&D, marketing and design (Hongdou Group News, June 7, 2010).  
Firms who have had difficulty upgrading in these ways have had to struggle with 
increased competition and downward pressure on contract prices while being pushed by buyers 
to accept increased requirements for volume, quality, and delivery. As a result, industrial 
upgrading is not an unambiguous good, with these added demands being transferred to workers 
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through increased discipline, extended hours and speeding-up of production lines, with the 
unfortunate consequence that technical and organizational upgrading has resulted in the 
downgrading of social conditions and, in some cases, job loss (Mayer and Pickles, 2009; Pickles 
et al., 2006). The relationships between industrial upgrading/downgrading and social 
upgrading/downgrading are not linear and one form does not easily follow another within any 
specific regional economy (Pickles and Smith, 2011).  
Recognizing the importance of this issue and the need for explicit state action to support 
social upgrading, the 2007 National People’s Congress of China promulgated a new Labor 
Contract Law (LCL), which took effect on 1 January, 2008, with the objective of improving 
working conditions. Labor law is a relatively new phenomenon. The first comprehensive labor 
law was passed in 1994. Prior to the LCL’s passage, most employees in SMEs did not have 
employment contracts. Even those with contracts often only had short-term agreements, 
providing employers with the flexibility to bring in new, often cheaper, workers as needed. 
Employers often refused to pay overtime and some even relied on forced labor (Interview, textile 
association staff, Beijing, June 2011). The new LCL has made many changes to prevailing 
contracting and employment practices (Table 2). The main intention of the new LCL was to 
expand protection to employees by offering an “employee-friendly” environment (BMU Service, 
January 1, 2008). One consequence has been the formalization of labor contracts and the 
enforcement of worker rights after specific periods of employment. The indirect effect in many 
factories has been the adoption of a more cautious hiring policy and the consolidation of work 
contracts around key technical personnel, with a parallel increase in short-term and temporary 
work contracts. As one firm manager in Ningbo commented 
Firms which rely on short-term and temporary workers and fire them before the 
probationary period ends are stupid, because workers hardly contribute to their firms in 
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the first few month. Firing them before they can really create profits is like killing the 
goose before it can lay eggs. A smart employer should get through this challenge through 
upgrading his firm.  
(Founder of Baimu, translated from Chinese) 
It remains too early to draw any determinate conclusions about the effect of the new labor law on 
firm strategies, but initial evidence points to a range of responses from workforce upgrading to 
the outsourcing of production (Lan and Pickles, 2011). 
Table 2 Key Points of China’s New Labor Contract Law 
 Key Provisions 
1 In drafting or revising work rules and regulations, an employer must consult with the 
applicable labor union, employee representatives or the employees. If the work rules 
are deemed to be inappropriate, the labor union, employee representatives or the 
employees may raise issues during the consultation process. 
2 Employers are required to execute a written labor contract with an employee within one 
month of hiring or face statutory penalties. 
3 The probationary period of an employee is determined according to the length of term 
of the labor contract. 
4 An employer may require an employee to sign a service agreement requiring a period 
of service for, and imposing an early termination penalty on, an employee who receives 
training at the employer’s expense. Only senior management personnel, senior 
technical employees or other employees who have access to an employer’s trade 
secrets may be required to sign confidentiality and non-compete agreements, which 
may extend for a period of up to two years. 
5 Three types of labor contracts are authorized: fixed-term contracts, non-fixed-term 
contracts and project-based contracts. 
6 Severance payments are required in many circumstances under which an employee is 
terminated. 
Source: BMU Service (2008). 
 
The former Ministry of Textiles and Clothing, now organized as a series of public-private 
associations, has also actively responded to the need to improve workplace and product 
standards by creating standards and codes “designed to fit Chinese conditions” (Interview, China 
National Textile and Apparel Council, Beijing, June 2011). The China Social Compliance 9000 
for Textile & Apparel Industry (CSC9000T
4
) was developed in 2005 by the China National 
Textile and Apparel Council with the co-operation of the China Federation of Labor Unions 
                                                     
4China’s CSR standard, CSC9000T, so far only applies to the textile and apparel industry (hence the ‘T’) 
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which is the only lawful trade union. It is a combination of the management standard ISO 9000 
and the CSR standard SA8000 (Asia Portal, July 13, 2008). SA8000 is based on international 
labor and human rights law, while CSC9000T is based on China’s labor law. The latter refers to 
an extensive list of international human and labor rights declarations and conventions, such as 
the United Nations Conventions on the Rights of the Child, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Political Rights, the UN Convention 
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Also important are ILO Conventions on weekly rest, 
accident compensation, minimum age, tripartite consultation and equal remuneration. The 
CSC9000T contains three main sets of principles: (i) Enterprises are required to set up a CSR 
management system based on the Plan-Do-Check-Act model; (ii) Employees must be offered 
written employment contracts and employers must not use child or forced labor, observe legally 
stipulated working hours, and pay legally required wages; and (iii) Employers are required to 
respect the rights of employees to form and join the trade union and to bargain collectively, not 
to discriminate against workers, to prohibit harassment and abuse and to pay attention to 
occupation health (Responsible Supply Chain Association, November 14, 2010). 
CSC9000T and LCL aim to contribute to the promotion of employee well-being and 
social upgrading, but they too are not without their limits. Thus, while China’s LCL allows 
employees to establish local or industrial branches of the official trade union, it does not allow 
independent trade unions. As a result claims that the LCL provides better protection for 
employees than ILO conventions in a number of areas cannot be tested (Asia Portal, July 13, 
2008). Also, absent independent labor organization, employers’ enforcement of existing 
regulations has been uneven, hampered in some cases by conflicts between central authorities 
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pushing social upgrading and local authorities focusing more on enterprise competitiveness and 
potential job loss resulting from enterprises relocation. 
GO WEST: regionalization policies and inter-regional competition 
Driven by the export-oriented industrialization, the coastal regions expanded their 
production capacity much more rapidly than central and western regions. The development 
gap between eastern and central/western China have been widening, with attendant political, 
social and even security problems. In order to encourage the west and central regions to catch up 
with the east, a series of development plans have been launched (Table 3). 
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Table 3 Policy Initiatives Launched by Chinese Governments on GO WEST 
Time Organisation Policy Initiatives Summary 
2000 State Council “China Western 
Development” 
The main policies of the plan include
5
: (1) the 
development of infrastructure (transport, 
hydropower plants, and telecommunications), 
such as the “West-East Gas Pipeline” and 
Qinghai-Tibet Railway (from Beijing to Tibet); 
(2) adjustment of industrial structure; and (3) 
deepening the reform and increasing openness 
of the economy to entice foreign investment to 
the western region (Figure 7).  
2001 State Council “Outline of National 
Economic and Social 
Development of the Tenth 
Five-Year Plan from 
2001-2005” 
2006 State Council “Eleventh Five-Year Plan 
on Western Region 
Development” 
2006 -
2009 
Ministry of 
Commerce 
“10,000 Businesses Go 
West” program 
To encourage about 10,000 companies located 
in eastern areas to invest in central and western 
China 
2008 -
2010 
Ministry of 
Commerce 
Priority Relocation 
Destinations of the 
Processing Industry 
The Ministry of Commerce set a goal for 2010 
of the creation of 50 priority relocation 
destinations in central and western China to 
attract processing enterprises that would 
relocate from coastal regions (Figure 8). The 
State Development Bank provided loans, tax 
incentives, and building supporting facilities to 
encourage relocation, including investments in 
water and electricity supply, waste management, 
education, warehousing and transportation. 
2010 National 
Development 
and Reform 
Commission 
Industrial Transfer 
Demonstration Zone of 
the Wanjiang River Urban 
Belt 
This is China’s first national-level industrial 
transfer zone to encourage the relocation of 
low-end industries from coastal to inland areas 
(Figure 9). The zone is part of the government’s 
project to help eastern China move up the value 
chain while keeping low-end and low-value-
added manufacturers inside the country. In the 
plan priority is given to equipment 
manufacturing, raw materials, textile and 
apparel, high-technologies, services and 
agriculture. 
 
                                                     
5The same policies motivate the “Revitalize Northeast China” program, which is intended to rejuvenate the old 
industrial bases in north-eastern China in 2003. In March 2004, the “Rise of Central China” plan was announced to 
accelerate the development of central region. 
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Figure 7 Economic Regions in China 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
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Figure 8 Priority Relocation Destinations of the Processing Industry Identified by the Ministry of 
Commerce (2007 and 2008) 
Note: The third batch issued in 2010 is not shown on this map. 
Source: Compiled by authors, using data from (Li & Fung Research Centre, 2008). 
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Figure 9 Industrial Transfer Demonstration Zone of the Wanjiang River Urban Belt 
Source: Anhui Provincial Development and Reform Commission reproduced from China.org.cn, 
March 14, 2011  
(http://www.china.org.cn/china/anhui_media_tour/2011-03/14/content_22135889.htm) 
 
For the apparel industry, in 2010 the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 
released the Guideline on Pushing Forward Relocation of Textile and Apparel Industry (Ministry 
of Industry and Information Technology of China 2010). According to the Guideline, there are 
several industrial relocation tasks for the textile and apparel industry in order to integrate 
industrial location with upgrading strategies. In the eastern coastal region, state policies are to be 
aimed at accelerating industrial upgrading and the shift to high-end textiles and apparel, 
developing brands and strengthening design and marketing capacities, the relocation of spinning, 
silk reeling, weaving, and other labor-intensive or/and low-tech production activities to western, 
central and north-western regions by means of mergers and enterprise reorganization or 
reinvestment, providing support to enterprises in the eastern region to outsource to inland 
locations, and to strengthen the business co-operation and supply chains between coastal and 
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inland regions. In central China the Guideline is aimed at strengthening the textile and apparel 
manufacturing system, actively facilitating the shift of textiles from east to west, and developing 
an integrated cotton textile, wool textile, knitting, garment, home textile and industrial textile 
manufacturing system in the region. In the western region, the Western Development strategy 
encourages the development of the textile and apparel industries, especially those with local 
characteristics such as cotton textile, silk, and garment industries. In the north-eastern region, the 
policy aims to develop chemical fiber, flax, garment and other labor-intensive processes which 
have some comparative advantage there. In all these policy environments, a key aim is to prevent 
the unwarranted transfer of discarded, obsolete industrial equipment and polluting enterprises 
from the east to other regions. 
In 2007, China’s Ministry of Commerce and China Customs promulgated the “List of 
Restricted Commodities in Processing Trade,” differentiating between allowed labor-intensive 
processes inland and those that are now restricted in the east. Importantly for my purposes, 
textile and apparel products made up most of the restricted labor-intensive processes and 
products. As a result, apparel enterprises in coastal regions (which account for 85% of apparel 
industry) had little option but to upgrade or to relocate inland.
6
 
The impacts of these policies on the industrial geography of textiles and apparel are 
marked. By 2010, investment in central and western regions accounted for 39.13% and 7.90%, 
respectively, of the total investment in textiles and apparel, an increase of 19.71% and 1.29% 
                                                     
6
The government has also actively encouraged and, in some cases, compelled textile and apparel enterprises to 
reduce their operating costs and their environmental impacts by moving from polluted coastal provinces to inland 
areas closer to their cotton and wool input suppliers and to extensive and low cost regional labor markets. Central 
government inducements have been particularly strong in urging textile manufacturers to move to Inner Mongolia, 
Xinjiang, Ningxia and Qinghai, silk production to Sichuan, Guangxi and Yunnan, and fiber dependent industries to 
Henan and Hubei. Large successful export-oriented apparel firms were also targeted in this endeavor. In 2008, the 
China Chamber of Commerce for Importers and Exporters of Textiles organized a trip to visit the Western provinces 
for operators of more than 120 export-oriented textile and garment enterprises, including the firms Silique from 
Guangdong, Shenda from Shanghai and Weiqiao from Shandong. (China Wool Textile Association, April 2008), 
“Great Industrial Relocation.” Accessed 10 August 2011. http://www.cwta.org.cn/news080423e.htm. 
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from 2005 (Figure 10). The global financial crisis has further stimulated Chinese textile and 
apparel restructuring and relocation. For example, annual growth rates of new textile and apparel 
projects have continued to decline in eastern and central regions, but in the western region 
growth rates have rebounded after a dramatic decrease in 2008-09 (Figure 11). 
 
 
Figure 10 Distribution of Investment in Textile and Apparel Industry (2005 and 2010) 
Source: Adapted by the authors from Annual Report on Corporate Social Responsibility in 
Chinese Textile and Apparel Industry-2010/2011 (CNTAC 2011) 
 
 
Figure 11 Annual Growth Rate (YOY) of the Number of Newly-commenced Projects in Textile 
and Apparel Industry (2006-2010) 
Source: Adapted by the authors from Annual Report on Corporate Social Responsibility in 
Chinese Textile and Apparel Industry-2010/2011 (CNTAC 2011) 
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Local Government Policy: Inter-regional Competition for New Investments 
Local administrations in the coastal and inland regions have remained active in 
promulgating their own policies based on local needs to attract investment and create jobs (Wang 
and Mei, 2009). Local governments in the less-developed inland regions regard industrial 
relocation policy as an opportunity to attract investment and boost economic development. As a 
regional administration officer in Anhui expressed it, “The coastal provinces became wealthy and 
their economy took off by developing labor-intensive industries like apparel. Now it is our turn 
and we should be prepared in the new round of industrial relocation” (Interview, regional 
administration, Anhui, July 2011). These local administrations lobby firms and offer low land 
rent and other favorable policies, which – they claim – make their enterprises competitive with 
those in other provinces and even with emerging export production in Southeast Asian countries 
(see Table 4).  
Table 4 Policy Initiatives Offered by Inland Provinces/Cities to Entice Relocating Enterprises 
Provinces/Cities Examples of Policy Initiatives 
Anhui Industrial relocation park, designated funds to support relocation, 
improving infrastructure, simplifying custom procedures, improving job 
training 
Hunan Financial support for relocation, improving services in logistics centers 
and customs, simplifying the approval procedures of relocation projects 
Hubei Designated funds to support relocation, improving transport 
infrastructure 
Yueyang (Hunan) Tax breaks, simplifying customs procedures 
Chenzhou (Hunan) Subsidies on construction of production plants, improving transport 
infrastructure 
Ganzhou (Jiangxi) Tax breaks, subsidies on usage of electricity and water 
Wuhu (Anhui) Improved government services, waiving of administration fees of some 
of the government services during the course of relocation, providing 
financial support, developing industrial relocation park, strengthening 
collaboration with Shanghai 
Source: Compiled by authors from data in (Li & Fung Research Centre, 2008). 
 
The result of these practices is increasing inter-regional competition for new investments, 
with local governments in coastal provinces seeing aggressive relocation to other provinces as 
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weakening their own plans for local economic development. In the view of a Ningbo regional 
administration official: “It is all about GDP” (Interview, firm manager, Ningbo, August 2012). 
Consequently, they too have become increasingly active in encouraging enterprises to adopt one 
of three policies: (i) to upgrade locally, (ii) to maintain their headquarters and R&D centers while 
relocating only low-end and labor-intensive activities to inland China, or (iii) to relocate but 
within the province. For instance, Jiangsu announced the “Relocation across the Yangtze River” 
plan to provide financial support, offer acres of cheap land and favorable investment policies to 
firms in South Jiangsu that are willing to relocate to North Jiangsu. Similarly, by issuing “173 
Plan,” Shanghai collaborated with neighboring areas to prevent firms from relocating out of the 
province. In 2008, Guangdong announced the Decision on Encouraging Industry and Labor 
Relocation (also known as “Double Relocation”) in which measures and funds are designated to 
facilitate industry and labor relocation within the province. These include inducements for labor-
intensive, resource-consuming, processing industries to move from the central Pearl River Delta 
(PRD) to less developed areas, such as northern, western and eastern Guangdong. Provincial 
policies also support the relocation of labor from agriculture to the secondary and tertiary sectors 
in order to concentrate the skilled labor force in the central PRD, as a way to favor the 
technological upgrading of industry. In addition, 24 government-driven “Industrial Relocation 
Parks” have been set up within Guangdong province, mostly located in less developed areas, to 
encourage internal relocation (Interview, China National Textile and Apparel Council, Beijing, 
June 2011).  
Regionalization of Enterprises 
For many enterprises, going west is more easily achieved than going out. Going west has 
several advantages. First, coastal and inland regions share similar cultures, conventions, 
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traditions and laws, and these are perceived to offer lower relocation risks. By contrast, going out 
requires relocating apparel enterprises and training staff to become familiar with local culture 
and laws, which might lead to high operational risks. Second, as long as the importance of 
domestic markets continues to grow, going west also provides opportunities for market capture 
as well as reducing production costs. Third, as technical demands increase, technical and 
managerial workers become an increasingly important asset and one for which westernization is 
more easily managed than overseas relocation, especially for smaller firms with more limited 
capacities. 
For example, the Youngor Group, China’s leading menswear manufacturer based in the 
eastern region, Ningbo, Zhejiang province, has turned to a delocalization strategy. Youngor 
started to go west in 2004, when a manufacturing base was built in Chongqing for 100 million 
Yuan (US$14.65 million). The labor force and energy resources in Chongqing are relatively 
cheap compared with Zhejiang province. Subsequently, Youngor invested an additional 100 
million Yuan (US$14.65 million) to increase productivity in the Chongqing plant and now 
this base can produce 15,000 shirts every day, with a planned increase to 24,000 per day by 2011. 
As domestic markets have grown, Youngor has been increasingly able to sell most of its products 
locally in the western region, further saving Youngor on transportation and logistics costs.
7
 In 
2005, Youngor established a cotton textile company in Xinjiang, and has now begun to expand 
its value chain into raw material production. More than 2,000 employees were hired locally in 
Chongqing and over 1,000 employees in Xinjiang.  
Not all enterprises find these policy and cost incentives sufficient to induce them to 
                                                     
7
The rise of China’s domestic market for manufactured goods is a crucial driver of many of these changes, allowing 
firms to manage export market risk by leveraging domestic markets, by establishing domestic brands for that market, 
and for selling into a local market that saves on the logistical and tariff costs of increasingly competitive and low-
cost export markets (Henderson and Nadvi, 2011; Kaplinsky and Farooki, 2010b). 
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relocate. Many apparel enterprises have adopted a wait-and-see attitude (see Figure 6). For some 
enterprises, relocation to underdeveloped regions is not commercially viable unless the entire 
supply chain moves and, even then, they indicate that they would only relocate if enough 
government incentives were offered (Li & Fung Research Centre, 2008). A 2008 Federation of 
Hong Kong Industries survey of 200 enterprises in the PRD found that shortage of labor, high 
logistics costs and inadequate support from local governments in less developed regions were 
major obstacles preventing enterprises from relocating to western and central China (Federation 
of Hong Kong Industries, 2008). On the other hand, the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) region, with 
well-developed infrastructure, abundant skilled labor, strong support from local governments, 
good business environment and access to global markets, was seen as an optimal destination for 
such relocation. For some firms, relocation from PRD to YRD is considered to be the first step to 
the further possible relocation to and expansion in less developed inland regions. The Industrial 
Cluster Research Group from the China National Garment Association interviewed children’s 
wear enterprises in Huzhou, Zhejiang (in the YRD) in February 2009 and found that most of the 
800 new enterprises had moved from PRD in this way (China Apparel (EFU), September 14, 
2009).  
While some firms in the traditional manufacturing centers in the coastal provinces may 
see the advantages of partial or full industrial relocation, others are more cautious and are 
implementing forms of stratified relocation (relocating the labor-intensive and low-end parts of 
production) or they are outsourcing parts of their production to inland enterprises (Liao and Chan, 
2009). Large firms are more predisposed to maintain their production base in the coastal region, 
while setting up or off-shoring to satellite factories in western and central region. The high-end 
and high-value-added activities such as R&D and design are increasingly important in factory 
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operations in the coastal region, while the subsidiary factories focus more on assembly and other 
lower-value operations. In this way, the coastal and inland regions increasingly complement each 
other in expanded regional production networks with overall gains in competitiveness. Among 
the large leading firms in coastal regions that have already moved part of their labor-intensive or 
resource-intensive activities to western and central regions, some are now finding that supporting 
facilities in inland region have improved sufficiently for them to consider relocating more 
complicated and sophisticated processes (Interview, firm managers, Ningbo, August 2012). 
In other cases, relocation within the province has become common as provincial government 
incentives have grown. Apparel enterprises in southern Jiangsu have relocated their plants to the 
northern part of the province to take advantage of the provincial incentives under the “Relocation 
across the Yangtze River” plan. For instance, the Hengli Group in southern Jiangsu invested 7.5 
billion Yuan to establish an industrial park in the northern part of the province. Another firm, 
Bosideng in southern Jiangsu, set up a manufacturing base in northern Jiangsu (Xinhua News, 
December 10, 2009). Although an increasing number of inter-provincial enterprise relocations 
(GO WEST) are now occurring, most of the relocations actually still take place within a 
province.  
Similar shifts of factories and employment have occurred in the central PRD to less 
developed areas, such as northern Guangdong and western and eastern PRD. One result has been 
a shift from agriculture into secondary and tertiary industries in these regions, stimulated in 
particular between 2008 and 2012 by provincial government allocations of nearly 50 billion 
RMB to encourage Double Relocation, which provided investments in transport infrastructural 
development, industrial relocation parks, backward linkages, workforce development, opening 
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up new land for industrial plants and strengthening environmental protection to ensure that 
relocation does not reproduce the degradation of the regions from which industry is moving.  
The less developed areas within the province have, as a result, become the first choice for 
apparel firm relocation. In Guangdong, GDP in the PRD is five times larger than in Northern 
Guangdong and nearly three times larger than Guangdong’s western and eastern regions (China 
Apparel (EFU), September 14, 2009). Intra-provincial relocation is intended to invest in less-
developed regions, reduce regional disparities between the PRD and its northern, eastern and 
western less developed hinterlands, and allows firms in the PRD to adjust to increasing cost 
pressure and upgrade their production facilities in core plants. 
GO OUT: from bringing-in to outsourcing  
China’s economic opening or the BRING IN policy began in 1978 and was accelerated 
with WTO accession in 2001. Since that time, China has been successful in attracting foreign 
investment and building up its own industrial export and domestic market capacities. To 
participate further in international markets, GO OUT was proposed after the social tensions and 
economic challenges resulting from the BRING IN policy became clearer. The idea of GO OUT 
or GO GLOBAL was formed in the mid-1990s. GO OUT was formally written into the Tenth 
Five-Year Plan in 2001 and reasserted in the Eleventh Plan in 2005 as a part of a national 
strategy working together with BRING IN, not replacing it. 
Apart from encouraging relocation within the country, the central government and 
regional coastal administrations also support the outsourcing of labor-intensive, low-wage parts 
of the value chain as another way to deal with the financial and social problems facing low 
value-added industries. These are referred to as the GO OUT policies. To date, the program has 
five key components: (i) to utilize raw materials that are scarce in China through overseas co-
operation and investment, in order to improve the industrial structure and optimize the re-
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allocation of resources in China while also encouraging enterprises to set up R&D abroad to 
actively make use of raw materials worldwide (Lan and Pickles, 2011); (ii) to increase Chinese 
FDI and overseas processing trade to spur exports; (iii) to improve supporting systems of finance, 
insurance, tax, foreign exchange, human capital, law and entry-exit management for overseas 
foreign investment; (iv) to co-operate with adjacent countries economically and politically and to 
encourage the regionalization of Chinese-owned enterprises and investments; and (v) to 
promote brand recognition for Chinese enterprises in global markets. 
In a parallel context in post-socialist central and eastern Europe, Pickles and Smith (2011) 
have recently shown how, from the late 1970s and early 1980s, the process of delocalization 
within the EU increasingly encouraged European manufacturers and brands to reduce production 
costs in the face of increasing global completion by delocalizing assembly work into central 
Europe to access surplus skilled labor pools, socialist technical infrastructures and know-how 
and quick turnaround capacities. In this way, the need to reduce labor costs, minimize delivery 
times, and guarantee quality could all be met – for some firms – without the additional 
transaction costs of global sourcing. In China, industrial delocalization is still not the primary 
strategy for the central government, regional administrations or enterprises, even though the GO 
OUT strategy was written into the Tenth and Eleventh Plans as a national strategy. While China 
is still focusing more on BRING IN, GO OUT incentives and pressures, particularly labor cost, 
geographic proximity and the stability of trading relations that Pickles and Smith (2011) discuss 
for post-socialist Central Europe are also at work in the process of Chinese enterprises’ GO OUT 
Chinese overseas investment between 2002 and 2005 amounted to US$17.9 billion, with an 
average annual growth rate of 36%. In the same period, the cumulative turnover of Foreign 
Project Contracting was US$72.6 billion with an average annual growth rate of 24%, and that of 
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Labor Services Co-operation was US$17.3 billion, with an average annual growth rate of 6%. 
Chinese FDI reached US$92 billion in 2007. 
The GO OUT strategy caters to the interests of both central government and enterprises. 
The government seeks to acquire scarce and strategic resources by means of foreign investment 
to satisfy China’s increasing demand for resources. For example, in 1993, China changed from a 
petroleum-exporting to importing country. Outsourcing or delocalization to Southeast Asian 
locations also assists with the criticisms of anti-dumping (338 cases between 1995 and 2005) and 
other invisible trade barriers where re-export trade through third-party countries is one way to 
resolve the difficulties in exports and escape from trade or non-trade barriers. China’s “earn 
foreign exchange through export” policy has allowed it to accumulate a large amount of foreign 
exchange. The resulting economic bubble and criticism from developed countries about RMB’s 
slow appreciation has led the government to release the pressure of these enormous foreign 
exchange reserves through outward investment and the GO OUT policy is an important release 
valve for this (Lan and Pickles, 2011). In these ways, the administration intends to address its 
production capacity surplus by investing overseas, obtaining access to scarce natural resources, 
expanding opportunities to access advanced technology and managerial experience from 
successful enterprises in other countries and off-shoring low-wage and low value-added 
production (with all its negative social and political consequences).
8
 
In 2003-2004, the Ministry of Commerce issued the Guiding Directory in Country for 
China’s Investment of Textile and Apparel Processing Trade in Asia (Ministry of Commerce of 
China 2003). In 2004, the Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Foreign Affairs jointly released 
the Guiding Directory in Country and Industry for China’s FDI (Ministry of Commerce of China 
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See Pickles and Woods (1989) for examples of an earlier round of the GO OUT policy pursued by Taiwan 
enterprises in the 1970s and 1980s. 
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and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China 2004). These Directories recommended specific 
destinations for outsourcing Chinese apparel production; six were in Asia (Pakistan, Nepal, 
Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia and Turkey), eight in Latin America (Mexico, Colombia, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Jamaica, Chile, Argentina, Ecuador and Uruguay) and six in Southeast Africa 
(Kenya, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Lesotho, Namibia and Botswana) for Chinese apparel enterprises 
which are going out.  
Outsourcing of Chinese Firms 
By 2009, nearly 1,000 Chinese apparel enterprises had set up factories in Cambodia and 
Vietnam and another 100 (or more) Chinese apparel enterprises had invested in Bangladesh 
(China Textile and Economic Information (CETI), September 24, 2009). The receiving countries 
in Southeast and South Asia have largely been those that have trade preferences and preferential 
access agreements for EU and US markets, while also offering favorable enticements to foreign 
apparel enterprises. For instance, Bangladesh offers ten-year income tax deduction to foreign 
apparel enterprises relocating their factories. Cambodia offers low-wage costs, cheap land and a 
liberal market economy, but it also has the Generalized System of Preferences from 28 countries 
including the US and some EU countries, and exports from Cambodia have preferential access 
and tax reductions and exemptions to most countries (China Apparel (EFU), September 14, 
2009). 
One company that has taken advantage of outsourcing is the Hongdou Group, the second 
largest garment manufacturer in Jiangsu province. In 2007, Hongdou approved a plan for 
investing about 300 million Yuan to set up a production base in Cambodia as an attempt to avoid 
US and EU Safeguards (Fibre2Fashion News Desk, February 5, 2007). In addition, as the costs 
of land, water and labor have continued to increase in China, Cambodia and other countries have 
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gained distinct cost advantages. In 2008, Hongdou invested in the development of a Special 
Economic Zone (SEZ) in the port city Sihanoukville in Cambodia on more than five square 
kilometers. This SEZ was approved by the Ministry of Commerce of China as the first foreign 
trade zone, and, upon completion, will be Cambodia’s largest SEZ. In order to encourage the 
SEZ, the Ministry of Commerce approved financial support of more than 0.3 billion Yuan to the 
SEZ and promised a further 2 billion Yuan loan (China Apparel (EFU), September 14, 2009). In 
2007, China’s fixed asset investment in Cambodia amounted to US$461 million, a more than 
tenfold increase from 2003 (Shanghai Overseas Chinese News, May 26, 2008). With leading 
apparel firms like Hongdou relocating to Sihanoukville SEZ, more upstream and downstream 
suppliers have also relocated there so that an entire industrial chain has gradually formed inside 
the SEZ (Arnold and Pickles, 2011).  
Besides the “low road” delocalization where low-wage assembly work is being 
outsourced or relocated to low-cost producing centers like south-eastern Asia, “high road” 
delocalization has also emerged. As GO OUT policies seek to promote the brand recognition of 
Chinese enterprises in global markets, large leading Chinese-owned apparel firms have 
already begun to move part of their R&D, marketing and designing activities so as to have better 
access to overseas markets. Bosideng, China’s largest down clothing manufacturer, started its co-
operation with Greenwoods Menswear, a British retailer of men’s garment, in 2005. 
This business relationship finally led to Bosideng’s acquisition of a 50% stake in Greenwoods for 
£50 million in 2009. Bosideng seeks to leverage Greenwood’s expertise in the UK retail market 
to develop a chain with up to 100 stores between 2009 and 2014. Two such outlets, which are 
selling Bosideng-branded clothing, were opened in 2009. Since 2005, Bosideng-branded 
products have made up 33% of Greenwoods’s total sales. In 2011, Bosideng bought a £20 
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million six-story property in London for both its flagship store and European headquarters. 
Bosideng’s high road overseas investment was described by its CEO as a hybrid of GO OUT and 
GO UP approaches (China Daily, February 1, 2009). 
Conclusion 
Output, employment, value-added, and the number of enterprises in China’s apparel 
industry continue to increase in absolute terms, although each accounts for a declining proportion 
of total manufacturing and of exports. China has become the dominant apparel supplier to nearly 
all of the major industrial economies (the US, the EU and Japan). It has also diversified its export 
reach by gaining ground in many of the world’s emerging economies as well, including Russia, 
India and Brazil. As the apparel industry gets stronger and more diversified, China is not only a 
supplier of cheap and low quality apparel products, but it is also becoming a major hub and 
manufacturing base for high-end products. China’s coastal regions have become the pre-eminent 
global center of apparel manufacturing, but as the share of production inland increases and with 
expanded infrastructural investment, the presence of abundant skilled and cheap labor and tens of 
thousands of clustered enterprises,
9
 the emerging configuration of apparel production networks 
seems to be increasing, not decreasing the overall competitiveness of the industry. 
As competitive pressures, production costs and social pressures on working conditions 
and wages have increased in recent years, apparel enterprises have been hit hard by slackening 
global demand, production cost hikes, RMB appreciation and rising labor cost due to the 
shortage of skilled labor and approval of the Labor Contract Law and the CSC9000T.  
Rising labor costs have been particularly important in forcing China’s apparel enterprises 
                                                     
9“According to the CNTAC, there were 48 major apparel clusters in China. Each of these clusters specializes in the 
production on one or more textile or apparel products…. [as of 2005] All of these [major] clusters are located along 
the coastal provinces, namely Zhejiang, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Fujian, Shandong and Hebei”. As of 2009, the number 
of firms with revenue 5 million Yuan or greater is 18265 (apparel). 
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to restructure their value chains. Labor shortages are crucial and pose deep-seated economic and 
social challenges for the apparel industry, particularly because of its dependence on migrant labor. 
Presently, a great deal of attention is directed toward enticing investment, stimulating economic 
development and promoting economic upgrading, while concern for the well-being of labor and 
social upgrading along with economic upgrading has lagged. My analysis has highlighted the 
signal importance of policy initiatives launched by local and central governments and the way 
apparel enterprises are responding to this changing landscape, either by upgrading or through 
geographical relocation. 
The central government has been extremely pro-active in responding to these pressures 
and has approved a series of policy initiatives to encourage and support enterprises to implement 
industrial upgrading and relocation in three ways: GO UP (industrial upgrading), GO WEST 
(relocation to inland China) and GO OUT (relocation overseas). The central government has 
designated funds to support relocation, improve infrastructure, simplify relocation approval 
procedures, provide information about foreign apparel markets, increase investments and support 
for technological transformation, increase financial support and provide subsidies and support 
research on apparel-related technological innovations. The central government also seems to be 
paying increasing attention to the well-being of labor. I have noted the many cautions one needs 
to exercise in reading these emerging labor regimes, especially in the absence of free and 
independent trade unions, but the new LCL and CSC9000T have, at least, been significant 
symbols of the recognition by both state and private actors of the need to address working 
conditions and the social instabilities they have produced. 
Local governments do not always share the concerns that motivate central government 
policies and as a result, they have, at times, responded differently. In recognizing that aggressive 
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relocation to other provinces could harm the local economy and affect employment, local 
governments in coastal provinces creatively adapt relocation incentives to impede inter-
provincial relocation in favor of relocation within a province or upgrading locally. By contrast, 
Western regions increasingly offer competitive advantages on wages, infrastructural costs and 
logistical support and their governments actively recruit enterprises away from established 
production centers to often well-provisioned green-field industrial parks by offering incentives 
and supports, such as tax breaks and subsidies. The result is the emergence of a much more 
spatially extended and functionally articulated series of regional production networks. Whether 
these regional production networks – with their higher-value cores, regionally extended assembly 
plants, and overseas outsourcing of low-value added contracts – will resolve the challenges of 
China’s dominant role in GVCs remains an open question. For the moment, the rapid expansion 
of domestic consumption acts as a stimulus and subsidy while global markets remain turbulent 
and price sensitive. 
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CHAPTER 3 GLOBAL, REGIONAL AND LOCAL: NEW FIRM FORMATION AND 
SPATIAL RESTRUCTURING IN CHINA’S APPAREL INDUSTRY 
Introduction 
The promising development of China’s export-oriented apparel firms has been largely 
attributed to (1) the flexible business environment including cheap peasant workers who migrate 
from western and central region to coastal China, and China’s other low cost factor inputs, land 
electricity and raw materials; (2) loose inspection on import materials and export products in 
customs; (3) half-hearted implementation of environmental and labor regulations; and (4) 
preferential tax policies (He et al., 2008; Hsing, 1998; Hsueh, 2011; Yang, 2012). As production 
costs and competitive pressures both rise, the flexible business environment that export-led 
production used to embed in has undergone dramatic restructuring and this has further pushed 
forward new rounds of spatial restructuring and industrial relocation, especially in China’s 
highly export-oriented apparel industry (Wei et al., 2007; Wei et al., 2009).  
In this chapter, I focus on the apparel industry in China and investigate the geographical 
and organizational restructuring in response to the transforming business environment since late 
1990s. This chapter documents the changing geographical patterns of new firm formation so as 
to disclose inter-regional shifts of new investment, production and employment, i.e. industrial 
relocation. It does so by examining spatial variation and temporal evolution in the processes of 
new firm formation and a set of potential determinants contributing to this dynamics. While 
efforts to explain new firm formation and industrial relocation have attracted increased scholarly 
attention in recent years, the incomplete and disparate analytical frameworks they have applied 
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have resisted attempts to develop a coherent accounting for this vitally important economic 
process. In large part this difficulty reflects the fact that extant studies have only examined new 
firm formation’s relationship with either global, regional or local factors, whereas failed to 
encompass all three aspects which inter-connectedly play a pivotal role in the processes of 
industrial relocation and new firm creation. Specifically, they have either tested conceptually the 
linkage between agglomeration economies and new firm location choice (Jo and Lee, 2012; 
Moral, 2009), or focused on impacts of external multinational enterprises over new firm creation 
(Lee et al., 2012), or studied the ways in which firm-specific factors (for example, firm size and 
plant types) and place-specific factors (for example, human capital and local wage) influence 
entrepreneurs’ decision-making processes (Armington and Acs, 2002; Lin et al., 2011; Sutaria 
and Hicks, 2004; Wang et al., 2010). An all-encompassing tri-polar analytical framework is, 
therefore, developed in the next section to analyze new firm formation and industrial relocation 
in the global, regional and local context. I also seek to argue that the heterogeneity in new firms’ 
characteristics affect their location decision and the extent to which new firm formation and 
industrial relocation are affected by global, regional and local factors is determined by 
idiosyncratic firm-specific capability. The next section teases out key hypotheses on new firm 
formation in relation to my tri-polar analytical framework. After an introduction of the data, 
variables and specifications for empirical analysis in section three, the fourth section offers 
a brief overview of the new firm formation in China’s apparel industry. Section five presents and 
discusses the results. The last section concludes the chapter by summarizing main findings and 
discussing theoretical and policy implications.  
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Conceptual Framework and Research Hypotheses 
Embedding in a Localized Cluster 
Competitiveness of firm partly hinges on its embeddedness into local clusters made up by 
heterogeneous and homogenous firms (Granovetter, 1985; Porter, 1990). Clusters mainly focus 
on the local sources of competitiveness driven by local economic agents and their vertical and 
horizontal relationships which generate collective efficiency and knowledge spillovers (Barnes 
and Gertler, 1999; Storper, 1997). Local industrial clusters tend to intensify in a self-reinforcing 
way by further attracting new entrants until economies of agglomeration turn into diseconomies 
from congestion (He and Wang, 2012). Several hypotheses have been proposed concerning 
conditions under which local clusters and economies of agglomeration affect economic growth 
and new firm formation. One hypothesis, developed by Marshall (1920 [1890]), contends that 
knowledge is predominantly industry-specific and therefore local specialization will foster 
economic growth and new firm formation. The other hypothesis, proposed by Jacobs (1969), 
claims that regional diversity in economic activity will result in agglomeration externalities as 
knowledge developed by one industry can also be fruitfully applied in other industries.  
As marketization, privatization and globalization proceed in China, the growth of export-
oriented production has driven the geographical distribution of the apparel industry from 
a broadly-based industry to one concentrated in export-processing zones in coastal regions (He et 
al., 2008; Wen, 2004). China’s apparel enterprises agglomerate to benefit from the Marshallian 
and Jacobsian externalities (Fan and Scott, 2003; He et al., 2008; He and Zhu, 2009; Ke, 2010). 
However, over-agglomeration may turn positive externalities into diseconomies of congestion 
and further trigger spatial restructuring of industries (Broersma and Oosterhaven, 2009; He and 
Wang, 2012). The congestion effects are often associated with rising costs of labor, land, energy 
and environment (Wang, 2010).  Intensive and excessive intra- and inter-industry competition 
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within local clusters would lead to diseconomies of congestion as well. This indicates an inverted 
‘U’-shaped relationship between industrial clustering and new firm creation, which means that 
despite industrial clustering fosters economic growth and new firm formation, too much 
agglomeration would generate congestion effects that frighten away new entrants. Ideas 
developed in this section leads to the following testable hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: There is an inverted ‘U’-shaped relationship between the degree of 
agglomeration and the magnitude of new firm formation.  
Racing to the Bottom in a Globalized Value Chain 
Studies on the articulation between local cluster and new firm formation tend to overlook 
the significance of external linkages. The underestimation of global factors sometimes weakens 
their explanatory framework or makes their findings problematic, especially as local clusters are 
often integrated into globally organized value chains in a world characterized by ‘integration of 
trade’ and ‘disintegration of production’ (Gereffi, 2005). The apparel industry is such a case in 
point. The apparel trade has long figured prominently in discussions of globalization, given the 
well-deserved reputation of apparel manufacturing as one of the most globalized, dynamic and 
geographically mobile industries; virtually the relocation of labor-intensive elements of the 
production process to lower cost locations has been central aspects of the industry whereas core 
competencies, like R&D, design, and brand ownership, are considered to be less spatially 
flexible, tied more closely with human capital resources and knowledge networks (Evans and 
Smith, 2006a; Rantisi, 2004; Scott, 2006). For instance, the last few decades have witnessed a 
significant relocation of clothing production away from the main producing regions in Europe 
and North America, through Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, to coastal 
China (Evans and Smith, 2006a); and now we expect to see another round of relocation towards 
inland China as production costs rise in China’s coastal regions (Zhu and Pickles, 2014). This 
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geographical dynamics of production and sourcing must be reflected by the spatial 
transformation of new firm formation.  
The process of ‘race to the bottom’ deepens as newly established apparel firms are often 
integrated into ‘captive’ GVC where the action and motivations of global buyers are the key 
causal forces in the organization of global contracting systems (Gereffi, 1999; Schmitz and 
Knorringa, 2000). Access for new apparel firms to global markets is increasingly seen to depend 
on their capability to race to the lower bottom; and locating in lower cost regions is sometimes 
the prerequisite to receive orders from global buyers. However, it is still questionable to pre-
determine that regions with lower cost are likely to witness larger extent of new firm formation 
since lower labor cost also reflects low labor quality and low labor productivity to some extent. 
This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: In the buyer-driven apparel GVC characterized by a process of ‘race to 
the bottom’, newly established firms are likely to locate in lower cost regions due to their 
own needs or global buyers’ requirement. However, low labor-quality associated with 
low labor-cost may frighten off new entrants. 
Relocating in a Regionalized Way 
Rather than focusing one-sidedly on factor costs, in particular wage levels, I also take 
into account geographical proximity, the specific demands created by the needs of particular 
products in relation to short production cycles or rapid replenishment (Pickles and Smith, 2011). 
The fact that logistical and policy costs (e.g. tariff) derived from geographical remoteness can 
easily outstrip the advantages based on low labor cost, results in more nuanced sourcing 
decisions than is predicted based simply on factor costs (Abernathy et al., 2006). The rise of 
lean-retailing is shaping the sourcing pattern in a way where, under certain conditions, speedy 
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delivery, geographical proximity and quick response are privileged over considerations of labor 
costs (Abernathy et al., 2006; Tewari, 2006).  
When analyzing China’s apparel industry, it is therefore important to recognize a model 
of industrial relocation and new firm formation based exclusively on labor cost may be 
inadequate to an understanding of the imperatives towards regionalization of sourcing and 
production (Abernathy et al., 2006). Specifically, this regional sourcing pattern at work in China 
unfolds in the form of relocation of low-wage apparel productions to lower-cost inland China, 
often regions from which migrant workers have traditionally been drawn (Zhu and Pickles, 2014). 
Geographical proximity obviously plays a fundamental role in the industrial relocation from 
China’s coastal regions to inland provinces. Thanks for the geographical proximity to Hong 
Kong, Taiwan and South Korea, China’s coastal regions has boomed and become the largest 
destination of the transplantation of the export-oriented and labor-intensive manufacturing from 
Hong Kong and Taiwan in 1980s and 1990s (Yang, 2012). As competitive pressures intensified 
in coastal region, I expect that, due to geographical proximity, central China will become a rising 
destination for new firm formation and is likely to attract more new entrants than western China, 
though the latter has even lower labor cost. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is established: 
Hypothesis 3: There is an inverted ‘U’-shaped relationship between the magnitude of 
new firm formation in a given host region and its geographical distance from China’s 
coastline. 
The geographical distance between one given host region and China’s coastline describes 
not only the host region’s proximity to current apparel manufacturing bases, but also its distance 
to ports for exports which determines the possibility for new entrants in this given host region to 
achieve short lead time and to contain logistical costs. An inverted ‘U’-shaped relationship 
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suggests China’s central region, which is moderately distant to coastline, is assumed to attract 
larger extent of new entrants than western and coastal regions which are geographically farther 
and closer to coastline respectively.  
Firm Capability and Different Location Choices 
The above analysis has developed a tri-polar framework of spatial restructuring where 
new firm formation and industrial relocation has been organized globally, regionally and locally 
(Figure 12). However, it is questionable to assume that new entrants should be affected by the 
global, regional and local factors to the same degree. The extent to which new entrant’s location 
choices are affected by global, regional and local factors is determined by firm’s characteristic.  
Firm 
relocation
Regional/
Regionalization
Local/
Localization
Global/
Globalization
GPN/GVC
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-Global market change
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Figure 12 A Tri-polar Analytical Framework of Industrial Relocation and New Firm Formation 
(RPN: Regional Production Network) 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
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The fact that some low-capability new apparel firms have been focusing on assembly or 
OEM production and failed to establish a strong position in high-value-added and high-tech 
products reinforces their dependence on low-cost unskilled or semi-skilled workers rather than 
high-quality ones. In contrast, high-capability new firms may build up their core competencies 
on medium- or high-value-added ODM (Original Design Manufacturing) and OBM (Original 
Brand Manufacturing) production. In this scenario, high-capability new firms are able to 
withstand the rise of production costs and locate in coastal regions since their core competencies 
on high-value-added production force them to embrace high labor quality rather than low labor 
cost.  
By the same token, high-capability new firms’ focus on ODM and OBM production often 
means they are manufacturing time-sensitive and quick-selling apparel products. As a result, they 
may locate in high-cost coastal regions to embrace not only high-quality labor, but also the 
easiness to realize quick response and short lead time. On the contrary low-capability new firms 
which are not able to stand increased labor costs opt for locating in inland China, as their 
products are neither time-sensitive nor quick-selling.  
Firm-specific capability also affects the net benefits firm can receive from local industrial 
clusters (Lin et al., 2011; Myles Shaver and Flyer, 2000; Wang et al., 2010). Firm’s capability to 
identify, assimilate and utilize knowledge spillovers and externalities hinges on its absorptive 
capacity (Jo and Lee, 2012). High-capability firms are often better able to absorb distant and 
even unrelated external knowledge and externality than their low-capability counterparts (Teece, 
2007). Low-capability firms, by contrast, focus on imitating neighboring successful predecessors 
in the same industry before they become full-fledged. If attributing the Marshallian 
agglomeration economies to externalities among firms operating in the same industry and 
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employing similar technologies, and characterizing the Jacobsian agglomeration economies as 
externalities from different complementary industries, I assume that high-capability new entrants’ 
location choices are likely affected by both Marshallian and Jacobsian externalities while the 
location choice of new entrants with low-capability may only be shaped by Marshallian 
agglomeration economies. To sum up, the idea developed in this section leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
H4: The impacts of global, regional and local factors over new entrants differ due in 
large part to firm-specific capability. 
Research Design 
Variables 
To test these hypotheses I use an important database on new firm formation and firm-
specific economic and financial variables: China’s Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF) 
(1998-2009). The dependent variable is the density of new entrants in region i and year t 
(NewFirmi,t), which is measured as the ratio of the number of new entrants in region i and year t 
to the national total number of new entrants in year t; it is presented in percentage terms. The 
geographical unit of analysis is China’s prefectural level city (excluding Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Macau). 
The adoption of a one-year lag is a natural accommodation to the fact that the impacts of 
global, regional and local factors take time. The first group of key independent variables is to 
evaluate the level of agglomeration effects derived from local industrial clusters. To test the 
‘local’ Hypothesis (H1), Marshallian and Jacobsian externalities are quantified separately. The 
degree of Marshallian externalities (Marshalli,t-1) for new entrants represents the employment 
density in the same industry (i.e. apparel), measured as the total employment of the apparel 
industry in region i and year t-1 divided by the total area of region i. Likewise, the degree of 
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Jacobsian agglomeration effects (Jacobsi,t-1) is measured as the total employment of other 
complementary manufacturing industries in region i and year t-1 divided by the total area of 
region i. Here, by ‘other complementary manufacturing industries’, I refer only to the textile 
industry, since its high-level input-output linkages with the apparel industry and the generally-
acknowledged upstream-downstream relationship between those two. As a result, Jacobsi,t-1 
particularly refers to the total employment of the textile industry in region i and year t-1 
divided by the total area of region i.  
To test the ‘global’ hypothesis (H2), the level of labor cost in region i and year t-1 is 
included (LCosti,t-1). Some studies have used GDP per capita or per capita personal income to 
measure labor cost (Sutaria and Hicks, 2004). This type of indicator becomes flawed in the 
context of China where the temporary migrant population without household registration (hukou) 
is often excluded in the population statistics. Due in large part to the unique hukou system in 
China, the population data in coastal provinces with massive inflow of migrant workers tend 
to be underestimated, while the population data for inland region from which migrant workers 
have traditionally been drawn can be easily overestimated. The inaccuracy in population data 
further makes the calculation of GDP per capita and labor cost erroneous. In this chapter, instead, 
LCosti,t-1 is measured as the total expense on wages and welfare benefits for workers of all 
apparel firms in region i and year t-1 divided by the total employment of the apparel industry in 
region i and year t-1. This method is not only unaffected by the inaccuracy of population 
data, but also quantifies specifically labor cost of the apparel industry. Labor productivity 
(LQualityi,t-1) is applied to capture labor quality, measured as the gross output value of the 
apparel industry in region i and year t-1 divided by the total employment of the apparel industry 
in region i and year t-1. 
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To test the ‘regional’ hypothesis (H3), the geographical distance between a given host 
region and China’s coastline is defined as the shortest distance to the major link port city in the 
coastal China (He and Wang, 2012):  
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where p represents the eight link port cities in the coastal China, including Dalian, Tianjin, 
Qingdao, Shanghai, Ningbo, Xiamen, Guangzhou and Shenzhen. Chinese manufacturing 
products are largely exported through these major link ports. Si is the total area of the port city p 
and dip is the distance between region i and port city p.  
Model Specifications 
According to variables discussed above, the following empirical model is estimated: 
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where i and t denote region and year, respectively. In the estimation equation, natural logarithm 
for Porti and a one-year lag for all other independent variables are taken. To test the inverted 
‘U’-shaped relationship between the magnitude of new firm formation in a given host region 
with (1) its geographical distance from China’s coastline (H3), and (2) its degree of 
agglomeration (H1), I introduce the squared LnPorti, Marshalli,t-1, and Jacobsi,t-1 in the models.  
The theoretical insights discussed in the second section suggest that a new entrant may 
decide to locate in regions that guarantee the highest expected profits. From the empirical 
viewpoint, expected profits are not directly observable, but the new firms established in each 
region each year can be observed. In these circumstances, data are censored and the appropriate 
statistical model for estimating the new firm formation is the TOBIT estimated by the maximum 
likelihood method (Tobin, 1958): 
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where i and t denote region and year, respectively; y
*
 is a latent variable not directly observable;  
0  denotes the regional and temporal fixed effects; Xi,t-1 represents a vector of explanatory 
variables; ' indicates a vector of corresponding parameters to be estimated;  , ~ (0, )i t N    is a 
stochastic normal error.  
Tobit models (i.e. censored regression models) are employed when there is either left- or 
right-censoring in the dependent variables, which can violate the linearity and normality 
assumption of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and potentially lead to biased OLS 
coefficient estimates (McDonald and Moffitt, 1980). In my case, there is a left-censoring in the 
dependent variable, and values that fall at or below a threshold (i.e. 0) are censored. The tobit 
model uses a maximum likelihood estimation method to generate a censored regression equation, 
and have been designed specifically to solve problems when the dependent variable has been 
censored to a range from 0% to 100%. The coefficient of the Tobit model simutaneously 
measure two different effects: the impact of the corresponding regressor on the probability that 
the region attracts new entrants and the impact of the corresponding regressor on the level of new 
firm formation in the regions where it is positive (McDonald and Moffitt, 1980).  
I run three sets of regressions to test my four hypoetheses. The first set uses a Tobit 
model for each year in the study time period 1998-2009, with NewFirmi,t as the dependent 
variables against explanatory variables. Since a one-year lag for all independent variables except 
LnPorti are applied, there are eleven regressions (from 1999 to 2009). The second set examines 
the temporal variation of the new firm formation model using Casetti’s expansion method 
(Casetti, 1972; Casetti and Fan, 1991). The parameters (i.e.  ) of my model will be tested for 
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temporal stability and drift. The expansion method specifies ‘expansion equations’ that redefine 
some or all parameters of the ‘initial model’ (i.e. Equation (2)) as functions of substantively 
relevant variables. Substitution of the expanded parameters for their counterparts in the ‘initial 
model’ forms the ‘terminal model’.  
The parameters in Equation (2) are expanded as functions of temporal variables (Casetti, 
1972; Casetti and Fan, 1991). Parameter variation in Equation (2) over time (t) can be denoted as 
follows: 
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7 70 71t    ………………………………………(12) 
8 80 81t    ………………………………………(13) 
Where t is a dummy variable measured as time difference between each year and the base year 
1998 (e.g., t = 1 in 1999 and t = 11 in 2009). The terminal model is as follows: 
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The terminal model incorporates the same structure as the initial relationship, and a specification 
of its potential drift across a substantively relevant context (time t). When the terminal model is 
estimated and tests of statistical hypotheses are carried out upon its coefficients, conclusion 
about the occurrence of contextual drift or temporal variation in my case may be reached. 
Specifically, if only 
00 , 10 , 20 , 30 , 40 , 50 , 60 , 70 , or 80  are significantly different 
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from zero, the estimated model will imply parameter stability. Otherwise, I can conclude the 
temporal variation in the parameters of the ‘initial model’. Finally, the third set of regressions 
tests the firm capability hypothesis (H4).  
Industrial Relocation and Transforming Pattern of New Firm Formation 
The past few decades have seen a two-stage inter-regional shift in apparel employment. 
First, during the 1990s, the apparel industry became increasingly agglomerated in China’s 
coastal region. Second, since the early 2000s, the intensified competitive pressures have forced 
dramatic changes in firm behavior and firm location choice, leading to industrial relocation to 
lower cost places, and changing the pattern of new firm formation and new investment. In Figure 
13 I first show the progressive regional concentration of apparel employment in 1990s and early 
2000s driven by the export-oriented industrialization. Guangdong succeeded in keeping its 
dominant position with about 17.8% of national employment share in 1992 and 24.3% in 2004. 
Zhejiang nearly doubled its share, from 8.0% in 1992 to 15.7% in 2004. Jiangsu also 
significantly increased its share, from 11.0% in 1992 to 18.1% in 2004 and maintained its 
position as one of the top producing bases.  
In the late 2000s, however, a reverse diffusion of industry emerged. On the one hand, 
dominant manufacturing bases started to shrink, as Guangdong declined from 24.3% in 2004 to 
23.6% in 2010, Shandong’s share decreased from 8.3% to 7.3%, and Zhejiang also downsized 
from 15.7% to 14.7%. Among them, Shanghai, as a highly urbanized and populated metropolis, 
was the first to experience the intensified competitive pressures. Apparel employment in 
Shanghai declined from 228,434 in 2004 to 168,000 in 2010. On the other hand, as the 2010 map 
shows, apparel employment has already started to shift inward in particular to China’s central 
region. Some rising provinces include Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan and Hunan. This new trend of 
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industrial relocation also echoes with Hypothesis 3 that central region is expected to become a 
rising destination for industrial relocation and is more likely to attract new entrants than western 
region.  
 
 
Figure 13 Temporal Changes of Distribution of Employment in Garments by Province10  (1992, 
1998, 2004, and 2010) 
Source: Compiled by authors, from various annual issues of China Industry Economy Statistical 
Yearbook 
 
The rapid inter-regional shifts are also reflected by the temporal changes of regional 
shares of new firm formation in the apparel industry (Figure 14). The impacts of the reverse and 
diffusive industrial relocation on industrial geography of apparel are marked. Central region kept 
growing at the expense of eastern region, though the latter rebounded slightly after China’s entry 
                                                     
10
Longitudinal analysis of industrial employment in apparel has to take into account the administrative 
change between 1992 and 2010 when Chongqing was upgraded to a centrally administered municipality in 1997, 
adding an additional administrative region.   
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into the WTO in 2001 and the removal of quotas on apparel exports to the developed countries in 
2005 because sudden increases in global demand to some extent eased the difficulties derived 
from intensified competitive pressures. Specifically, by 2009, the number of newly established 
firms in central region accounted for 23.5% of the total newly established firms in the apparel 
industry, an increase of 17.5% over 1998, while eastern region saw a decline from 90.0% to 75.1% 
in the same period. This geographical shift implies central region has become a hotspot for 
attracting new entrants. 
 
Figure 14 Changes in Regional Shares of the Number of Newly Established Apparel Firms11 
(1998-2009) 
Source: Compiled by authors, from the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms 1998-2009 
 
 
                                                     
11
Eastern (Coastal) Region includes Liaoning, Hebei, Beijing, Tianjin, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, 
Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Guangxi; Central Region includes Heilongjiang, Jilin, Shanxi, Neimenggu, Henan, 
Hubei, Hunan, Anhui, Jiangxi; Western Region includes Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Xizang, 
Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai and Xinjiang. 
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Statistical Results 
Correlation analysis indicates that LCosti,t-1  is highly correlated with LQualityi,t-1, since 
wages and welfare benefits per worker, to some extent, reflects the level of labor productivity 
and labor quality. The Pearson’s coefficient is around 0.90 for each year of the study time period 
(1999-2009). Other explanatory variables do not strongly correlate with each other. To alleviate 
the multi-collinearity, the interaction of LCosti,t-1 and LQualityi,t-1 is introduced in the model.  
Transforming New firm Formation Pattern 
The Tobit regression model estimates for each year of the study time period are reported 
in Table 5. I first look at the coefficients of Marshalli,t-1,  
2
, 1i tMarshall  , Jacobsi,t-1, and  
2
, 1i tJacobs  , the key concern of Hypothesis 1. On the one hand, the coefficient of Marshalli,t-1 is 
mostly positive and highly significant from 1999 to 2009 model, while that of 
2
, 1i tMarshall   is 
negative and changes from being of no significance towards being highly significant. The 
consistency in the coefficient of Marshalli,t-1 and inconsistency of the coefficient of 
2
, 1i tMarshall   
indicate that the relationship between the magnitude of new entrants and Marshallian 
externalities has transformed from a linear one towards an inverted ‘U’-shaped one. On the other 
hand, the study time period has witnessed a more complicated evolution of the coefficients of 
Jacobsi,t-1 and 
2
, 1i tJacobs  , showing the relationship between the magnitude of new entrants and 
Jacobsian agglomeration effects has undergone three distinct stages. In the first stage, neither 
Jacobsi,t-1 nor 
2
, 1i tJacobs   is significant, suggesting that the Jacobsian agglomeration economies 
as externalities from different complementary industries have had a relatively weak impact over 
new firm formation in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Then, shortly after the second stage where 
the relationship between the magnitude of new entrants and Jacobsian agglomeration 
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economies became positive, linear and highly significant in 2004, an inverted ‘U’-shaped 
relationship between those two emerged.  
Table 5 Estimation Results from the Tobit Model for New Firm Formation during 1999-2009
12
 
Variable 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
LCosti,t-1*LQualityi,t-1 0.0002 0.0017
**
 0.0004 0.0021
**
 0.0004 0.0001 
LnPorti -0.0704
**
 -0.0091 0.0121 0.1126
***
 0.0829
***
 0.0229
**
 
LnPorti
2 
0.0048 -0.0007 -0.0018 -0.0106
***
 -0.0082
***
 -0.0023
***
 
Marshalli,t-1 0.0031
*
 0.0041
**
 0.0037
***
 0.0033
**
 0.0025
**
 0.0013
***
 
Marshalli,t-1
2 
-0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
***
 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0001
***
 
Jacobsi,t-1 -0.0002 -0.0019 0.0018
*
 0.0018 0.0009 0.0011
***
 
Jacobsi,t-1
2 
0.0001 0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
       
Number of observation 321 321 321 321 321 321 
LR  2  69.02
***
 63.80
***
 102.29
***
 74.79
***
 79.99
***
 142.38
***
 
Pseudo R
2
 -0.8397 -2.4128 -0.6082 -0.9092 -0.3797 -0.2712 
Log likelihood 75.610 45.118 135.238 78.528 145.337 333.685 
Notes: *significant at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level; and ***significant at the 1% level. 
 
Table 5 Estimation Results from the Tobit Model for New Firm Formation during 1999-2009 
(Cont.) 
Variable 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
LCosti,t-1*LQualityi,t-1 0.0001 -0.0003
*
 -0.0002 -0.0001
**
 -0.0002 
LnPorti 0.0339
**
 0.0228 0.0491
***
 0.0143
*
 0.0350
**
 
LnPorti
2 
-0.0038
**
 -0.0029
*
 -0.0048
***
 -0.0015
*
 -0.0035
**
 
Marshalli,t-1 0.0010
*
 0.0004 0.0009
*
 0.0010
***
 0.0014
***
 
Marshalli,t-1
2 
-0.0001
**
 -0.0001 0.0002
***
 -0.0001
***
 -0.0001
***
 
Jacobsi,t-1 0.0011
**
 0.0010
**
 0.0018
***
 0.0004 0.0003
*
 
Jacobsi,t-1
2 
-0.0001
**
 -0.0001
*
 -0.0001
***
 -0.0001 -0.0001
*
 
      
Number of observation 321 321 321 321 321 
LR  2  72.75
***
 89.70
***
 104.34
***
 94.73
***
 65.25
***
 
Pseudo R
2
 -0.2250 -0.2931 -0.2358 -0.1365 -0.1364 
Log likelihood 198.050 197.839 273.446 394.243 271.801 
Notes: *significant at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level; and ***significant at the 1% level. 
 
As expected, new entrants tended to locate in regions with high level of Marshallian 
externalities at first. However, as the growth of export-oriented production drove the 
geographical distribution of the apparel industry from a broadly-based industry to one 
concentrated in coastal region, over-agglomeration which turned positive externalities into 
                                                     
12
Pseudo-R
2
 can be above 1 or below 0 for continuous or mixed continuous/discrete likelihoods like Tobit. So, it 
makes no sense. For models like Tobit, the Pseudo-R
2
 has no real meaning. The formula for Pseudo-R
2
 is nothing 
more than a reworking of the model chi-squared. Thus, it is better to pay attention to the model chi-squared and its 
p-value rather than the pseudo-R
2
 (see also Stata FAQ: http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/statistics/pseudo-r2/). 
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diseconomies of congestion started to repel further entry of new entrants. The changes of the 
coefficient of Jacobsi,t-1 and 
2
, 1i tJacobs   tell a two-fold story. On the one hand, high-capability 
firms are often better able to absorb distant and even unrelated Jacobsian externalities than their 
low-capability counterparts (Teece, 2007). This suggests a gradual upgrading of the average 
capability of new entrants, as the weak and insignificant relationship between Jacobsian 
externalities and the magnitude of new entrants turns into a strong and highly significant one in 
2004 model. On the other hand, the relationship between the Jacobsian externalities and 
magnitude of new entrants has transformed from a linear, positive and significant one, to an 
inverted ‘U’-shaped one after 2004, indicating complicated shifts from agglomeration to over-
agglomeration, in particular in China’s coastal region. 
There are unexpected and apparently contradictory signs of the coefficient of LCosti,t-
1*LQualityi,t-1 from 1999 to 2009 model. This interaction of explanatory variables first presents 
positive signs before 2005 model and then changes into negative signs afterwards. This 
inconsistency could be reconciled by the following possible explanation. New entrants have 
to balance labor costs and labor quality. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, inland 
China’s backward labor quality ruled it out as a candidate location for industrial relocation and 
large-scale new firm formation, in spite of its relatively low labor cost. The apparel industry is 
footloose as apparel firms globally search for low-cost production sites, but it is not footloose in 
a way where a ‘race to the bottom’ can be unrestrictedly performed regardless of poor labor-
quality and its associated low labor-costs.  
As inland China caught up, the gap between inland and coastal regions narrowed in terms 
of not only labor quality per se but also infrastructure and supporting facilities which contributed 
to labor productivity as well. Labor quality hence quit being a main concern in a firm’s location 
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choice; and medium-quality and relatively low-wage labor in inland China started to be valued 
over its high-quality and high-wage counterpart in coastal region, particularly for new entrants 
reliant on low-wage assembly and OEM production which, at least until recently, accounted for a 
considerable part of China’s apparel industry. In summary, driven by the complexity of ‘race to 
the bottom’, the pattern of new firm formation has unfolded in an inconsistent way as new 
entrants balance labor cost with labor quality.  
The same ‘agglomeration first, diffusion later’ pattern is also supported by empirical 
estimations of ‘regional’ factors: LnPorti and LnPorti
2
. LnPorti is negative and LnPorti
2
 is 
insignificant in 1999 model, suggesting that coastal regions likely attract more new entrants than 
inland regions. Subsequently, an inverted ‘U’- relationship emerges in 2002 model between the 
magnitude of new entrants in a given region and its geographical distance to a coastline, 
suggesting that regions which are moderately distant from China’s coastline are likely to attract 
more new entrants. Global, regional and local factors have been collectively shaping the new 
firm formation pattern in ways which that have generated two distinct stages of spatial 
restructuring (see also Figure 13). First, the apparel industry boomed and new entrants flooded 
into China’s coastal region so as to take advantage of its high-quality labor, positive 
agglomeration effects and geographical proximity to end markets in the North. As inland China 
caught up and labor cost surged in coastal areas, labor quality became less a concern than labor 
cost. In addition, positive externalities turned into diseconomies of congestion, which further 
frightened new entrants off coastal regions to search for new low-cost sites. In the process of 
industrial relocation, new entrants started to value central China as a favorable location over not 
only coastal region, but also over the  western region where additional costs derived from 
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geographical remoteness could potentially outstrip the advantage based on low labor costs. An 
inverted ‘U’-shaped relationship between LnPorti and NewFirmi,t was therefore generated.  
Temporal Variation 
The temporally expanded terminal model (Equation 14) is estimated using Tobit 
regression model (Table 6). The estimation results indicate that the model varies temporally, as 
the cross products of the temporal variable t are statistically significant. The temporal expansion 
shows that the coefficients for LCosti,t-1*LQualityi,t-1, Marshalli,t-1, and Marshalli,t-1
2
 are 
temporally unstable and can be expressed as functions of time (t) in Model 7. Coefficients for 
some variables in Model 1 to 6 also present temporal instability.  
Table 6 Estimation Results from the Tobit Model based on Temporal Expansion (1999-2009) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
LCosti,t-1 
*LQualityi,t-1 
0.0013
***
     0.0006
***
 0.0007
***
 
LCosti,t-1 
*LQualityi,t-1 
*t 
-0.0001
***
     -0.0001
***
 -0.0001
***
 
LnPorti  0.0014
***
 -0.0137
***
   -0.0113
***
 0.0267
***
 
LnPorti *t  0.0005 0.0002
***
   0.0003
***
 0.0002 
LnPorti
2
  -0.0014
***
     -0.0032
***
 
LnPorti
2
*t  0.0001     0.0001 
Marshalli,t-1    0.0036
***
 0.0013
***
 0.0003
*
 0.0023
***
 
Marshalli,t-1*t    -0.0003
***
 -0.0001
***
 -0.0001 -0.0002
***
 
Marshalli,t-1
2
    -0.0001
***
   -0.0001
***
 
Marshalli,t-1
2 
*t 
   0.0001
***
   0.0001
***
 
Jacobsi,t-1    0.0005
***
 0.0008
***
 0.0008
***
 0.0010
**
 
Jacobsi,t-1*t    0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
***
 -0.0001 
Jacobsi,t-1
2
    -0.0001
**
   -0.0001
*
 
Jacobsi,t-1
2
*t    -0.0001   -0.0001 
        
Number of 
observation 
3531 3531 3531 3531 3531 3531 3531 
LR  2  132.01
***
 648.79
***
 648.79
***
 561.58
***
 381.45
***
 742.08
***
 829.19
***
 
Pseudo R
2
 -0.0433 -0.2129 -0.2129 -0.1842 -0.1251 -0.2431 -0.2720 
Log 
likelihood 
1590.030 1848.417 1848.417 1804.813 1714.749 1894.512 1938.620 
Notes: *significant at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level; and ***significant at the 1% level. 
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Despite the fact that regions with a high level of labor quality are more attractive 
investment locations for new entrants as the coefficients for LCosti,t-1*LQualityi,t-1 are positive 
and significant, the effect of high labor quality over new firm formation is declining as the 
coefficients for LCosti,t-1*LQualityi,t-1*t is negative and significant (Model 1, 6 and 7 in Table 6). 
This is also supported by findings from the last section that the concern of new entrants gradually 
move away from high labor quality to low labor cost as the coefficient for LCosti,t-1*LQualityi,t-1 
changes from positive to negative in Table 5. As a result, the positive effect of high labor quality 
over new firm formation has been declining and potentially becomes negative effect once it 
reaches a certain threshold where disadvantages of high labor quality (i.e. high labor cost) start to 
outweigh its advantages.  
The effect of ‘regional’ factors over new firm formation, however, has been stable over 
time, as the interaction terms (LnPorti*t and LnPorti
2
*t) are all insignificant (Model 2 and 7 in 
Table 6). Without the quadratic term (LnPorti
2
), LnPorti has a negative effect on the magnitude 
of new entrants, but its influence is decreasing (Model 3 and 6 in Table 6). While a negative 
effect suggests that the eastern region --which is most geographically proximate to end export 
markets-- tends to be more attractive investment location for new entrants, the weakening 
tendency tells a more nuanced story where new entrants become less agglomerated in the eastern 
region and start to diffuse to inland China. Finally, it generates an inverted ‘U’-shaped 
relationship between LnPorti and NewFirmi,t.  
The diffusion of new entrants narrows the disparity between the eastern region and 
central region in terms of the degree of industrial agglomeration in the industry. The relative 
convergence, with respect to the Marshallian agglomeration effects, taking place among central 
and coastal regions is potentially decreasing the impacts of Marshallian externalities over firm 
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location choice, despite it still presenting a significant inverted ‘U’-shaped relationship (Model 4 
and 7 in Table 6). The textile industry as a capital-intensive industry, however, is less footloose 
with lower levels of geographical mobility compared with the apparel industry. Its spatial 
distribution is still uneven and a disproportionate number of textile enterprises still concentrate in 
coastal regions, such as Shandong, Jiangsu and Guangdong. As new entrants in the apparel 
industry undergo a process of gradual upgrading (see analysis on Table 5), they are increasingly 
capable of absorbing distant and unrelated Jacobsian externalities (Jo and Lee, 2012; Teece, 
2007). As a result, the uneven distribution of the textile industry and the growing capability of 
new apparel entrants to absorb Jacobsian externalities have been co-structuring the apparel firm’s 
location choice and resulting in a relatively stable inverted ‘U’-shaped relationship between 
Jacobsian externalities and new firm formation (Model 4 and 7 in Table 6). This is also partially 
supported by findings from the next section that new entrants with distinct capability differ in 
their preference in terms of Marshallian and Jacobsian externalities, to which I now turn.  
Firm Capability and Different Location Choices 
This section reports the empirical results on whether firm capability influences the ways 
in which global, regional and local factors affect firm location choice (Hypothesis 4). An entrant 
is classified as having high capability if it successfully introduces new products shortly after its 
entry. Otherwise, it is labeled as a low-capability firm. Based on this standard, I divided new 
entrants into two groups, high- and low-capability group, and ran regressions separately. Due to 
the availability of data on new products introduction at firm-level, I only modeled the location 
choice of high- and low-capability new firms in 2009 (Table 7). 
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First, while a tendency that new entrants’ preference has moved from labor quality 
towards labor cost is observed above, location choices of new entrants still diverge in terms of 
how they balance labor quality with labor cost. Specifically, high-capability new entrants are 
more likely to locate in regions with high-quality labor while their low-capability counterparts 
tend to locate in low labor-cost regions. These results provide supportive evidence for 
Hypothesis 4, that high-capability new firms reliant on skilled labor and low-capability new 
firms reliant on unskilled or semi-skilled labor have distinct location strategies in terms of ‘local’ 
factors.  
Second, only LnPorti presents a negative and moderately significant sign in Group I, 
while an inverted ‘U’-shaped relationship between LnPorti  and NewFirmi,t are observed in 
Group II. In other words, high-capability new entrants still disproportionately locate in coastal 
region, whereas their low-capability counterparts start to diffuse from coastal to central regions. 
It may therefore be assumed that the former --which often produces high-end, time-sensitive and 
quick-selling items-- values geographical proximity, while the latter --dependent on low-value, 
low-tech and low-end production-- has to compromise geographical proximity so that it can reap 
low labor-costs by locating in the central region. 
Third, although in Table 5 we observe that the relationship between Jacobsian 
externalities and new firm formation evolves from a weak one, to a linear and significant one, 
finally to an inverted ‘U’-shaped one as new entrants in apparel industry gradually upgrade, 
firm-specific capability affects the net benefits firms can reap from the Jacobsian externalities 
(Myles Shaver and Flyer, 2000). The high-capability new entrants which are able to identify, 
assimilate and utilize distant and unrelated external knowledge can therefore benefit from not 
only Marshallian externalities but also knowledge spillovers based on Jacobsian agglomeration, 
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while low-capability ones do not have the absorptive capacity to take advantage of externalities 
from complementary industries. High-capability new entrants which manufacture high-end, 
high-tech and high-value items constantly seek to explore new products and highly invest in 
R&D activities. Their core competitiveness ties them closely with local textile firms since a large 
amount of new apparel products cannot be realized without supports from textile firms which 
provide tailored and premium fabrics. The visible input-output linkages and invisible knowledge 
spillovers among complementary industries drive high-capability apparel firms to follow their 
potential partners in the textile industry. The co-location of sportswear firms and textile firms 
specialized in advanced, waterproof and breathable fabrics exemplifies this type of symbiotic, 
reciprocal relationship. On the other hand, low-capability new entrants striving to survive are 
more likely to focus on imitating successful predecessors in the same industry and same locale, 
at least until they become full-fledged. In this scenario, Marshallian externalities are valued over 
Jacobsian externalities. In sum, both Marshallian and Jacobsian externalities have impacts over 
high-capability new entrants, whereas the low-capability new entrants may only be affected by 
the Marshallian externalities. 
Conclusion and Discussion 
This chapter has examined the ways in which spatial restructuring and industrial 
relocation have unfolded in China’s export-oriented manufacturing in general and the most 
footloose, globalized and geographically mobile apparel industry in particular. At the present 
time, while efforts to explain new firm formation and industrial relocation have attracted 
increasing scholarly attention, a great deal of attention is directed towards analyzing industrial 
relocation and new firm formation in either global, regional or local context and most extant 
studies have fallen short in disclosing the full picture where all three aspects (global, regional 
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and local) have profound impacts over the processes of industrial relocation and new firm 
formation in interactional and collective ways. To deal with this lacuna I have used a tri-polar 
analytical framework that combines all three aspects, and have further demonstrated its 
usefulness by using it to interpret the geographical dynamics and industrial relocation in China’s 
apparel industry.  
To make my theoretical insights testable, four hypotheses are proposed. The empirical 
estimations support my hypotheses. It therefore can be assumed that first, the positive effects of 
Marshallian and Jacobsian externalities would be stronger at lower levels, but they start to 
diminish after the density of agglomeration passes a certain threshold. In contrast, the negative 
effects of diseconomies of congestion can be negligible at lower levels of 
agglomeration, but become increasingly cumbersome for new entrants once the level of 
agglomeration becomes excessively high. The inverted ‘U’-shaped benefit minus the increasing 
cost indicates an inverted ‘U’-shaped relationship between new firm formation and the degree of 
agglomeration. Second, labor quality and labor cost are two sides of the same coin which new 
entrants have to balance. As gap between coastal regions and inland China narrows in terms of 
not only labor quality but also supporting facilities and infrastructure which contribute to the 
total labor productivity as well, labor cost has gradually become a more important concern than 
labor quality. Third, in the process of industrial relocation, new entrants started to value central 
China as a favorable investment location over not only coastal region, but also western region 
where additional costs derived from geographical remoteness could potentially outweigh the 
advantage based on low labor cost. Finally, the ways in which and the extents to which new 
entrants could be affected global, regional and local factors are determined by firm-specific 
capabilities.  
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In sum, as labor cost surges and competitive pressures intensify in coastal regions apparel 
employment and production start to diffuse from over-concentrated coastal regions towards the 
central region which is moderately distant from China’s coastline. While the vast majority of 
low-capability new entrants follow this trend, their high-capability counterparts which 
manufacture high-end and time-sensitive items are resistant to the intensified competitive 
pressures in general and rising labor cost in particular. The latter’s persistent preference for 
coastal regions over the central region is due in large part to its strong dependence on high-
quality labor, the Jacobsian externalities, as well as geographical proximity to overseas end 
markets, all of which can only be realized by locating in coastal region.  
Three policy implications can be derived from these empirical findings. First, efforts 
oriented towards regional disparity alleviation should pay attention to the improvement of 
transportation as well as development of regional logistical and distribution system, which can 
lubricate industrial relocation by lowering spatial barriers and increasing geographical proximity. 
Second, labor training and education programs should be conducted with respect to the current 
division of labor. Specifically, in the case of China’s apparel industry, relevant policies in coastal 
region should encourage high-level training and education programs in order to provide highly-
skilled, managerial or R&D labor force, whereas those in inland China should aim to impart 
workers practical and operational techniques. Third, at the national level policies should strive to 
maintain a balance between economies of agglomeration and diseconomies of over-
agglomeration. To release the excessive concentration along the coastal region, one possible 
approach is to nurture Jacobsian agglomeration in coastal regions and Marshallian agglomeration 
in the central region, since the relatively capital-intensive textile industry is less footloose and 
unevenly distributed.  
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In drawing from analysis of firm-level data from 1998 to 2009, I realize the potential 
limitations of my analysis. First, the 2007/8 global financial crisis must have stimulated Chinese 
apparel restructuring and relocation, but its complete effects, which may take more than two or 
three years to be seen, span beyond my study time period. Second, the firm-level data, ASIF, 
which covers all Chinese industrial state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises with 
annual sales of 5 million RMB or more, do not enable me to examine the geographical dynamics 
of small enterprises. In the next chapter on firm location choice and industrial relocation, I have 
employed results from semi-structured firm-level interviews to overcome these limitation, since 
the interviews were conducted with apparel entrepreneurs in late 2012 (four years after the 
outbreak of global financial crisis) and covered both small and large apparel enterprises.  
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CHAPTER 4 GEOGRAPHICAL DYNAMICS AND INDUSTRIAL RELOCATION: 
SPATIAL STRATEGIES OF APPAREL FIRMS IN NINGBO, CHINA 
Introduction 
China’s emergence as a key exporter to the world has relied on low-wage and unskilled 
or semi-skilled labor and industrial clustering. The apparel industry exemplifies this export-
oriented development model. Production and employment have become heavily concentrated in 
the coastal regions of East and Southeast China. With growth in other sectors, prices, land costs, 
wages, and competitive pressures have all risen. The model of ‘race to the bottom’, global 
sourcing, and export-oriented strategy over the past decades is already undergoing fundamental 
restructuring, producing new geographies of production and employment, with the consequent 
need to re-assess the China’s role in global productions networks in the coming years (Chan, 
2010a, 2010b; Lee, 2007).  
In this chapter, I focus on the apparel industry in Ningbo, China and investigate the 
spatial strategy—especially relocation—that has been adopted by Ningbo’s apparel firms. This 
chapter documents the diversity of trajectories in which different kinds of firms are attempting to 
deal with increasing competitive pressures and the dilemmas they pose, and it does so by 
focusing specifically on apparel firms’ spatial strategy, i.e. relocation. At the present time, a 
great deal of attention is directed toward industrial relocation per se, while concern for the 
underlying mechanism driving firm relocation and geographical restructuring has lagged or 
failed to disclose the full view. A tri-polar analytical framework is, therefore, developed in the 
next section to analyze firm relocation in the global, regional and local context. Section three 
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seeks to examine various forms of relocation Ningbo’s apparel industry is undergoing to point 
out the diversity of relocation trajectories. Section four analyzes the relocation processes in the 
global, regional and local context, based on my tri-polar analytical framework. The fifth 
section brings together the main arguments and concludes with an analysis of the impacts of 
these spatial strategies over apparel production networks and opportunities co-existing with firm 
relocation.  
Conceptualization of spatial dynamics: towards an analytical framework  
Firm relocation 
Firms tend to remain at their present location. Firm relocation is not a goal per se but a 
particular form of locational adjustment that leads to a spatial reallocation of economic activities 
(Van Dijk and Pellenbarg, 2000). The concept of ‘relocation’ needs to be clarified first. Most 
studies on firm relocation identify at least two types of relocation: complete relocation and 
partial relocation (Table 8) (Liao and Chan, 2011; Yang, 2012). Complete relocation refers to 
entirely relocating from old location to a new one. Partial relocation usually refers to the 
relocation of labor-intensive and low-end parts of production to lower cost locations, while core 
competencies, like R&D, design, and brand ownership, are considered to be less spatially 
flexible and tied more closely with the old location (Evans and Smith, 2006b; Scott, 2006). 
While some firms in the traditional manufacturing centers in the coastal provinces may see the 
advantages of partial or full industrial relocation, others are more cautious and are implementing 
forms of expansionary relocation (establishment of branch plants or acquisition of other firm’s 
plants usually smaller scale for test in the destination location) or they are outsourcing parts of 
their production to inland enterprises (i.e. Firm B in Type IV).  
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Table 8 Types of Firm Relocation 
Types 
Before After 
New 
Location 
Old 
Location 
I. Complete Relocation 
 
II. Partial Relocation 
 
III. Acquisition or Expansion 
 
IV. Outsourcing or Subcontracting 
   
Source: Compiled by Authors 
 
A tri-polar analytical framework 
Firm location and relocation has been interpreted in terms of three main location theories: 
neo-classical, behavioral and institutional theory (Hayter, 1997). The neo-classical approach 
is based on explanatory models where ‘location factors’ (e.g. transportation cost, labor cost and 
market size) are the main forces driving firm relocation; the behavioral approach explores 
‘internal factors’ (e.g. firm age and size) that are important in the decision-making process of the 
firm and that lead to a particular location; the institutional approach interprets relocation based 
on ‘external’ or ‘institutional factors’ (e.g. social trust, reciprocity, cooperation and convention) 
(Brouwer et al., 2004; Van Dijk and Pellenbarg, 2000). Instead of understanding these factors as 
deriving from seemingly isolated and separate theoretical frameworks, I develop a tri-polar 
analytical framework whereby different strands of theoretical debates and their corresponding 
factors become interrelated and overlapped. Based on Coe, Dicken and Hess’s effort on 
conceptualizing the complexities of the contemporary global economy as a multi-scalar and 
relational framework heavily laden with dynamically interactional and simultaneous processes 
(Coe et al., 2008b), I seek to establish a tri-polar structure of firm’s spatial strategy where 
relocation has been organized globally, regionally and locally (Figure 15). This framework 
AA +A
A A A+
A AA +
A B A+
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is built from a geographical perspective and the tri-polar structure is designed to eschew the 
traditionally hierarchical understanding which predetermines power can only be exerted in a top-
down way. In other words, it implies factors from global, regional and local arena have been 
affecting firm relocation collectively and inter-connectedly. 
Firm 
relocation
Regional/
Regionalization
Local/
Localization
Global/
Globalization
GVC
-Global market change
-Buyer-driven chain
Local industrial cluster
-Embeddedness
-Agglomeration Economy
-Social networks
RPN
-Geographical and social 
proximity
-Short lead-time
-Fast replenishment
 
Figure 15 A Tri-polar Analytical Framework of Firm Relocation  
(GVC: Global Value Chain, RPN: Regional Production Network) 
 
Industrial clustering and path dependence are important in social networks since actors 
are likely to enhance ties with partners that they have the most interactions with and are 
geographical close to, especially if those ties involve complicated interactions and trust (Barnes 
and Gertler, 1999; Storper, 1997). “Such network features are created and reinforced by 
geographic proximity and as a result, economic activity often has an important local dimension” 
(Sturgeon et al., 2008) (emphasis added). Specialized labor markets and exchanges of tacit 
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knowledge are especially dense, efficient and vibrant when it is possible for agents to have face-
to-face interaction. Competitiveness of firm partly hinges on its embeddedness into local clusters 
(Granovetter, 1985; Porter, 1990). Interpretations on how industrial location and relocation 
choice are shaped by clusters therefore focus on the local sources of competitiveness driven by 
local economic agents and their vertical and horizontal relationships which generate collective 
efficiency and knowledge spillovers (Marshall, 1920 [1890]), institutional thickness (Amin and 
Thrift, 1994), embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985) and traded and untraded interdependencies 
(Scott, 1988; Storper, 1997).  
Nevertheless, studies of industrial relocation based exclusively on local clusters tend to 
overlook the significance of external linkages. The underestimation of global factors sometimes 
weakens their explanatory framework or makes their findings problematic, especially as local 
clusters are often integrated into globally organized value chains in a world characterized by 
‘integration of trade’ and ‘disintegration of production’ (Gereffi, 1994, 1999). By highlighting 
the asymmetric power relationship between suppliers and buyers, the literature on GVCs calls 
attention to the fact that the organization of global contracting and sourcing systems are heavily 
affected by the actions and motivations of global buyers, as the latter firmly controls the access 
to end market in the North (Gereffi, 1999; Schmitz and Knorringa, 2000). In the face of 
intensified competition for export contracts many firms must struggle with downward pressure 
on contract prices while being pushed by buyers to accept increased requirements for volume, 
quality, and delivery. Suppliers have been told to ‘do more with less’ by global buyers and had to 
shift some of their production to lower-cost locations, which potentially affects suppliers’ 
decision-making with respect to firm relocation  (Tokatli and Kizilgun, 2010).   
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The focus on ‘global’ is not saying the geographical proximity will quit being a lens 
through which geographical, social, and economic phenomena can be explored and interpreted. 
On the contrary, geographical proximity still matters not only in terms of industrial 
clusters based on face-to-face interaction at the local level, but also because the so-called 
‘modern’ factors at the regional level proposed by Abernathy et al. (2006), further developed by 
Pickles et al. (2006) and Tokatli (2008), in their interpretation of the emergence of regional 
production networks.  
The conventional understanding of global apparel trade hinges on basic economic 
principles of international trade: factor prices, exchange rates, shipping costs, and tariff rates. 
Abernathy et al. (2006) suggests that factors driving apparel sourcing decisions are much more 
nuanced than is predicted based on these traditional factors. Additional costs derived from 
geographical remoteness can potentially outstrip the advantage based on low labor and input 
costs. The emergence of new considerations in sourcing such as the importance of ‘short-cycle 
replenishment’ or short turnaround times in the procurement of time-sensitive, quick-selling 
items has added further stickiness to the flow of apparel trade, reinforce the importance of 
geographical proximity (Tewari, 2006). The rise of lean-retailing is shaping the sourcing pattern 
in a way where, under certain conditions, speedy delivery and quick response are privileged over 
considerations of input and labor costs (Abernathy et al., 2006; Tewari, 2006). 
However, the ways in which geographical proximity shapes localization and 
regionalization differ. The former contends that geographical proximity matters as specialized 
labor markets and knowledge spillovers are especially dense, efficient and vibrant when it is 
possible for agents to have face-to-face interaction. On the other hand, the latter are driven by 
geographical proximity at a larger scale, i.e. regional scale. As sourcing pattern is increasingly 
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shaped by speedy delivery and quick response, supply chain needs to be shortened in terms of 
geographical distance and rationalized to contain both logistical costs and lead time. The fact that 
EU buyers sometimes prefer East Europe and North Africa over lower cost China and India for 
the supply of time-sensitive items exemplifies how geographical proximity generates a 
regionalization of production. In a word, geographical proximity acts as a centripetal force in the 
form of localization and regionalization, whereas globalization, as a centrifugal force, tends to 
encourage industrial relocation as suppliers are often told to ‘do more with less’ by global buyers 
and have to shift some of their production to lower-cost locations.  
Application to China’s apparel industry 
As one of the most globalized, dynamic, and geographically mobile industries, the 
apparel industry has often been seen as an exemplar of supply chain and production flexibility, 
driven either by manufacturing or branded buyer lead-firms predominantly supplying Northern 
markets (i.e. buyer-driven GVC) (Dicken, 2007; Gereffi, 1999). Relocation and delocalization of 
production have long been central aspects of the industry involving the fragmentation of tasks 
and the division of labor across geographical space, usually with the relocation of labor-intensive 
elements of the production process to lower cost locations, while core competencies, like R&D, 
design, and brand ownership, are considered to be less spatially flexible, tied more closely with 
human capital resources and knowledge networks (Evans and Smith, 2006b; Scott, 2006). For 
instance, the last few decades have witnessed a significant relocation of clothing production 
away from the former producing regions in Europe and North America, through Japan, Taiwan, 
South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, to coastal China (Evans and Smith, 2006b); and now 
we expect to see another round of relocation as production costs rise in China’s coastal regions 
(Zhu and Pickles, 2014). 
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At the heart of these changing geographies of production and sourcing are the twin 
processes of globalization and regionalization. Within these patterns of global sourcing 
Abernathy et al. (2004) and Pickles et al.(2006) have shown how geographically proximate 
regional production continues to play a crucial role. In this view, the globalization of sourcing 
thus simultaneously fuels the need for regionalized production systems to supply proximate 
markets with shorter lead-time for orders, faster replenishment, and greater flexibility to adjust 
orders, styles, and colors in the face of uncertain market demand (see (Tokatli, 2008) on the 
importance of regionalized replenishment in Zara’s sourcing for fast fashion). 
In analyzing the rise of China in GVCs it is important, therefore, to show how these 
processes of regionalization structure the complex geographies of competitiveness and cost 
regionally, particularly in regions close to major markets, but also to assess how these processes 
are also at work in China’s own apparel production networks. The regionalization processes in 
China unfolds in two directions: one is the ‘Go-in’ (or intra-national relocation) which refers to 
the relocation of low-wage apparel production to lower-cost inland China, often regions from 
which migrant workers have traditionally been drawn; the other is the ‘Go-out’ (inter-national 
relocation) which refers to the outsourcing of low-wage assembly production from China’s 
coastal region to low-cost producing centers in Southeast Asia. In both cases, the division of 
labor among US or EU, China’s coastal region, and China’s inland region (or low-cost Southeast 
Asian countries) generates a new pattern of “triangular trade” where US or EU buyers send 
orders to the first-tier full-package suppliers located in China’s coastal region who may 
subsequently outsource the assembly production to the second-tier suppliers located in China’s 
inland region or Southeast Asian countries (Lyberaki, 2010). Geographical proximity obviously 
plays a fundamental role in firm’s decision-making with respect to industrial relocation. China’s 
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current configuration is rapidly changing from one dominated by assembly for export markets to 
one that comprises more organizationally and geographically complex global and regional 
production networks.  
The process of relocation is a complex issue, and one that is not only mediated through 
the twin processes of globalization and regionalization, but also inflected by locally specific 
systems of social interaction and trust. I argue that the capacity of apparel firms to relocate 
must be understood within local institutional contexts in which inter-firm learning, social 
network, government policies, labor market and conventions create a dynamic field of 
opportunities and constraints (Dicken and Henderson, 2003; Pickles et al., 2006; Storper, 1997). 
The local dimension becomes more important as Ningbo apparel industry exists in the form of 
cluster with local characteristics. The aggregate economic advantages from industrial clusters 
and social networks on the one hand offset the impact of rising cost and increasing competitive 
pressures, reduce the operating costs in recruitment and sales. On the other hand they delayed or 
inflected the need for industrial relocation considerably (Huang et al., 2011). 
Geographical dynamics and firm relocation 
This section presents case study on relocating Ningbo apparel manufacturers. Examining 
concrete cases is important in order to understand the underlying mechanisms that affect 
individual relocation strategies. The firms included in the sample are mostly active in industrial 
relocation in distinct ways. Most of them started as subcontractors performing assembly work for 
large foreign firms. Some of them are developing their own brands, and most of them have 
implemented at least one type of relocation. What makes these firms interesting is that they all 
have been affected by various factors from the global, regional and local arena therefore made 
distinct decisions.  
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Case A: relocating as a lead firm 
Peace Bird started as a family workshop in the 1980s and expanded drastically in 1990s 
as domestic demand for garments rocketed in China’s transition to a market economy. After its 
transformation from a small family workshop to a real registered enterprise in 1995, the strong 
competitiveness of being a private firm and the founder’s farseeing decision to focus on casual 
shirts gave Peace Bird a competitive advantage over other state-owned and private apparel 
enterprises, a majority of which still relied on mass production and established competitiveness 
on low-cost strategy. In 1999, Peace Bird was the avant-garde to start ladies’ wear production in 
a men’s-wear-production-dominated apparel cluster. Unlike many of the companies in Ningbo’s 
apparel industry, its history in subcontracting is very limited. Production was first carried in-
house and targeted the niche of medium or high-quality, own brand products. Over the past three 
decades it invested intensively on innovation and upgrading, gradually became a lead firm 
focusing on OBM production. It now concentrates on its core competences (R&D, branding, 
marketing and sales), while the rest of production (cutting, sewing, ironing, and trimming) are 
increasingly carried out in smaller factories in Ningbo and elsewhere (Figure 16). In 2006, it still 
directly owned 80% of production, while today outsourced production makes up no less than 80% 
of the total output. The share of outsourcing is likely to increase in the near future as the 
company’s focus has been increasingly switching towards R&D, branding and marketing.  
As the competitive pressures intensified, Peace Bird also wanted to seize the opportunity. 
Although the fluctuation of global demand rarely affected the domestic-market-oriented Peace 
Bird, the rise of labor cost to some extent inflected its strategy. As the general manager of Peace 
Bird commented: 
We only supply domestic market, so appreciation of currency and global financial crisis 
have not caused a lot of damage on us. But the labor issue is real. Some of my friends 
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already moved to Bangladesh or inland China. Wage here is 3000 Yuan a month, while it 
is 2000 or less in inland regions.  
    (General Manager of Peace Bird, translated from Chinese) 
Peace Bird’s relocation strategy unfolded in two ways. One is Type III relocation. In Oct 2003, it 
invested 0.1 billion Yuan to build up a new manufacturing base located in Yichang, Hubei. On 
the one hand, it was thus able to access the market of inland China, compensating its previous 
underinvestment in this area. On the other hand, this relocation enabled Peace Bird to take 
advantage of the low labor cost in inland China. In addition, Yichang is located along the 
Yangtze River so that products can be easily shipped back to Ningbo, which is at the end of 
Yangtze River, at little expense. The other strategy is Type IV relocation. As Peace Bird shed off 
its non-core parts, it let the invisible hand of market to take care of the process of outsourcing. It 
announced its order on apparel market and let subcontractors bid. Whoever offered the best 
deal became its subcontractors. Local subcontractors used to win as they were able to provide 
high-quality service and geographically proximate to Peace Bird. However, as competitive 
pressures intensified and subcontractors outside Ningbo matured, production outsourced by 
Peace Bird gradually moved outside the local cluster, at first relocated to nearby areas within the 
same province, and recently reached the neighboring provinces. However, Peace Bird was also 
aware of the accompanying uncertainty and risk.  
We are not going to move any further, since long supply chain is difficult to manage and 
potentially generates some substantial costs which might outnumber the profit. 
(General Manager of Peace Bird, translated from Chinese) 
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Figure 16 Peace Bird’s Production Networks 
(Source: compiled by authors) 
 
Case B: going out 
Peace Bird represents one extreme of Chinese apparel firms which already became the 
lead firm and concentrated on OBM production. Unlike the domestic-oriented Peace Bird which 
is barely affected by ‘global’ factors, Seduno stands for the other extreme where dominant 
interpretation of the ‘big picture’ stresses the asymmetric relationships between global buyers 
and local suppliers, and the captive role of suppliers in low-wage economies (Gereffi, 1994; 
Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002b). Emerging out of a state-owned enterprise (Zhejiang Dongfang), 
Seduno underwent a process of partial privatization and became joint-venture in late 1990s. 
Starting with assembly production, Seduno is stilling focusing on assembly and OEM production, 
though it began to develop its own brand—C.O. — in 2012. No less than 90% of its production 
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is carried out in-house, which makes Seduno the second largest apparel producers in Ningbo. 
Seduno is weak in OBM production, but it builds up its strength in production stage. Seduno’s 
more than 150 clients are made up by two categories: one is fast fashion retailers like H&M and 
Zara accounting for 70% of its output; the rest 30% is sportswear lead firms such as Adidas and 
Reebok. The concentration on OEM production makes Seduno vulnerable to the intensification 
of competitive pressures in general and rising labor cost in particular. As its general manager 
argued: 
The increase of costs is eroding the profit margin drastically. First, the price of cotton 
increased 100% in 2009; second, Chinese currency appreciated 20%; third, labor cost 
increased from 1000 Yuan a month [in 2000] to 3000 [in the coastal regions in 2012]. 
Since cotton price and exchange rate are relatively stable this year, the biggest concern is 
the rising labor cost. Ningbo’s labor cost has already increased 15% in 2012. 
(General Manager of Seduno, translated from Chinese) 
He also emphasized owning oversea manufacturing base was already the prerequisite to receive 
orders from global buyers. Global buyers, based on their expertise on global sourcing, compel 
their suppliers to relocate to lower cost locations. As a captive producer, Seduno had to comply 
with the ‘command’ from global buyers. Its new manufacturing base in Cambodia was 
employing 500 local workers in 2012 and planned to recruit another 1500 workers within five 
years. Although wage in Cambodia was only one fourth of that in China, the backwardness of 
local supporting facilities in Cambodia forced Seduno to relocate only CMT (cutting, making 
and trimming) production oversea, while leaving the OEM production in Ningbo.  
Case C: staying and going nowhere 
The third firm is Baimu, which like Seduno also got its start from supplying global brand 
firms. Established in 1998 as a small family business performing assembly and OEM production 
on behalf of large global lead firms, the enterprises gradually scrambled along the GVC and 
established strong position in ODM production. Like Seduno, it started with OEM production; 
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unlike Seduno, it stopped taking low-end and low-value-added orders from global buyers like 
Wal-Mart as it started to upgrade. Now, it only supplies medium- and high-end brand firms, such 
as Abercrombie, VANS, Tommy Hilfiger and Diesel. As its founder disclosed, “otherwise, we 
are not competitive compared with low-cost suppliers in Bangladesh and Vietnam”.  
The impact of increasing competitive pressures on Baimu has been limited, since Baimu 
initiated the ‘irreplaceable’ strategy in 2006. Baimu’s irreplaceable strategy refers to not only 
rejecting low-end and low-value-added orders from global buyers like Wal-Mart, but also 
upgrading from assembly to ODM production while supplying medium- and high-end brand 
firms. First, fewer subcontractors can meet the requirement of Abercrombie and Tommy Hilfiger 
as they demand higher-quality of service, quicker response and shorter lead time. This has ruled 
out numerous suppliers with low capacity. In other words, Abercrombie and Tommy Hilfiger 
cannot play off Baimu and other low-cost suppliers against each other. Second, apart from 
supplying medium- and high-end brand firms, Baimu actively invested in upgrading. Its new 
automatic assembly line enabled Baimu to raise the productivity level 30% higher with the same 
amount of labor input. In addition, its cooperation with Abercrombie and Tommy Hilfiger has 
evolved towards a model where Baimu, as a high-end supplier, completes all processes 
except branding. In the face of the changing business environment, Baimu chose to stay and go 
nowhere. Its founder explained why: 
On the one hand, we are irreplaceable. It is hard for Abercrombie and Tommy Hilfiger to 
find another supplier which can meet their high-level requirement on service and product 
quality. Last year, one client cut 50% of its outsourcing to China. We were not even 
affected because what he cut was basically orders for low-end suppliers. On the other 
hand, although costs in inland China and Southeast Asia are lower, suppliers over there 
are not capable to handle our high-end production. Plus, the supporting facilities are poor. 
We value quality rather than cost. So we stay in Ningbo and relocate nowhere. 
(Founder of Baimu, translated from Chinese) 
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Case D: going along the coastline  
The last two cases are in-betweens, compared with Seduno and Baimu. They are both 
subcontractors of leading multinationals. However, neither are they high-end subcontractors as 
Baimu which can stay and go nowhere, nor do they need to seeking for the lowest-cost locations 
as low-end suppliers Seduno. Take Rouse as an example. Rouse is a medium-sized OEM 
producer serving the buyers from the EU and US. In response to the rise of labor cost and new 
round of relocation, Rouse had to shut down some of its production lines in Ningbo and to 
relocate part of production elsewhere. Rouse’s general managers ascribed their relocation to two 
types of changing business environment. One was the increasingly strict environment regulation 
in the coastal regions. The other was the rising labor cost, which referred to not only continuous 
growth of minimum wage set by national and local governments but also potential welfare-
related costs for employees.  
The mandatory minimum wage increased from 1360 Yuan per month to 1680 [Yuan] this 
year [2012]. Last year, the life insurance alone cost me 32 thousand [Yuan] per worker. It 
was only one type of numerous welfare-related costs. In contrast, they do not have this 
kind of welfare-related costs in Southeast Asia. In inland China, the supervision system is 
loose. Our customers are unwilling to take this cost increase and they have been urging us 
to relocate to lower-cost locations. 
(General Manager of Rouse, translated from Chinese) 
When it comes to relocation, Rouse has pioneered in this effort by partially relocating to Zigui, 
Hubei in central China in 2001. The relocation was driven by the corporate strategy to lower the 
cost of production. However, now the Rouse considers this relocation as not a great success. 
Their original relocation decisions were made exclusively on the basis of the traditional factors, 
regardless of the fact that additional costs derived from other aspects can potentially outstrip the 
advantage based on low labor and input costs. Although Rouse was not a high-end supplier like 
Baimu who can provide high-quality service, it was also not a low-end supplier like Seduno 
whose competitive advantage was mainly reliant on low cost. As a medium-end subcontractor, 
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Rouse is supplying customers who are retailing time-sensitive and quick-selling items and stress 
quick response and short lead time more than low costs. However, the time, it takes to transport 
finished products from Rouse’s Zigui plant to the nearest harbor for export, exceeds the required 
delivery time. Drawing a lesson from failure, Rouse’s next step of relocation has been planned as 
‘going along the coastline’, to reach a balance between low cost and fast delivery. Coastal cities 
such as Qufu, Shandong and Yongkang, Zhejiang have been investigated as candidates. Rouse’s 
goal is to ensure the delivery time from plant to harbor is less than five hours.  
Case E: going in but not far away 
Mobi-garden is also a medium-end producer supplying global buyers. Being from the 
outset of an outdoor sportswear subcontractor of leading multinationals such as Decathlon, 
Intersports and Coolmax, it started to upgrade since its birth. First, the company pursued more 
than just ‘narrow subcontracting’. Its participation in the GVC was mainly driven by its 
resolution to achieve process and product upgrading, so as to be a qualified supplier in outdoor 
sportswear industry, which was characterized by high-tech fabric and high-performance wear. 
Moreover, Mobi-garden ensured that each buyer accounted for no more than 30% of total 
outputs, to avoid becoming a captive supplier. As its founder argued: 
The ‘no more than 30%’ rule is set to give us more bargaining power against each of our 
customers. Wal-Mart has contacted us many times to discuss about subcontracting. We 
said no. Wal-Mart is so big that its demand easily outstrips half of our production. We do 
not want to be like those firms who ‘live on Wal-Mart’. 
(Founder of Mobi-garden, translated from Chinese) 
The company was also aware of the changing business environment and had been a pioneer in 
relocation. In response to the new round of relocation, it established a plant and a logistics center 
in Quzhou, Zhejiang (the same province as Ningbo) and another plant in Shangshao, Jiangxi (the 
neighboring province). Both of two locations were geographically close to Ningbo so that 
delivery time and costs were manageable, and risk and uncertainty could be minimized. This also 
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partly explains why Mobi-garden has not gone further west or to Southeast Asia. Supporting 
facilities and supply chain are so backward in Southeast Asia that materials like accessories 
(buttons and zippers) have to be shipped from Ningbo, and finished products have to be 
shipped back to logistics distribution centers located in Ningbo. Unlike Seduno whose products 
are mainly made up by low-cost and low-end T-shirts, Mobi-garden’s high-tech, medium- and 
high-end outdoor sportswear entails high-skilled labor and advanced supply chain management. 
Neither of them can be met by Southeast Asian countries. Other reasons keep Mobi-garden from 
relocating to Southeast Asia include bureaucratic costs, volatile political situation and 
unacquainted legal and cultural circumstances.  
Other less prevalent spatial strategies include reversed relocation and resource-oriented 
relocation. The former one refers to relocating R&D and designing department, which are 
normally tied closely with human capital resources and knowledge networks, to high-cost 
regions. Shanshan’s relocation of its designing department to Shanghai is a case in point. Giant 
eagle’s acquisition of a manufacturing base in Xinjiang, to take advantage of nearby cotton 
resources, exemplifies the resource-oriented relocation. Finally, the above-listed cases are not 
implying that one firm only implements one spatial strategy or one type of relocation. On the 
contrary, firms, in particular medium and large ones, have been experimenting with a complex 
array of spatial and industrial responses including factory consolidation, plant closure and 
geographical relocation, and sometimes launching a combination of various types of relocation. 
Peace Bird’s simultaneous focus on Type III and Type IV relocation is a case in point.  
Relocation in the global, regional and local context 
The ways in which the above-listed firms have been affected by global factors to different 
extents can be perfectly interpreted by the GVC analysis, which investigates the inter-firm, often 
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cross-border, relationships. Particular attention, especially in the buyer-driven apparel GVC, 
has been given to the role of powerful lead firms that “undertake the functional integration and 
coordination of internationally dispersed activities” (Gereffi, 1999), and to governance structures, 
defined as “authority and power relationships that determine how financial, material, and human 
resources are allocated and flow within a chain” (Gereffi, 1994). In this research, I shall argue 
that by exercising this governance, global lead firms also play an important role in determining 
the relocation processes of their suppliers. The extent to which suppliers’ relocation is 
influenced by their global buyers is dependent on the type of GVC and the asymmetry of power 
it creates. Gereffi et al. (2005) identified five modes of GVC governance: market, modular, 
relational, captive and hierarchy (vertical integration). The first one is market type of governance 
where price is paramount and transactions are arms-length. When buyer-driven industries require 
more intense interactions between lead firms and suppliers, governance takes on a relational or 
modular form as lead firms and suppliers develop close and mutually dependent relations with a 
high degree of trust, or a captive form which enables lead firms to maintain tighter control over 
production and sourcing. The degree of power asymmetry increases from the market to hierarchy.  
The GVC-based explanation partially reveals the logic behind the divergence of Chinese 
apparel firms’ relocation (Table 9). Seduno represents OEM producer whose core competencies 
are low-cost and volume production. It is trapped in a captive governance structure where 
producers are dependent on one or a few large customers for the bulk of their sales and also 
dependent on these customers for the designing and branding of the garments they manufacture. 
In this case, Seduno cannot make relocation decision independently as its customers keep 
imposing their sourcing strategies on it. It had to relocate to Southeast Asia if its customers 
consider oversea manufacturing bases as necessary. At the other end of the spectrum stands 
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Baimu, whose relationship with global buyers is more symmetrical. Baimu, as a relatively 
independent supplier, is able to provide access to specialized assets and complementary 
competences which buyers may find difficult to develop or manage cost-effectively. The fact that 
competent suppliers cannot be easily found and therefore the switching costs are high for both 
parties makes Baimu’s relationship with its customers more symmetrical and stable. 
Consequently, it can make the relocation decision more independently. In between, there are 
Rouse and Mobi-garden who cannot make relocation as independently as Baimu and also are not 
as captive as Seduno in the GVC. Their spatial strategies are therefore co-shaped by both parties. 
Peace Bird is an exception because it is a domestic-oriented lead firm which is not in a GVC. It 
can make relocation decision entirely independently as impact from global factors is negligible.  
Table 9 Comparison of Apparel Firms in Ningbo 
 Peace Bird Baimu 
Rouse and Mobi-
Garden 
Seduno 
Governance 
structure 
Domestic-oriented 
lead firm, not in a 
GVC 
Relational/ 
Modular 
 Captive 
Business 
Mode 
OBM ODM  OEM, assembly 
Core 
competencies 
Branding, R&D, 
Marketing, 
innovation 
Designing, full-
package 
production 
 
Low-cost and 
volume production 
Products 
Medium-end 
garments for 
domestic markets 
Intricate, medium- 
and high-quality 
garments for 
global buyers 
 
Mostly basics (t-
shirts and low-cost 
shirts) for 
global buyers 
Degree of 
power 
asymmetry 
N/A low  high 
Global 
Buyer’s 
impact 
No impact weak  strong 
(Source: compiled by authors) 
 
However, the GVC analysis leaves many open questions. First, Baimu can make 
relocation decision relatively independently does not mean it has to stay, if relocation can bring 
cost-saving and profit. As the global factors are pushing firms to relocate as a centrifugal force, 
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what is the centripetal force that fixates firms? Second, even though some firms relocate, why 
are they only implementing Type II, III, and IV relocation? In other words, why is complete 
relocation rare? To clarify these questions, local factors are explored to offer a second angle of 
explanation. The development and rapid diffusion of knowledge within the cluster are not only 
the result of incidental synergies, the industrial atmosphere, but also are fostered by local 
institutional, cultural and societal contexts. Firms that are deeply embedded in their original 
locations may continue to benefit from labor pools, knowledge spillover and inter-firm synergies 
that have cultivated over time.  
Cluster analysis that relies on transaction costs, knowledge, institutions and social 
perspectives stresses the key importance of vertical character of linkages (Piore and Sabel, 1984; 
Scott, 1988; Storper, 1997). Vertical linkages in Ningbo’s apparel cluster unfold in two ways. 
The intra-industry linkage refers to a multi-tier local production networks where large first-tier 
subcontractors or lead firms outsource to local small second-tier subcontractors (Figure 16). The 
inter-industry linkage shows the linkages between apparel firms and local supporting facilities, 
which bundles both accessories manufacturing (e.g. buttons and zippers) and a powerful 
localized textile industry. For instance, Guangyuan Fabric’s specialization in R&D, designing, 
production and sales of knitted fabrics ties it closely with local apparel firms, such as GXG and 
Tonlion, as spatial proximity between partners with input-output linkages minimizes transaction 
costs. Cluster analysis not only values the producer-user vertical relations, but also draws 
attention towards knowledge flows through horizontal networks (Porter, 1990). The local social 
network, characteristic with common cultural background and friendship ties, could make the 
information exchange, communication and cooperation between enterprises much easier.  
We were only able to manufacture suits before. But as we are embedded in Ningbo’s 
apparel cluster, we imitated local lead firms’ success to diversify production. We 
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cooperate with local coat firms to learn how to make coats; we work with local shirt firms 
to learn how to make shirts; we have also learnt how to make woolen overcoats through 
collaboration with local firms. The inter-firm linkages remain, even after we have 
mastered the new know-how. We outsource part of production to them in rush season.  
(Chairman of Kangnan, translated from Chinese) 
Surrounding organizations, such as a supportive apparel association and sophisticated 
professional and vocational schools or training institutes, further reinforce the local vertical and 
horizontal linkages. These characteristics of clusters generate many benefits for enterprises and 
counteract the rising costs to certain extent, on the one hand, alleviate the urgency for firm 
relocation on the other. 
Geographical proximity not only acts as a centripetal force in the form of 
localization based on knowledge spillover and externalities within local cluster, but also plays an 
effective role in shaping relocation processes towards a regionalized direction. The importance 
of geographically proximate regional production is due largely to the specific demands 
created by the needs of particular products in relation to short production cycles, quick response, 
and rapid replenishment (Pickles and Smith, 2011) (also see Rouse’s first unsuccessful relocation 
to Zigui). Supply chain needs to be shortened in terms of geographical distance, as 
geographically long supply chain incurs logistical costs which violate the rule of ‘supply chain 
rationalization’. Consequently, as apparel firms in Ningbo have to partially relocate away from 
local clusters, neighboring regions are often privileged. Second, geographical remoteness come 
with a variety of risks and uncertainties, especially as firms relocates to deep inland China or 
Southeast Asia where political, cultural and societal contexts are entirely different. Finally, the 
backwardness of labor quality, supporting facilities, infrastructure, and local suppliers’ capability 
in deep inland China and Southeast Asia also frighten relocating firms off.   
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To sum up, firms stuck in captive GVCs have to relocate to Southeast Asia if 
global buyers consider overseas manufacturing bases to be necessary (Seduno). However, inter-
national relocation becomes problematic for firms manufacturing time-sensitive and quick-
selling items, because logistical costs generated by geographically long supply chain can 
potentially outweigh the advantage based on low labor and input costs. Other reasons prevent 
firms from relocating inter-nationally (e.g. to Southeast Asia) include bureaucratic costs, volatile 
political situation and unacquainted legal and cultural circumstances. As a result, nearby areas 
within the same province and neighboring provinces in central China are privileged over 
Southeast Asia by firms which supply time-sensitive items with short lead-time, fast 
replenishment, and quick response. Unlike Seduno’s ‘going-out’, certain firms’ relocation, 
therefore, unfolds in an intra-national way (Mobi-garden and Rouse), especially as they can 
make relocation decisions more independently in less captive GVCs. Both inter-national and 
intra-national relocation are the result of the complex balance in relocation processes between 
regionalization and globalization. Firms which manufacture medium- or high-end, time-sensitive 
and quick-selling items tend to relocate intra-nationally, while suppliers dependent on low-wage 
and low-cost production is more likely to conduct inter-national relocation. In both cases, 
regional and global factors co-shape firm’s decision-making with respect to relocation but to 
different extents. Localization plays as a centripetal force since benefits generated by clusters 
counteract the rising costs to certain extent and allow some firms to withstand the intensified 
pressures (Baimu), on the one hand, and entice relocating firms to leave their headquarters and 
core departments at home (Mobi-garden, Rouse, Seduno, and Peace Bird), on the other hand. 
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Conclusion and discussion 
This chapter formulates a tri-polar analytical framework that combines ‘global’, ‘regional’ 
and ‘local’ in an interactional way. The usefulness of this framework is illustrated in a case study 
about relocation of Ningbo’s apparel firms. The rise of China’s export-oriented apparel industry 
since the 1990s has been driven largely by global sourcing practices intent on capturing the cost 
advantages of a development model predicated, in part, on unskilled or semi-skilled migratory 
labor flows linking inland labor pools to coastal production sites. Since the early 2000s, coastal 
factories have increasingly had to confront difficulties generated by the increasing social and 
economic costs of this regionally concentrated low-wage growth model. As competitive 
pressures, production costs, and wages have increased in recent years, apparel enterprises 
have been hit hard by slackening global demand, production cost hikes, RMB appreciation, 
rising labor cost and approval of new policies. Rising labor costs have been particularly 
important in forcing China’s apparel enterprises to restructure their value chains. At the present 
time, a great deal of attention is directed toward industrial relocation, while concern for the 
underlying mechanism driving firm relocation and geographical restructuring has lagged or 
failed to disclose the full view.  
In drawing from a single case study, I realize the potential limitations of my analysis. 
However, the case of Ningbo provides a number of insights to the interpretation of relocation. 
First, firms are deeply embedded in their original locations and keep benefiting from local 
vertical and horizontal linkages they have cultivated over time in cluster. Second, the global 
factors emphasize cross-border linkages between global buyers from the North and local 
suppliers from Ningbo, and have been acting as a centrifugal force while driving firms to 
delocalize and relocate to lower-cost locations. Third, regionalization draws attention to the 
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assemblage of a range of forces including geographical proximity, delivery time, supply chain 
management as well as labor costs, all impacting on the geographies of sourcing decisions and 
production networks. Combining these important pillars, my tri-polar framework interprets 
industrial relocation through systematic interrelationships and ongoing interaction between 
globalization, regionalization and localization.  
In addition, the extent to which firm relocation processes are affected by globalization, 
regionalization and localization is determined by firm’s characteristic. For instance, firm’s 
embeddedness into local cluster, its horizontal and vertical linkages with other firms co-locating 
in the same cluster, and reliance on local supporting facilities largely explains its degree of 
localization and capability to resist relocation. Furthermore, firm’s core competencies, main 
products, and business mode disclose its position in GVC and extent to which global buyers are 
able to affect its sourcing strategy and relocation processes. These characteristics also decide 
firm’s need to handle quick response, short lead time, quick replenishment and therefore its 
tendency to embrace geographical proximity and regional production network. My argument is, 
therefore, not only simply about industrial relocation in the global, regional and local context 
where advantages of some untraditional factors can outweigh profit generated by lower labor 
cost, but about also the diversity of trajectories of relocation, some of which may not be 
reducible to a singular logic. Likewise, the extent to which firm relocation processes are 
affected by globalization, regionalization and localization is also determined by sector-specific 
characteristics, which deserves further investigation.  
This research also engages with debates on ‘opportunities for suppliers’ in GVC analysis. 
In a buyer-driven chain as apparel which is often characterized by the asymmetric relationships 
and the captive role of producers in low-wage economies, particular attention has been drawn 
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towards how global buyers both contribute to process and product upgrading of local suppliers 
and also place limits on functional upgrading and market diversifications (Humphrey and 
Schmitz, 2002b). Much existing literature on GVC emphasizes the action and motivation of 
global buyers are the key causal forces in the organization of global contracting systems (Gereffi, 
1999; Schmitz and Knorringa, 2000) which makes suppliers’ prospect seems dimmed, whereas 
reality may be more complex and changes over time may lead to the emergence of more 
symmetrical relationships among actors and diversity of trajectories.  
What is happening in Ningbo’s apparel industry is that intensified competition propels a 
variety of relocation responses. The sector appears to be ‘stuck in the middle’ and the trend 
favoring the relocation of production towards lower wage economies appears to be accelerating. 
Although this trend is often portrayed as a sign of danger leading to desperate exodus, this 
explanation has overlooked the fact that rising labor cost is only part of the story. I have 
suggested in this chapter that we need to be sensitive in any analytical work to the 
complex balance in relocation processes between a range of forces derived from regionalization, 
localization as well as globalization. The five different examples of relocation in apparel 
suppliers exhibit five different trajectories, but they also have something in common. Having 
previous experience with supplying global brands, at some stage they opted for relocation of the 
labor-intensive low-end processes to lower-wage locations. In the process of relocation, they 
either developed their own brand or evolved towards a triangular trade mode where the former 
producers became the intermediaries or full-package producers while they further outsource 
global buyers’ order to second tier subcontractors in lower-cost locations. Therefore, relocation 
of production may offer local suppliers some opportunities in the direction of upgrading within 
a buyer-driven GVC. In terms of policy implications, it appears that participating in a GVC is an 
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‘effort-intensive’ process involving risks and unanticipated traps but also opportunities. 
Opportunities exist not in relocation per se, especially if firms only conduct complete relocation 
with a pure purpose to chase for lower-cost locations, but in specific types of relocation which 
come with upgrading hand in hand.  
 
110 
CHAPTER 5 PROCESS, PRODUCT, AND FUNCTIONAL UPGRADING IN A 
GLOBALIZED AND LOCALIZED WORLD: FIRM-LEVEL EVIDENCE FROM 
CHINA’S APPAREL INDUSTRY 
Introduction 
One of the feasible responses of firms to maintain or increase their competitiveness in the 
increasingly globalized economy is to upgrade their production. Upgrading involves producers’ 
capability to make better products, to make products more efficiently, or to move into more 
skilled activities (Kaplinsky, 2000; Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2006; Porter, 1990). In Global 
Value Chain (GVC) approach, the concept of industrial upgrading is defined in a similar way as 
“the process by which economic actors—nations, firms, and workers—move from low-value to 
relatively high-value activities in global production networks” (Gereffi, 2005: 171). Upgrading is 
an increasingly central element in shaping new geographies of production, as economic actors 
strive to shed low-value activities and the social and economic problems they can generate in 
favor of higher-value activities (Bair, 2005; Gereffi, 2005; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002b; Ponte, 
2002). Here a primary focus has been on the mechanisms whereby firms and industries engineer 
a process of industrial upgrading within GVCs to capture additional functions in supply chains 
which generate higher value added. Humphrey and Schmitz (2002a), for example, distinguish 
between four types of upgrading in global value chains: product, process, functional and 
chain/inter-sectoral upgrading.  
 functional (moving to higher-value functions);  
 product (producing higher-value products);  
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 process (incorporation of more sophisticated technologies into production and/or 
re-engineering production lines, such as in lean manufacturing); and  
 chain/inter-sectoral (leveraging expertise gained in one industrial sector to enter a 
new sector). 
In a buyer-driven chain such as apparel, which is often characterized by the captive role 
of suppliers in low-wage economies, particular attention has been drawn to how 
global buyers both contribute to process and product upgrading of local suppliers and place 
limits on functional upgrading and market diversifications (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002b). 
Process and product upgrading have thus been related to ‘learning from global buyers’, while the 
sources of capabilities that lead to functional upgrading, as conventionally conceived, derive 
from local knowledge transmission and local institutional context 
13
 (Giuliani et al., 2005; 
Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002b). In this chapter, I test and extend these findings using a large 
firm-level dataset on China’s apparel industry. Specifically, this chapter focuses on the 
development and dynamism of functional, process and product upgrading in China’s apparel 
industry, and investigates the ways in which and the extent to which different types of upgrading 
have been co-shaped by both global and local forces.  
China’s apparel industry provides a rich context. On the one hand, the impressive 
economic growth of China has been driven to a large extent by an export-oriented 
industrialization model and China’s inclusion into GVCs (Gereffi, 2009). The integration of the 
Chinese apparel industry into global production and trade networks deepened greatly after 1990. 
Between 1994 and 2010, China increased its exports of apparel products from US$ 24.3 billion 
to US$ 149.5 billion (Figure 17). Despite declines in 1998-1999 and 2009 as a result of the 1998 
                                                     
13
For Ponte and Ewert (2009: 1639) “The status of inter-sectoral upgrading is unclear, as it relates to a trajectory of 
upgrading, while the other three categories describe what aspect of a given business is being upgraded”. For similar 
reasons I do not consider chain upgrading in this chapter. 
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Asian Financial Crisis and 2008 Global Financial Crisis respectively, Chinese apparel exports 
surged, driven largely by export to the US market in the early 2000s and by the removal of 
quotas on apparel exports to the developed countries in 2005. China’s export orientation of 
labor-intensive products has generated greater capacity utilization, vertical and horizontal 
integration, product specialization, increasing familiarity with technology, and large learning-by-
doing effects.  
 
Figure 17 Import and Export of China’s Apparel Products (1994-2010)14 
Data Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1995-2011. 
 
On the other hand, besides global linkages, another important and enduring basis for 
competitive advantages is predicated on firm’s localness. The capacity of Chinese apparel firms 
to upgrade must also be understood within local institutional contexts in which inter-firm 
learning, social network, government policies, labor market, and conventions create a dynamic 
field of opportunities and constraints (Dicken and Henderson, 2003; Pickles et al., 2006; Storper, 
                                                     
14Based on China’s classification of exports in the statistical yearbook, I have calculated the data on exports of 
apparel products by adding up four categories of Textile and Apparel Articles: 1. Knitted or Crocheted Fabrics. 2. 
Articles of Apparel and Clothing Accessories, Knitted or Crocheted. 3. Articles of Apparel and Clothing 
Accessories, not Knitted or Crocheted. 4. Other Made Up Textile Articles; Sets; Worn Clothing And Worn Textile 
Articles; Rags Articles; Rags. These four labor-intensive sectors has increased faster than other categories of Textile 
and Apparel Articles and represented 76% of China’s export of Textile and Apparel Articles in 2010, compared 
to 71% in 1994. 
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1997). The local dimension becomes more important in this scenario, as China’s apparel industry, 
in most cases, exists in the form of cluster with local characteristics (Wei, 2011; Wei et al., 2007; 
Wei et al., 2009). Apparel production and employment has heavily concentrated in the coastal 
regions of east and southeast China in general, and in a series of apparel clusters in coastal 
provinces in particular (Figure 3) (Fujita and Hu, 2001; He et al., 2008; Wen, 2004). 
Upgrading is a complex process, and one that is not only mediated through globalization 
and global linkages, but also shaped by what Storper (1997) refers to as the locally specific 
untraded interdependencies and systems of social interaction and trust. Due to its increasing 
integration into GVCs and heavy reliance on industrial clustering, China’s apparel industry 
provides an ideal case to research the dynamism of various types of upgrading and their 
relationship with both global and local linkages. Specifically, this chapter pays attention to the 
fluidity, complexity, variety, contingency, heterogeneity and dynamism of this relationship, by 
documenting the diverse effects global and local linkages have had over firm upgrading and the 
ways in which such effects have been constantly evolving over time. Section two presents a 
conceptual account on the articulation between firm upgrading, global and local forces. The third 
section introduces the data, variables and specifications for empirical analysis. Section five 
discusses the empirical results. The last section concludes the chapter by summarizing main 
findings and discussing theoretical and policy implications. 
Process, product, and functional upgrading in a globalized and localized world 
In this chapter, I focus on one of the central analytical heuristics in GVC research: the 
concept of  upgrading, particularly as it has been used to highlight paths for developing countries 
firms to ‘move up the value chain’ usually through the lenses of four categories—product, 
process, functional, and inter-sectoral upgrading (Gereffi, 1999; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002b). 
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Product and process upgrading involve firms retaining their position in a chain by enhancing 
productivity gains through adopting new production processes or new configurations of product 
mix. Functional upgrading involves a movement ‘up’ the chain into newer, higher value added 
activity, such as full package and own design/own brand manufacturing in the clothing sector. 
Chain upgrading involves a movement into new activity which may also imply higher skills and 
capital requirement and value added (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002a; Milberg and Winkler, 
2010). The implicit expectation in this work is that firms that upgrade produce higher value-
added products and/or take on more sophisticated functions along a value chain over time. 
By focusing on the array of network relations that structure the production and circulation 
of value, GVC scholars have been able to assess the asymmetries of power between lead-firms 
and suppliers (Gereffi, 1994, 1999), different forms of governance that marshal and exercise this 
power (Gereffi, 2005; Gereffi et al., 2005), and their consequences for work-place conditions and 
wages (Barrientos et al., 2008, 2010; Gereffi et al., 2011; Mayer and Pickles, 2010). As a greater 
proportion of global commodities are increasingly traded through GVCs, analyzing their 
structure and practices becomes even more crucial. The integration of clothing producers and 
workers in various parts of the world economy into export-oriented production networks has 
produced an extensive literature (see for example (Bair, 2005, 2009; Begg et al., 2003; Leslie 
and Reimer, 1999; Smith, 2003; Smith et al., 2003; Smith et al., 2005)). But, as Bair (2005) 
notes, the earlier focus of much of this work on global commodity chains has more recently 
shifted towards analysis of the way that value chains are organized and governed, and a 
consideration of the implications for industrial upgrading (also see (Gereffi et al., 2005)). 
The upgrading process has been attributed to the acquiring of new capabilities and 
increasing competencies through participating in particular chains, a process that generates 
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knowledge and information flows from lead firms to their suppliers. Although the knowledge 
and information flow within GVCs has high value for local firms, the role played by the 
global buyers in fostering and supporting local firms’ upgrading process is less clear. Mainly 
focusing on East Asia, Gereffi (1999), has stressed the role of global lead firms in promoting 
process upgrading, product upgrading and functional upgrading among local producers. However, 
more recently Gereffi (2005) and others such as Schmitz and Knorringa (2000) and Humphrey 
and Schmitz (2002b) have stressed that global buyers both contribute to process and product 
upgrading of local suppliers and place limits on functional upgrading and market diversifications, 
especially in a quasi-hierarchical chain (e.g., apparel). To achieve functional upgrading, supplier 
firms in developing countries have to rely to a greater extent on local sources of innovations, 
which are not only the result of knowledge spillovers and inter-firm synergies within local 
cluster but are also fostered by policy networks of public and private actors (Barnes and Gertler, 
1999; Scott, 1996; Storper, 1997). Therefore, while process and product upgrading have been 
linked to ‘learning from global buyers’, the sources of capabilities that lead to functional 
upgrading, are conventionally understood to derive from local knowledge transmission and local 
institutional context (Giuliani et al., 2005; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002b). This chapter seeks to 
test these findings and to argue that this tendency to attribute functional upgrading to ‘local’ 
factors and process/product upgrading to ‘global’ factors has become problematic as the global 
sourcing system and GVCs have been constantly transformed in the past few decades. 
Work on upgrading requires an engagement with the wider historical, political, 
institutional, economic and social context within which production networks are embedded. 
While process, product and functional upgrading may be apparent in China’s apparel industry 
(Zhu and Pickles, 2014), these have been articulated with a range of other causal mechanisms 
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that relate to wider and changing economic, institutional and historical conditions which are 
central in assessing the extent to which a process of upgrading is even possible (Smith et al., 
2014). In other words, there is a need to move beyond a firm-centered approach to upgrading 
towards a framework which recognizes the embeddedness of firm and sector-level change within 
the context of wider historical economies and institutional arrangements. This suggests the need 
for a framework that seriously takes into account the forces external to the chain that structure 
(enable and limit) what actors in the chain do (Bair, 2009; Pickles et al., 2006; Smith, 2003; 
Smith et al., 2003). In my case, this means the articulation between various types of firm 
upgrading and global/local factors needs to be not only understood as dynamic, contingent, and 
fluid, but also interpreted in ways which take into account the specific historical development of 
China’s apparel industry, the evolution of institutional arrangements for apparel, and the ups and 
downs of globalization and global economy. 
Furthermore, in these debates on upgrading, it is also important that we take seriously the 
heterogeneity, complexity and variety of the relationship between upgrading and global/local 
factors.  First, given the fact that firms are actually heterogeneous with different attributes and 
capabilities and firm upgrading decisions are normally made based on firm attributes, it may be 
inappropriate to examine the articulation between various types of firm upgrading and 
global/local factors only through meso- or macro-level analysis without paying special attention 
to micro- or firm-level features (Wang et al., 2010; Wang and Lin, 2013). Second, there also 
needs to be consideration of the heterogeneity and complexity of the effects of global and local 
linkages over firm upgrading, since such effects are, in most instances, materialized through 
interactions between heterogeneous firms in global and regional production networks.  
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The heterogeneity of firms, complexity of the effects of global and local linkages over 
firm upgrading, and the wider historical, political, institutional, economic and social context have 
all played a critical role in the process of firm upgrading and its articulation with global and local 
factors. They suggest that a focus on dynamics of firm upgrading alone is insufficient. 
Specifically, this chapter pays attention to the fluidity, complexity, variety, contingency, 
heterogeneity and dynamism of the relationship between firm upgrading and global/local 
forces, by documenting the diverse effects global and local linkages have had over firm 
upgrading and the ways in which such effects have been constantly evolving over time. 
Research design 
Firm entry and firm exit 
One database on firm-specific economic and financial variables is used to test the debates 
on upgrading: China’s Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF) (1998-2009) 15. Table 10 
presents the temporal change of firm entry and exit in China’s apparel industry. If firm i is 
reported in the ASIF in year t but not in year t-1, this firm is considered as a new firm in year t. 
Likewise, if firm i is reported in the ASIF in year t but not in year t+1, it is assumed that firm i 
exits in year t. Firm entry rate is thereafter calculated as the ratio of the number of new firms to 
the number of all firms in a specific year, and firm exit rate is the share of the number of exiting 
firms. Since ASIF dataset only includes non-state-owned enterprises with annual sales of 5 
million RMB or more besides state-owned enterprises, firm exit and entry rate are likely to be 
overestimated to some extent due to the fact that: (1) non-state-owned enterprise that passes the 
threshold (annual sales of 5 million RMB or more) in year t but fails to do so in year t+1 will be 
treated as an exiting firm; (2) non-state-owned enterprise that passes the threshold in year t but is 
                                                     
152004 and 2008 are also China’s census years, indicating inconsistent statistical criteria in these two years. In 
addition, firm identification information (i.e., legal person code) is incomplete in 2008 and 2009. As a result, ASIF 
2004, 2008 and 2009 will be excluded or investigated separately in the following analysis.  
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not big enough in year t-1 will be considered as a new firm. However, the goal here is to roughly 
see the temporal change and evolution of China’s apparel industry, rather than the magnitude of 
individual indicator.  
Table 10 Firm Entry and Exit in China’s Apparel Industry (1998-2007) 
Year 
Number of 
Firms 
New Firms 
Firm Entry 
Rate (%) 
Exiting 
Firms 
Firm Exit 
Rate (%) 
Surviving 
Firms 
1998 5,685 
  
1,369 24.8% 4,316 
1999 5,909 1,593 26.9% 1,399 23.7% 4,510 
2000 6,155 1,645 26.7% 1,734 28.2% 4,421 
2001 7,295 2,874 39.4% 1,253 17.2% 6,042 
2002 8,214 2,172 26.4% 1,484 18.1% 6,730 
2003 9,252 2,522 27.3% 3,673 39.7% 5,579 
2004 11,226 5,647 50.3% 2,050 18.3% 9,176 
2005 11,339 2,163 19.1% 1,568 13.8% 9,771 
2006 12,358 2,587 20.9% 1,507 12.2% 10,851 
2007 13,968 3,117 22.3% 
   
Data Source: Compiled by authors, from the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms 1998-2007 
 
The number of apparel firms has increased from 5,685 to 13,968 during 1998-2007, with 
an average firm entry rate of 26.1% and an average firm exit rate of 19.5%
16
. The time period of 
1998-2007 can be roughly divided into three stages based on the development of the apparel 
industry:  
(1) 1998-2001 represents a recovery stage after the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis. At this 
stage, on the one hand, the number of firms was increasing, on the other, firm exit and 
exit rate were both high, suggesting the co-existence of industrial recuperation and 
reorganization/restructuring. 
(2) 2001-2004 could be considered as a post-WTO stage.  The growth of China’s apparel 
industry was accelerated with WTO accession in 2001. In 2002, firm entry rate was as 
high as 26.4% while exit rate was less than 20%. However, the growth rate has been 
decreasing during 2001-2003, as China’s apparel industry started to feel the constraints 
caused by the MFA.  
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Firm exit and entry rates calculated based on the ASIF 2004 data have been excluded. 
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(3) China’s apparel industry boomed again during 2005-2007, a post-MFA stage, where 
firm entry rate rebounded while exit rate kept declining. Although firm entry rate was 
relatively lower during 2005-2007 than before, so was the firm exit rate, resulting in an 
overall increment in the absolute value of the number of firms as well as its growth rate. 
Relatively lower exit and entry rate also signaled the maturation and stabilization of 
Chinese apparel firms as well as the entire industry. 
Such a three-stage development of China’s apparel industry during 1998-2007 is also 
supported by the temporal change of growth rate (Figure 18). 
 
Figure 18 Growth Rate of the Number of Firms in China’s Apparel Industry 
Data Source: Compiled by authors, from the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms 1998-2007 
 
Measuring process, product and functional upgrading at the firm level 
Most of the massive amount of research done on upgrading has focused on the study of 
individual cases of countries, firms, regions or sectors (Giuliani et al., 2005; Neidik and Gereffi, 
2006; Pickles et al., 2006; Ponte and Ewert, 2009; Tokatli and Kizilgun, 2004). Case 
studies bring a deeper understanding of the process of upgrading, the role of each of the key 
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actors and the obstacles that upgrading firms face in GVCs. However, qualitative studies based 
on case studies and key informant interviews tend to focus on success stories and/or the most 
important firms, indicating a bias problem that would skew any generalizations one might draw 
from the overall literature (Milberg and Winkler, 2011; Pavlínek and Ženka, 2010). In addition, 
their results are in some instances difficult to generalize due to the limited sample size. On the 
other hand, in quantitative analyses, upgrading is often measured by analyzing export values, 
quantities, and unit values using macroeconomic trade data at the country, or at best regional, 
level, due to the unavailability of firm-level data (Gereffi, 1999, 2009; Pickles and Smith, 2011). 
These data are difficult to interpret because higher unit values can signify either upgrading or 
higher costs (e.g., higher wages), and the high level of aggregation makes it hard to understand 
firm dynamics.  
In this chapter, to overcome the limitations of export value analysis based on trade data 
and qualitative analysis based on company interviews, I use an empirical, firm-level approach, 
developed by Pavlínek and Ženka (2010), to measure upgrading at the firm level. This allows me 
not only to evaluate the extent of upgrading in the industry as a whole and to compare its extent 
among individual firms and selected groups of firms, but also to differentiate and measure 
different types of upgrading (i.e., functional, process and product upgrading). In doing so, I 
formulate a comprehensive yet nuanced approach to measure upgrading at the firm level, which 
complements current qualitative and quantitative methods. 
To analyze industrial upgrading, I have employed three indicators
17
. Capital intensity of 
production (fixed asset per employee) reflects a firm’s investment into buildings, machinery and 
equipment. This type of investment can lead to an increase in labor productivity, through the 
                                                     
17
All variables have been deflated and expressed according to 1998 prices using appropriate price indexes, unless 
stated otherwise. 
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materialized technological progress, as a result of process upgrading (Pavlínek and Ženka, 2010; 
Sakellaris and Wilson, 2004). A firm is classified as having a product upgrading if it successfully 
introduces new products. Finally, the share of value-added in output reflects the firm’s capability 
to produce and retain value, therefore is employed as an indicator of functional upgrading. 
Although process upgrading (increasing production efficiency) and product upgrading 
(introducing higher value-added products) enable firms to capture more value in absolute terms, 
the share of value-added in output is mostly determined by the power asymmetry, firms’ position, 
and the specific functions firms perform in the apparel GVCs.  
Table 11 shows the temporal change of the mean value of process, product and functional 
upgrading indicators at the firm level in China’s apparel industry during 1998 and 2007. My data 
suggests that while the number of firms has been growing consistently from 1998 to 2007 (Table 
10), resulting in continuous job creation and output increment, the temporal change of industrial 
upgrading indicators indicate a more complicated situation where upgrading is not always the 
case (Table 11). All three indicators went downhill after the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis, 
and bounced back a little due partly to China’s accession into the WTO in 2001. The removal of 
quotas in 2005 suddenly liberated Chinese apparel industry and took the dynamics of industrial 
upgrading to an entirely new level. These findings also echo with my statement above with 
respect to the three-stage development of China’s apparel industry. 
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Table 11 Temporal Change of the Mean Value of Process, Product and Functional Upgrading 
Indicators at the Firm Level in China’s Apparel Industry (1998-2007) 
 
Process Upgrading Indicator 
a
 Product Upgrading Indicator 
b
 
Functional Upgrading 
Indicator 
c
 
1998 36.1 1.6% 26.7% 
1999 25.1 1.4% 27.5% 
2000 29.4 1.2% 27.9% 
2001 24.1 1.0% 28.1% 
2002 22.5 0.8% 27.6% 
2003 21.7 0.9% 27.9% 
2005 21.8 2.7% 29.9% 
2006 24.1 2.8% 30.4% 
2007 26.1 3.1% 30.5% 
Data Source: Compiled by authors, from the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms 1998-2007 
Notes: 
a
 fixed asset per employee, unit: thousand Yuan per capita; 
b
 the ratio of new product output to total output; 
c
 
the share of value-added in output. 
 
Variables and model specifications 
The following three equations for three types of upgrading are estimated:  
                                                                         
                                         
                                
(1) 
                                                                             
                         
                                
(2) 
                                                                       
                                                    
                                
(3) 
where i is the firm. Based on the three-stage development of China’s apparel industry, I define t1 
and t2 as (1998, 2001), (2001, 2003) and (2005, 2007) so as to analyze industrial upgrading in all 
three stages separately. Process upgrading indicator (Processi,t) is defined as the fixed asset per 
employee of firm i in year t. Dependent variable in equation (1) is the difference of Processi,t in 
t1 and t2. Process upgrading will be indicated when Processi,t2 - Processi,t1 is positive. Likewise, 
functional upgrading indicator (Functionali,t) is measured as the share of value-added in output 
of firm i in year t. Dependent variable in equation (3) is the difference of Functionali,t in t1 and 
t2. A positive Functionali,t2 - Functionali,t1 suggests firm i has achieved functional upgrading 
during t1 and t2. Finally, product upgrading indicator (Producti,t) is a dummy, taking the value of 
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1 if the firm i has introduced new products in year t. In other words, if dependent variable in 
equation (2) (Producti,t2) is 1, it means firm i has accomplished product upgrading in year t2.  
The first group of key independent variables is to evaluate the effects of ‘learning from 
global buyers’ over firm upgrading. Exporti,t is export intensity of firm i in year t, indicating the 
extent to which a firm is linked to international market and global lead firms. Exporti,t and its 
squared term in all three equations test the hypothesis that global factors both contribute to 
process and product upgrading of local suppliers in developing countries and place limits on 
functional upgrading, especially in the quasi-hierarchical apparel GVC. 
Marshalli,t and Jacobsi,t are introduced to assess the relationship between firm upgrading 
and its reliance on local sources of innovations derived from knowledge spillover and inter-firm 
synergies within local clusters. Several hypotheses have been proposed concerning conditions 
under which local clusters and economies of agglomeration affect regional development and firm 
growth. One hypothesis, developed by Marshall (1920 [1890]), contends that knowledge is 
predominantly industry-specific and therefore local specialization will foster regional 
development and firm growth. The other hypothesis, formulated by Jacobs (1969), claims that 
regional diversity in economic activity will result in agglomeration externalities as knowledge 
developed by one industry can also be fruitfully applied in other industries. In this chapter, the 
degree of Marshallian externalities (Marshalli,t) for firm i represents the employment density in 
the same industry (i.e. apparel) in the city where firm i is located, measured as the total 
employment of the apparel industry in this city in year t divided by the total area of the city. 
Similarly, the degree of Jacobsian agglomeration effects (Jacobsi,t) is measured as the total 
employment of other manufacturing industries in year t in the city where firm i is located  
divided by the total area of the city.  
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Political intervention and state institutional action are of central importance particularly 
in the context of China where the state remains a heavy-handed actor in regulating industries 
activities (Wei, 2000, 2001b). Dummy variable Zonei,t is therefore introduced to control the 
effects of political intervention over firm upgrading, taking the value of 1 if firm i is located in 
government-designated economic development zones in year t.  It is also important that we take 
seriously the heterogeneity and variety of firms, given the fact that firms are actually 
heterogeneous with different attributes and capabilities and firm upgrading decisions are 
normally made based on firm attributes (Wang and Lin, 2013). I control several firm-specific 
variables, which are likely to affect firm upgrading. Agei,t  is the log of firm age (years), and 
Sizei,t is the log of number of employees. Ownership may also make significant difference in firm 
innovation and upgrading. Dummy variable Ownershipi,t is therefore included, taking a value of 
1 if firm i is a domestic-owned firm. Finally, Process and functional upgrading are measured as 
the difference of firm upgrading indicators in year t1 and t2, while product upgrading is defined 
as a dummy, taking the value of 1 if the a firm has introduced new products at the end of the year 
t2. As a result, Processi,t1 and Functionali,t1 are introduced to control the dependence of process 
and functional upgrading on the initial value, while the significance of the coefficient of 
Producti,t1 would imply product upgrading persistence. 
In the estimation equations, the adoption of lagged terms is to accommodate the time 
consumed by firms between benefiting from global and local sources and accomplishing real 
upgrading. The geographical unit of analysis is China’s prefectural level city (excluding Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and Macau). 
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Statistical results 
Process, product and functional upgrading in a globalized and localized world 
Correlation analysis indicates that correlations of independent variables are moderate or 
low, suggesting no serious problem of multi-colinearity. Table 12(a)-(c) reports the results of the 
estimations of equations (1), (2) and (3). Only firms that existed during the entire 1998-2001, 
2001-2003 and 2005-2007 periods are included in models in Table 12(a), (b) and (c) respectively, 
while entering and exiting firms during the 1998-2001, 2001-2003 and 2005-2007 periods are 
excluded. Process and functional upgrading are measured as the change of firm upgrading 
indicators throughout a specific time period, while product upgrading is defined as a dummy, 
taking the value of 1 if the a firm has introduced new products at the end of the time period. As a 
result, equation (1) and (3) are estimated by the OLS model, while equation (2) is estimated by 
the LOGIT regression model.  
The first finding is related to the dependence of process and functional upgrading on the 
initial value. In all cases (Model 1-6 in all three tables), upgrading is negatively related to the 
initial value of process and functional upgrading indicators, with a significance level not lower 
than 1%. In other words, as firms move upward, it becomes increasingly difficult to keep 
upgrading. On the other hand, estimates of the coefficient of Yi,t for product upgrading (Model 7-
9) indicate positive statistically significant upgrading persistence, suggesting firms that have 
already accomplished product upgrading are more likely to have product innovation in the future.  
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In almost all models, the control variables Agei,t and Sizei,t show a relationship with firm 
upgrading that is consistent with theoretical predictions: the heterogeneity of firms and firm 
attributes have played a critical role in the process of firm upgrading. In particular, the 
regressions confirm that firm age and size positively affect the propensity to upgrade, as, in most 
instances, firm’s upgrading decisions are made based on how many experiences and resources it 
possess.  
Economic development zone variable (Zonei,t) has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on firm process upgrading, while its effect on product and functional upgrading is 
statistically insignificant and, in some cases, negative (Model 7-9 in Table 12(a)). This 
inconsistency could be reconciled by the following explanation. During this period, the vast 
majority of China’s economic development zones have been export processing zones 
concentrating in China’s coastal regions, filled with export-oriented firms conducting processing 
activities with supplied materials for re-export (Hsing, 1998; Yang, 2012), especially in the 
apparel industry (Zhu and Pickles, 2014). Financial aid and tax incentives have therefore been 
disproportionately assigned to support production process improvement, while less attention was 
directed towards product innovation and functional upgrading. In addition, as intellectual 
property laws were half-heartedly implemented before China’s entry into the WTO, imitation 
practices within the zones could be prevalent and resulted not only in little product innovation 
and creativity, but also—in some instances—in low quality products, particularly where the 
opportunities generated by export growth encouraged firms to mimic other firms’ products rather 
than develop their own products (see Model 7-9 in Table 12(a)).  
Ownership variable (Ownershipi,t) presents negative and insignificant sign in almost all 
process and functional upgrading models and is significant in 2005-2007 functional upgrading 
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models. On the other hand, although its sign is negative and insignificant in 1998-2001 product 
upgrading models, it turns positive and significant in 2001-2003 and 2005-2007 product 
upgrading models. Such a temporal change reflects a process of maturation of domestic-owned 
apparel firms. In the late 1990s, foreign-owned firms were more likely to conduct process, 
product and functional upgrading. In the early and mid-2000s, domestic-owned apparel firms 
caught up and became more inclined to upgrade in terms of product innovation. However, they 
still lagged behind their foreign-owned counterparts not only in production efficiency, 
automation and mechanization, but also in moving up the chain into newer, higher value-added 
activities, such as full package and own design/own brand manufacturing in the clothing sector. 
Moving on to the results connected more closely with the central argument, note that in 
almost all models Jacobsian externalities (Jacobsi,t) have a positive and statistically significant 
effect on all three types of upgrading, suggesting firm upgrading has benefited substantially from 
Jacobsian externalities derived from other complementary industries throughout my study time 
period. For instance, firms’ resolution to achieve product upgrading ties them closely with local 
textile firms since a large amount of new apparel products cannot be manufactured without 
supports from textile firms which provide tailored and premium fabrics. Backward linkages into 
extensive local textile base also facilitate apparel firm to upgrade functionally from assembly 
production to full-package supply and branded manufacturing (Tewari, 2006). Finally, apparel 
firms’ process upgrading and adoption of more advanced production lines or technologies 
may be dependent on their co-location with machinery and equipment enterprises. On the other 
hand, Marshall externalities (Marshalli,t), counterintuitively, have a negative impact on firm 
upgrading in most cases, with the exception of functional upgrading models in 2005-2007. The 
unexpected signs of Marshalli,t might be attributable to the rampant firm imitation practices that 
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compromised the Marshallian agglomeration effects and industry-specific externalities. The 
situation were further compounded as over-agglomeration of the apparel industry, especially in 
China’s coastal regions, might turn positive externalities into diseconomies of congestion 
(Broersma and Oosterhaven, 2009; He and Wang, 2012), even though intellectual property 
enforcement became more strictly pursued after China’s entry into the WTO. However, co-
location with firms in the same industry is particularly important in firm functional upgrading 
during 2005-2007. In the mid-2000s, after years of supplying global lead firms, Chinese apparel 
firms started to upgrade from low-value-added production (e.g., assembly and cut-make-trim 
(CMT) production) to higher-value-added activities, such as original equipment manufacturing 
(OEM), original design manufacturing (ODM) and original brand manufacturing (OBM) 
production. However, prior to the early and mid-2000s, firms lacked knowledge about OEM, 
OBM and ODM production and, as a result, imitation practices were crucial for aggressive 
apparel firms that sought to climb up the chain. Local social network made information exchange 
and knowledge spillover between apparel firms within a cluster much easier and enabled firms to 
imitate strategies and learn from local pioneers. 
In all 1998-2001 models, global factor (Exporti,t) shows a relationship with firm 
upgrading that is consistent with traditional understanding: global buyers both contribute to 
process and product upgrading of local suppliers and place limits on functional upgrading and 
market diversifications (Giuliani et al., 2005; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002b). More important is 
that the introduction of the squared term (Export
2
i,t) suggests that there is an inverted ‘U’-shaped 
relationship between global linkages and firm process and product upgrading during 1998-2001. 
The non-linear relationship highlights the fact an organizational and production mode not fully 
reliant on either foreign or domestic market may be optimal. This means over-dependence on 
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oversea end market might (or domestic market) is likely to put product and process upgrading in 
check. In the next two stages, results from functional upgrading models are consistent with 
previous studies and the coefficients of ‘global’ variables are either negative and significant or 
statistically insignificant. Results in Table 12(b) show that the effect of global linkages over 
product and process upgrading changes from statistically significant to insignificant, possibly 
due to the constraints imposed by the MFA on China’s apparel exports during 2003-2005. After 
2005, a positive and significant relationship between product upgrading and global linkages re-
emerged, as a result of not only the removal of quota but also the strategy change of global lead 
firms, which, in the mid-2000s, increasingly encouraged (or forced) their Chinese partners to 
supply more sophisticated and medium- and high-end products as the latter’s capability increased 
dramatically. However, ‘global’ variables remain statistically insignificant in 2005-2007 process 
upgrading models. One possible explanation is that Chinese apparel firms have been already 
efficient enough in the mid-2000s, and resources and investment were therefore increasingly 
transferred to meet global lead firms’ new requirements on products. 
Upgrading of domestic-owned apparel firms 
Recent research has shown that to understand the relationship between firm upgrading 
and global/local linkages, more attention should be paid to different firms’ learning and 
absorptive capability and how this capability interacted with different types of global and local 
linkages to generate a complicated influence on firm upgrading (Staritz and Morris, 2013a, 
2013b). In this section, I focus on China’s domestic-owned apparel firms and examine the 
heterogeneity and complexity of the effects of local linkages. In the next section, the ways in 
which the articulation between firm upgrading and global/local linkages is inflected by firm 
heterogeneity and firm attributes will be further explored. Table 13 presents the estimation 
results for domestic-owned apparel firms. Ownership variable (Ownershipi,t) has been excluded, 
132 
while Marshalli,t and Jacobsi,t have been decomposed into FoeMarshalli,t and DoeMarshalli,t, 
FoeJacobsi,t and DoeJacobsi,t, respectively, to differentiate the Marshallian and Jacobsian 
agglomeration effects derived from foreign-owned and domestic-owned firms.  
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In table 13 the estimated parameters of the control variables and ‘global’ variables are 
mostly unaltered, with the exception of Agei,t and Zonei,t that lose significance in some cases. 
More important is that the introduction of four new variables confirms that, on the one hand, the 
effects of local linkages could be heterogeneous and, on the other hand, ownership affects the 
net benefits firm can receive from local sources. In the late 1990s, although co-locating with 
other domestic-owned apparel firms (DoeMarshalli,t) might be helpful for process upgrading and 
production efficiency improvement, concomitant imitation practices could be detrimental to 
functional and product upgrading. In the meantime, foreign-owned apparel firms might 
already be experienced in higher-value-added activities (e.g., full-package, OEM and ODM 
production) whereas the vast majority of Chinese domestic-owned firms still struggled in low-
value-added assembly and CMT production. As a result, FoeMarshalli,t could be valuable, due 
not only to a consideration of functional upgrading by learning from successful and 
geographically proximate foreign-owned firms, but also to the fact that foreign-owned apparel 
firms specialized in higher value-added activities, in some instances, outsourced to domestic-
owned firms specialized in low-value-added activities in the vicinity, especially in rush seasons. 
This situation was soon reversed during 2005-2007. On the one hand, the coefficient of 
DoeMarshalli,t became positive and significant, in particularly in product and functional 
upgrading models, due partly to China’s increasingly strict enforcement of intellectual property. 
More importantly, domestic-owned firms become more competent in the mid-2000s, and sought 
to upgrade functionally or was forced by their global buyers to manufacture more sophisticated 
products. Learning from local pioneers was crucial for the survival and functional/product 
upgrading of domestic-owned apparel firms, as they were marching into entirely new areas. On 
the other hand, FoeMarshalli,t lost significance during 2005-2007, suggesting Marshallian 
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agglomeration effects derived from foreign-owned apparel firms faded as domestic-owned firms 
grew up.  
At first, DoeJacobsi,t is statistically insignificant, indicating that the Jacobsian 
agglomeration effects derived from domestic-owned firms had a relatively weak impact over 
firm upgrading in the late 1990s and early 2000s. After 2005, the relationship between all three 
types of upgrading and DoeJacobsi,t became positive and significant. Firm’s capability to 
identify,  assimilate and utilize knowledge spillovers and externalities hinges on its absorptive 
capacity (Jo and Lee, 2012). High-capability firms are often better able to absorb relatively 
distant and even unrelated external knowledge and externalities from different complementary 
industries (Teece, 2007). As a result, this indicates a gradual promotion of absorptive capability 
of domestic-owned firms, as the weak and insignificant relationship between DoeJacobsi,t and 
firm upgrading turns into a positive and significant one in 2005-2007 model. Finally, the entire 
study time period has witnessed a weak and, in some cases, negative and significant 
relationship between FoeJacobsi,t and upgrading of domestic-owned apparel firms, possibly due 
to the crowding-out effects caused by foreign-owned firms in other industries. My findings also 
resonate with recent studies on weak embeddedness of foreign-owned firms and their weak local 
linkages in China (Wei et al., 2009; Yang, 2009).  
In this section, I have examined the heterogeneity of the effects of local linkages over 
firm upgrading, and recent GVC analyses have also pointed out that end market destination 
clearly plays a critical role in firm upgrading and heterogeneous export end markets may have 
distinct effects over firm upgrading (Kaplinsky and Farooki, 2010a; Staritz and Morris, 2013a), 
which, due to data unavailability, I leave for future research. 
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Different firms and different upgrading trajectories  
This section reports the empirical results on whether firm attributes influence the ways in 
which global and local linkages affect firm upgrading. A firm with employment less than 300 is 
classified as a small firm; otherwise it is labeled as a large firm
18
. Based on this standard, I divide 
all domestic-owned apparel firms into two groups and run regressions separately (Table 14).   
In Table 14(a), the parameters of the control variables are almost unchanged but the estimates of 
some parameters become statistically insignificant in some cases. However, in Table 14(b), 
coefficients of Agei,t and Sizei,t not only lose significance but also turn negative in some cases, 
suggesting once firm size passes a threshold value the effects of firm size and age over firm 
upgrading become mixed. So is the effect of economic development zone. 
  
                                                     
18Such division standard of large/small sized industrial enterprises is defined by China’s National Bureau of 
Statistics.  
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The key findings are as follows. First, consistent with my hypothesis, effects of global 
linkages over firm upgrading vary with firm attributes. Global linkages had a statistically 
significant, inverted ‘U’-shaped relationship with process and product upgrading in the case of 
small firms during 1998-2001, but lost significance in the next two stages. On the contrary, large 
domestic-owned apparel firms apparently were not strongly influenced by global factors in the 
first stage and the latter might even contribute to process downgrading during 2001-2003. Finally, 
in the last stage, Exporti,t started to stimulate product upgrading in a non-linear way. To 
understand the divergent experiences of small and large domestic-owned apparel firms, we need 
to move away from a firm-level and agency-focused approach to upgrading towards a framework 
which recognizes embeddedness of firm and sectoral-level change within the context of wider 
political economies, and state and non-state institutional action. Late 1990s has been a crucial 
time period in China in terms of privatization from state-owned, collectively-owned and town-
and-village enterprises to private and joint-venture enterprises, in particular in the apparel 
industry. As marketization, privatization and globalization proceeded in China, local apparel 
manufacturers gradually shifted from selling to the domestic market in a relatively planned and 
autarkic economy towards supplying global buyers as GVCs increasingly relocated their 
sourcing and production from Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea to mainland China (Evans 
and Smith, 2006b; Wei, 2001b; Zhu and He, 2013). Such process of privatization gave birth to 
most of China’s large apparel firms, which used to sell their own apparel brands in the domestic 
market for decades and, due to their socialist legacy, already possessed relatively skilled workers 
and high capital intensity before they supplied global brands. When they adjusted production 
processes and business strategies to international market, they were already competent in 
assembly or CMT production of low-value-added items. As a result, not only did global linkages 
140 
have weak impact over process and product upgrading of large domestic-owned apparel 
firms, but, in some extreme cases, large firms had to downgrade accordingly to fit the new 
market conditions (see also (Pickles et al., 2006) on the complexity of contingent nature of 
upgrading and its geographical and firm-specific unevenness in the apparel industry in post-
socialist Eastern and Central Europe). In contrast, immature and small firms had to upgrade to 
meet the requirements of global lead firms and survive in the complicated international market. 
After 2005, a positive and significant relationship between product upgrading and global 
linkages emerged in the large firm model, as a result of not only the removal of quota but also 
the strategy change of global lead firms, which, in the mid-2000s, increasingly encouraged (or 
forced) their Chinese partners to supply more sophisticated and medium- and high-end products 
as the latter’s production capability increased dramatically. However, small and less competent 
firms were still stuck in assembly and CMT production of low-value, low-end products and 
failed to (or were unable to) follow their large counterparts. 
Second, the parameters of DoeMarshalli,t and FoeJacobsi,t in both large-firm and small-
firm models are almost unaltered, except significance changes in a few cases. I therefore focus 
on the other two variables: DoeJacobsi,t and FoeMarshalli,t. As interpreted above, DoeJacobsi,t 
has a relatively weak impact over firm upgrading in the first stage, due to firm’s incapability to 
absorb relatively distant and even unrelated external knowledge and externalities from different 
complementary industries. In the same vein, results from 2005-2007 models suggest that firm-
specific capability affects the net benefits firm can reap from the Jacobisan externalities. Large 
firms which are able to identify, assimilate and utilize distant and unrelated external knowledge 
can therefore benefit from not only Marshallian externalities but also knowledge spillovers 
derived from Jacobsian agglomeration, while small ones do not have the absorptive capacity to 
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take advantage of externalities from complementary industries. Especially in the case of 
functional upgrading (see Table 14(b) 2005-2007 functional upgrading model), backward 
linkages into extensive local textile base are often a necessary condition to upgrade functionally 
assembly production to full-package supply and branded manufacturing (Tewari, 2006).  
The parameters of FoeMarshalli,t in large-firm model are almost unaltered, as notified 
above, indicating a fading effect of learning from foreign-owned apparel firms during the study 
time period. However, in the case of small-firm model, the impact of FoeMarshalli,t has become 
increasingly strong and significantly positive. One possible explanation is that whereas large 
firms became full-fledged and, in some instances, even began to compete head-to-head with 
foreign-owned apparel firms, small ones were still unqualified for such competition and instead 
often acted as subcontractors for foreign-owned apparel firms (as well as domestic-owned ones).  
As a robustness check, equations (1), (2) and (3) are estimated by incorporating an 
alternative lag of one year (i.e., t2 - t1=1) and by using alternative proxies for process (total 
assets per employee) and functional upgrading (R&D intensity and R&D employment)
19
. 
Compared with the results presented above, these changes produce only minor effects.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I focus on one of the central analytical heuristics in GVC research: the 
concept of upgrading, particularly as it has been used to highlight paths for developing countries 
firms to ‘move up the value chain’ usually through the lenses of four categories—product, 
process, functional, and inter-sectoral upgrading. While process and product upgrading 
have been linked to ‘learning from global buyers’, the sources of capabilities that lead to 
functional upgrading, are conventionally understood to derive from local knowledge 
                                                     
19
Data for these alternative indicators are missing in certain years, so they are only used for robustness check and not 
for analysis in this chapter. 
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transmission and local institutional context. This chapter seeks to test these findings and to argue 
that this tendency to attribute functional upgrading to ‘local’ factors and process/product 
upgrading to ‘global’ factors has become problematic as the global sourcing system and GVCs 
have been constantly transformed in the past few decades. It does so by using an empirical, firm-
level approach to measure upgrading at the firm level, which allows us not only to evaluate the 
extent of upgrading in the industry as a whole and to compare its extent among individual firms 
and selected groups of firms, but also to differentiate and measure different types of upgrading 
(i.e., functional, process and product upgrading). This provides a more comprehensive yet 
nuanced approach to measure upgrading at the firm level, which complements current qualitative 
and quantitative methods.  
Specifically, I focus on the development and dynamism of functional, process and 
product upgrading in China’s apparel industry, and investigate the ways in which and the extent 
to which different types of upgrading have been co-shaped by both global and local forces. I 
argue that while process, product and functional upgrading may be apparent in China’s apparel 
industry, these have been articulated with a range of other causal mechanisms that relate to wider 
and changing economic, institutional and historical conditions which are central in assessing the 
extent to which a process of upgrading is even possible. In my case, this means the 
articulation between various types of firm upgrading and global/local factors needs to be not only 
understood as dynamic, contingent, and fluid, but also interpreted in ways which take into 
account the specific historical development of China’s apparel industry, the evolution of 
institutional arrangements for apparel, and the ups and downs of globalization and global 
economy. 
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Furthermore, empirical results also confirm that, in these debates on upgrading, it is also 
important that we take seriously the heterogeneity, complexity and variety of the 
relationship between upgrading and global/local factors.  First, given the fact that firms are 
actually heterogeneous with different attributes and capabilities and firm upgrading decisions are 
normally made based on firm attributes, it may be inappropriate to examine the 
articulation between various types of firm upgrading and global/local factors only through meso- 
or macro-level analysis without paying special attention to micro- or firm-level features. Second, 
there also needs to be consideration of the heterogeneity and complexity of the effects of global 
and local linkages over firm upgrading, since such effects are, in most instances, materialized 
through interactions between heterogeneous firms in global and regional production networks. In 
summary, the heterogeneity of firms, complexity of the effects of global and local linkages over 
firm upgrading, and the wider historical, political, institutional, economic and social context have 
all played a critical role in the process of firm upgrading and its articulation with global and local 
factors. 
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CHAPTER 6 UPGRADING IN APPAREL GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: A HEURISTIC 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
In response to a question about the limits of global value chain (GVC) research at a 
recent presentation at Duke University, Gary Gereffi (2013) suggested that GVC research 
emerged to solve a problem in world-system research on commodity chains, namely its focus on 
inter-regional analyses of power in a world in which the governance of economic systems was 
increasingly shifting from national and regional systems of capital accumulation into and  
through value chains. Value chain research, therefore, emerged as a way of complementing the 
national focus of global commodity chain analysis and the firm-level focus of much economic 
sociology by focusing on the differential power exercised by actors across the value chain.  This 
led subsequently to the consideration of forms of chain governance (Gereffi et al., 2005; Gereffi 
and Mayer, 2006; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002a), to notions of economic upgrading (Gereffi, 
1999; Milberg and Winkler, 2010), links with global production networks (Coe, 2011) and most 
recently to questions relating to working conditions and social upgrading in globally distributed 
production networks, and to the increasing role of new end markets in shaping their outcomes 
(Barrientos et al., 2010, 2011).  It was, as Gereffi suggested, the nature of GVC research to adapt 
to both the rapidly changing forms of industrial organization and the geographies they produce, 
and to respond to the analytical limits each phase of GVC research has generated.  In this sense, 
we might interpret GVC analysis as a heuristic process that constantly seeks to adjust its 
concepts and analyses to the changing structures of and actors in the global economy.   
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In this chapter, I focus on one central analytical heuristic of this approach: the concept of  
upgrading, particularly as it has been used to highlight paths for firms in developing countries to 
‘move up the value chain’ usually through the lenses of four categories—product, process, 
functional, and inter-sectoral (or chain) upgrading (Gereffi, 1999; Humphrey and Schmitz, 
2002b). The implicit normative expectation in this work has been that firms and countries that 
upgrade produce higher value-added products and/or take on more sophisticated functions over 
time and this captures a higher proportion of value in the chain, while firms and countries that 
are unable to add functions, change products, or change their relationship to others in the chain 
may see orders decline, their costs squeezed, and their employment prospects diminish.  
This approach to global value chains has been exceptionally generative of analyses that 
avoid what Agnew (1994) called the territorial trap by moving beyond the national economy and 
the specific focus on national firm-behavior as foundational concepts for analysis. By focusing 
on the array of network relations that structure the production and circulation of value, GVC 
scholars have been able to assess the asymmetries of power between lead-firms and suppliers 
(Gereffi, 1994, 1999) and different forms of governance that marshal and exercise this power 
(Gereffi, 2005; Gereffi et al., 2005). As a greater proportion of global commodities are 
increasingly traded through GVCs, analyzing their structure and practices becomes even more 
crucial. But, while GVC analyses reacted against the national/regional focus in such commodity 
chain analyses, until recently GVC research has itself tended to freeze complex and diversified 
circuits of economic activity into fixed geographical frameworks where consumption is 
presumed to be largely located in the North and production has been increasingly out-sourced to 
cheap labor markets in the South (Leslie and Reimer, 1999). In other words, the GVC literature, 
which links local suppliers in the ‘periphery’ on the one end and global buyers in the ‘core’ on 
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the other, has implicitly portrayed the global sourcing system as made up mainly by two camps: 
lead firms from the advanced economies and ‘generally-acknowledged weak’ manufacturing 
suppliers from the developing countries. This focus reflected the structure of global sourcing 
relations and the relative power of actors in the value chain throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
Recent GVC analysis is now focusing on the effects of the rising powers of Brazil, India, China, 
and South Africa (the BICS), new patterns of consumer demand in the South, the emergence of 
regional production networks, and the growing importance of domestic sourcing, further 
increasing the need to re-assess how this North-South dualism has shaped the model of the chain 
in ways that now make revision of the concept of upgrading necessary.  
The recent shift in analytical focus in GVC research from an earlier emphasis on the 
significance for economic development of the difference between buyer-driven and producer-
driven commodity chains (Gereffi, 1994), to one oriented towards understanding the mechanisms 
whereby industrial upgrading can be achieved has produced a series of rich contributions to 
exploring the developmental implications of upgrading (Bair, 2005, 2009; Cattaneo et al., 2010; 
Gereffi, 2005; Gereffi et al., 2005; Tokatli, 2007a, 2007b; Tokatli and Kizilgun, 2004). These 
contributions have paid particular attention to the increasingly expanded integration of producers 
and workers in various parts of the world into export-oriented production networks (see for 
example (Bair, 2005, 2009; Begg et al., 2003; Leslie and Reimer, 1999; Smith, 2003; Smith et al., 
2003; Smith et al., 2005)). But, as Bair (2005) notes, the earlier focus of much of this work on 
global commodity chains has more recently shifted towards analysis of the ways in which value 
chains are organized and governed, and much of this work has focused specifically on the 
implications of GVC dynamics for industrial upgrading (also see (Gereffi et al., 2005)). Here a 
primary focus has been on the mechanisms whereby firms and industries engineer a process of 
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economic upgrading within GVCs to capture higher value. Humphrey and Schmitz (2002a), for 
example, distinguish between four types of upgrading in global value chains: product, process, 
functional and chain upgrading. Product and process upgrading involve firms retaining their 
position in a chain by enhancing productivity gains by adopting new production processes or 
new configurations of product mix. Functional upgrading involves a movement ‘up’ the chain 
into newer, higher value added activity, such as full package and own design/own brand 
manufacturing in the clothing sector. Chain upgrading involves a movement into new activity 
which may also imply higher skills and capital requirement and value added (see also (Milberg 
and Winkler, 2010)). In such analyses, the concept of ‘upgrading’ has often been used to 
highlight paths for developing country producers to move from low-value to relatively high-
value activities in GVCs (Gereffi, 1999, 2005). As Gereffi (2005: 171) describes it: 
“we can think about upgrading in a concrete way as linked to a series of economic roles 
associated with production and export activities, such as assembly, original equipment 
manufacturing (OEM), original brand name manufacturing (OBM), and original design 
manufacturing (ODM). This sequence of economic roles involves an expanding set of 
capabilities that developing countries must attain in pursuing an upgrading trajectory in 
diverse industries.” 
While ‘upgrading’ models are, as Gereffi noted, heuristic to enable a focused analysis of a new 
kind of object; economic transformation through GVC dynamics, as a heuristic they also have 
limits. With the deepening and extending of global value chains and the entry of new actors from 
developing countries, three embedded assumptions about this process of upgrading need to be 
reconsidered. They are (i) how we understand functional upgrading and GVC success, (ii) the 
significance of high and low roads to upgrading, and (iii) the ways in which differential learning 
paths presuppose specific forms of agency for local and global actors.
20
 I refer to these as 
                                                     
20
A further assumption relates to the way in which the upgrading literature continues to hold on to the belief that 
upgrading occurs in a largely linear, unidirectional trajectory. A handful of studies have already critiqued this 
assumption, pointing out the complexity and contingent nature of upgrading and the geographical and firm-specific 
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‘constraining assumptions’ because, despite their enormous analytical power and policy 
implications, they operate increasingly to constrain the ways in which the current dynamics of 
GVCs are understood. That is, with Gereffi, I seek to read the concept of upgrading heuristically. 
The first constraining assumption in this body of work is the implicit normative 
expectation that functional upgrading equals success and that successful “developing country 
firms follow a ‘high road’ to upgrading, one eventually leading to performing functions in a 
value chain that have more skill and knowledge content (emphasis added)” (Ponte and Ewert, 
2009: 1637). This point was made particularly forcefully by Gibbon (2008: 44) when he argued 
that: 
“Additionally, while all four upgrading types are accorded a formally equivalent 
status, overwhelming attention in practice is paid to functional upgrading. In an 
early contribution to the discussion of upgrading, Gereffi (1999) focused almost 
exclusively on functional upgrading in the clothing sector, where firms can turn 
onto a ‘high road’ towards own-brand manufacturing. This implied that such a 
change was more optimal than other possible upgrading options. In fact, at least for 
new or subordinate players such as suppliers in developing countries, there are 
equally or more profitable positions available within value chains and other 
available forms of upgrading.” 
In other words, although the definition of upgrading per se refers to both process/product 
upgrading and functional upgrading, most of the GVC literature on upgrading tends to privilege 
functional upgrading over other kinds (Gereffi, 1994, 1999, 2005; Giuliani et al., 2005; Ponte 
and Ewert, 2009). A hierarchy of upgrading is therefore generated (Figure 19), beginning with 
process upgrading, then moving to product upgrading, finally to functional upgrading and to 
chain upgrading (Kaplinsky and Farooki, 2010a, 2010b; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001). Kaplinsky 
and Morris (2001) have further argued that this hierarchy accords with the common assertion that 
East Asian firms have made the transition from assembly to OEM, to ODM to OBM.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
unevenness of upgrading (Pickles et al., 2006; Ponte and Ewert, 2009; Tokatli, 2013). I will not elaborate this 
assumption, but it will be accordingly analyzed when it intertwines with my treatment of the first three. 
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Figure 19 Is there a hierarchy of upgrading? 
Source: (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001) 
 
Here firms in developing countries are conceived as ‘generally-acknowledged weak’ 
suppliers focusing on OEM and assembly production, reliant on lead firms from advanced 
economies (Gereffi, 1994, 1999; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002b; Tokatli, 2007a). In this 
scenario, assembly and OEM production are assumed to be the starting points for economic 
upgrading and ODM and OBM manufacturing to be the pinnacle of upgrading success (Gereffi, 
1999; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002a, 2002b). For Gereffi and Bair (2003: 147) “industrial 
upgrading can be conceptualized as a series of role shifts involved in moving from export-
oriented assembly to more integrated forms of manufacturing and marketing associated with the 
original equipment manufacturing (OEM) and original brand name manufacturing (OBM) export 
roles, respectively.” But, as Tokatli and Eldener (2004: 174) suggest, in this model: 
 “…it is expected that manufacturers working for global buyers enjoy upgrading 
along the dimensions of quality, flexibility and productivity but usually encounter 
barriers when it comes to moving into design, marketing, branding and retailing. 
What really enhances a firm’s position in the global market is the latter (functional 
upgrading) because activities such as branding and retailing are the most profitable 
areas." 
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Indeed, Tokatli (2008) has subsequently shown that in the apparel industry supplier firms in 
countries such as China, India and Turkey are rapidly expanding  their competencies into the 
manufacture of intricate high-quality garments and design, marketing and branding, and 
increasingly new entrants begin business from ODM  and OBM production rather than as 
suppliers (Tokatli, 2008; Wei, 2011). Besides changing the starting point of upgrading, this also 
forces us to ask, what precisely do we mean by the end point of upgrading? Have new entrants 
that start from OBM production reached the end point of upgrading? Clearly, while they 
may begin operations at this point cannot mean that there is no further upgrading for them to 
undertake.  But, if this is so, what then does the logic of upgrading actually say and what is its 
explanatory power? Thus, my first question is both about the changing structure and new actors 
in the GVCs, and the ways in which the concept of upgrading needs to be reworked to reflect the 
restructuring of North-South, lead-firm and supplier geographies. 
The second assumption derives from the first and is that much GVC literature is still, 
more or less, haunted by certain type of ‘normative’ view characterized by a dichotomy between 
process/product upgrading and functional upgrading as well as the underestimation of the former. 
Here process and product upgrading are seen as ‘low road’, and functional upgrading as ‘high 
road’, an implicit assumption that generates several further problems. The privileging of 
functional upgrading and underestimation of process/product upgrading is also evident in another 
definition of ‘upgrading’, where upgrading is understood as: improving the position of firms or 
nations in international trade networks (Bair, 2005; Gereffi, 1999; Giuliani et al., 2005; Ponte, 
2002) or moving up the value chains “from labor-intensive activities like export-oriented 
assembly, to more integrated forms of manufacturing like OEM and OBM production, to the 
most profitable and/or skill-intensive economic activities such as breakthrough innovations in 
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new goods and services, design, marketing, and finance” (Gereffi, 1999: 39). In summary, 
“upgrading within a value chain implies going up the value ladder, moving away from activities 
in which competition is of the ‘low road’ type and entry barriers are low” (Giuliani et al., 2005: 
552), and developing country firms should “follow a ‘high road’ to upgrading, one eventually 
leading to performing functions in a value chain that have more skill and knowledge content 
(emphasis added)” (Ponte and Ewert, 2009: 1637). Such a definition captures well the gist of 
functional upgrading while paying less attention to process/product upgrading. In this 
perspective, economic actors (such as firms and nations) which have achieved functional 
upgrading are considered as role models (for example, see (Gereffi, 1999, 2005) the effects of 
participating in GVCs on the rise of East Asian suppliers). Here functional upgrading equals 
success. Even though process and product upgrading are well-defined and recognized in many 
studies (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002a, 2002b), the normative expectation is that developing 
country firms will (or should) follow a ‘high road’ to upgrading by moving from OEM to ODM 
to OBM (Gereffi, 1999; Ponte and Ewert, 2009). Thus the second constraining assumption is 
about the ways in which high road (functional upgrading) and low road upgrading (process and 
product upgrading) are understood.  
Tokatli (2013) in particular has pointed to several weaknesses of conventional GVC 
studies in this context. These include an inaccurate understanding of the diverse and somewhat 
complicated ways in which actual apparel firms try to upgrade; the limited success in showing 
precisely how upgrading is related to additional value capture in the industry; and the tendency 
in the literature to black-box so-called high-value functions like design, branding, marketing, and 
retailing (also see (Tokatli, 2007a; Tokatli and Kizilgun, 2004, 2009, 2010)). Tokatli (2007a, 
2013) has further stressed that despite the focus on power asymmetries and chain governance 
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within the global apparel industry, questions about the exact manner in which global buyers 
make their suppliers act in certain ways and prevent the latter from encroaching on their core 
competencies have not yet been thoroughly answered. Plank and Staritz (2009: 66) have 
similarly argued that attention is needed beyond the black box of the firm to consider also who 
benefits from upgrading. And, as Pickles (2012) has documented, the recent history of trade 
preferences, rules of origin, and other trade rules has been one that locks-in southern markets for 
northern textile producers while constraining upgrading opportunities for many new entrants into 
CMT and OEM export production. From this perspective, opportunities for upgrading and a 
high-road to development are highly uneven. 
Not only are the lead actors in the global value chain changing, but the ways in which 
they operate and the forms of business strategy they deploy are diversifying. One form of this 
change is the emergence of new relations between buyers and suppliers, changes which are 
refiguring the asymmetries of power on which so much upgrading arguments are based. This is 
not a new idea, indeed it was fundamental to the original concept of upgrading developed by 
scholars like Gereffi, Sturgeon, and Humphrey as they attempted to account for the shifting 
geographies of global value capture in industries like apparel. As supplier firms in developing 
countries upgrade into OBM and ODM production, there is increasing evidence that they are not 
withdrawing from OEM and assembly production activities. Instead, as I will show, they 
grow by the accretion of new functions such as branding, marketing, designing and retailing, 
while retaining their core competencies in production (Ozatagan, 2011; Tokatli and Kizilgun, 
2004). They do not move up, but they become more diversified, both organizationally and 
geographically. The phenomenon where a supplier firm becomes a buyer/supplier firm becomes 
even more prevalent as firm size in developing countries grows through various strategies of 
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geographical and organizational restructuring, such as merger and acquisition, 
outsourcing/subcontracting, relocation, as well as upgrading. This blurs the line between buyer 
and supplier (Tokatli, 2013), and as Pickles et al.(2006) have suggested, it poses the question of 
how GVC upgrading can deal analytically with the complexity and contingent nature of 
upgrading and its geographical and firm-specific unevenness. In this scenario process and 
product upgrading/downgrading can co-exist with functional downgrading/upgrading as firms 
adjust their production processes and business strategies to complex changing market conditions. 
Ponte and Ewert (2009: 1648) have gone even further, attempting  to jettison the normative view 
that “the ‘high road’ to upgrading is the movement from Original Equipment Manufacturing to 
Original Design manufacturing to Original Brand Manufacturing” as they also stress the 
complexity and contingent nature of upgrading. This second question is therefore not only about 
the ways in which GVC commitments to parsimony may underestimate the complexity 
of business strategies at work in supplier networks, but it is a question of how we then 
characterize the GVC structure at the national level. Here functional upgrading from OEM to 
OBM or ODM production is not the only ‘high-road’ upgrading trajectory firms/countries can 
pursue, and process and/or product upgrading are not necessarily low road. 
The third constraining assumption relates to how suppliers are conceptualized in GVC 
analyses. While suppliers are encouraged to undertake process/product upgrading, they face 
much greater obstacles when it comes to functional upgrading (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002a, 
2002b; Schmitz and Knorringa, 2000). To achieve functional upgrading, especially in a quasi-
hierarchical chain, local suppliers have to rely to a greater extent on local sources of innovations, 
which are not only the result of knowledge spill-overs and inter-firm synergies within local 
cluster but are also fostered by policy networks of public and private actors (Barnes and Gertler, 
154 
1999; Scott, 1996; Storper, 1997). Therefore, while process and product upgrading have been 
linked to ‘learning from global buyers’, the sources of capabilities that lead to functional 
upgrading are conventionally understood to derive from local knowledge transmission and local 
institutional context (Giuliani et al., 2005; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002b). This tendency to 
attribute functional upgrading to ‘local’ factors and process/product upgrading to ‘global’ factors 
has become ever more problematic as the global sourcing system and GVCs have been radically 
transformed in the past decade and as the capabilities and competencies of producers have 
expanded in some key areas of the global value chain. This dichotomy becomes more 
problematic as global lead firms increasingly transfer functions like design to their OEM 
suppliers and encourage them to upgrade the range of functions and services they can provide 
(Ozatagan, 2011). Increasingly, as suppliers provide these additional functions and 
services, buyers are trimming their supply chains and focusing their contracting on a smaller 
number of strategic partners. The resulting change in the ways in which risk is managed globally 
and finances can be managed locally mean that certain types of upgrading are increasingly being 
driven by regional production networks (RPNs) and learning within industrial systems and 
industrial districts where the sources of capabilities come from neither the GVC nor the local 
context (Lyberaki, 2010; Pickles and Smith, 2011; Pickles et al., 2006). Thus, the third question 
on which I focus has to do with how power within the GVC is being restructured around new 
strategic partnerships, in part driven by lead-firm willingness to devolve functions and services 
to suppliers, and in part driven by changes in the ability of supplier firms to mobilize local and 
regional resources and knowledge networks.   
In the next section I interrogate these three constraining assumptions through an analysis 
of apparel production systems in Ningbo, China, and suggest an elaborated analytical framework 
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for dealing with the changing and increasingly complex nature of GVC dynamics and actors. 
This is not intended as a challenge to GVC upgrading logics and analyses, but it is an attempt to 
align them with the emerging geographies of contemporary GVCs dynamics. That is, while I 
agree entirely with Brown, Bessant and Lamming (2000) and Kaplinsky and Morris (2001) that 
GVC analyses are well aware of the simplification involved in the deployment of chain models, I 
also want to suggest that while this form of parsimony is essential to reading the relations of 
power and value capture in the value chain, its implications for our understanding of upgrading 
are more sanguine. Nowhere is this clearer than in the transformations and new entrants in the 
Chinese clothing industry. Drawing on extensive field research in the apparel cluster of Ningbo, 
China, I analyze how three types of transformation have unfolded and then shaped global 
production networks in ways that differ from these three constraining assumptions.  
Different firms, different upgrading trajectories 
The results of these forms of regional embeddedness and inter-firm linkages are 
important for the question of upgrading. Many of Ningbo’s enterprises are engaged in forms of 
product, process, functional, and/or chain upgrading, but these regionally specific conditions and 
the ways in which export production has entered into and articulated with domestic production 
has made the form of upgrading and the trajectories of firm strategies extremely complex. To 
show how Ningbo’s apparel enterprises articulate with broader GVCs and help us understand the 
limits of the three constraining assumptions I have identified I develop four case studies of 
specific firm upgrading trajectories. The firms I discuss are actual firms active in upgrading, with 
starting points, trajectories and sources of upgrading that are all very distinct. They are also ideal 
typical firms that represent the wider dynamics in the regional cluster.  
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It is certainly not a surprise that different firms choose different upgrading strategies, and 
that context and contingency are critical in shaping these differences.  My goal is not to argue 
that firm strategies differ, but that functional upgrading as a goal of firm adjustment has become 
much more of a strategic issue than it was in the past. The result is that we need to understand 
the ways in which emerging market manufacturers are making resource and investment decisions 
in ways that mobilize a wider range of upgrading (or downgrading) practices.  As Bernhardt, 
Pollak and Janoo (2014: 23) have recently argued: 
“[T]he approach and terminology used here might seem to suggest that upgrading 
is always desirable in any given GVC. However, it would be wrong to generalize 
this assertion. Certain sectors or chains – especially those that offer little prospects 
for learning, productivity increases or technological progress – may prove to be, in 
a sense, dead ends with regard to longer-term economic development. If developing 
countries focus their upgrading efforts on these chains and allocate an increasing 
amount of resources to these sectors, they risk being trapped in a “low road” 
trajectory to development (Milberg and Houston, 2005). Additionally, developing 
countries should not be seen as a homogenous group. Rather, each country may 
wish to specialize in different value chains for different reasons, or at different 
stages of their development. Lack of upgrading (or even downgrading) in a given 
GVC as measured by the indicators adopted here, therefore, might be a good thing 
if it is a side effect or manifestation of the structural change an economy is 
undergoing.” 
Before turning to specific case studies, I formulate a horizontal and vertical upgrading 
framework (Figure 20) that is sensitive to the strengths of both GVC and GPN analyses, but 
which also elaborates functional and process/product upgrading in a different way.
21
 The Y axis 
represents vertical upgrading (functional upgrading) and refers to the acquisition of new 
functions. Along the X axis is horizontal upgrading (process/product upgrading), involving firms 
retaining their position in a chain and enhancing productivity gains through adopting new 
                                                     
21For Ponte and Ewert (2009: 1639) “The status of inter-sectoral upgrading is unclear, as it relates to a trajectory of 
upgrading, while the other three categories describe what aspect of a given business is being upgraded”. For similar 
reasons I do not consider chain upgrading in this chapter.  
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production processes or new configurations of product mix.
22
 Conventional process and product 
upgrading tend to focus on upgrading within production. By using horizontal upgrading I also 
incorporate any managerial and organizational upgrading that lead to productivity improvement 
(e.g., transformation from family workshop to real registered enterprise). Based on this 
framework I map out the upgrading trajectories of four Ningbo’s apparel firms I have selected to 
represent ‘ideal types’ of firm structures and strategies currently emerging in the region. The 
selection is based on eight months of fieldwork in Ningbo, including extensive and repeated 
interviews with 30 firms, and trade associations, national and regional textile and apparel 
industry association, and local public officials. All interviews were selected from analysis of 
firm-level data on all apparel enterprises in Ningbo from China’s Annual Survey of Industrial 
Firms (ASIF) (1998-2009). The ASIF is administered by the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China and covers all Chinese industrial state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises 
with annual sales of 5 million RMB or more. The database provides firm-level data on firm 
structure and operation, including firm identification, location, capital structure, total profits, 
total shipments, exported shipments, intermediary inputs, asset value, inventory, employment, 
sales value, type of investment, output, value added, R&D expenses, education and training of 
staff, and wages, social insurance, and benefits paid.  
                                                     
22
Not included here are cases where CMT contracting is sustained without product or process upgrading, and 
without productivity gains or increased value added, but is maintained as an enabling part of firm upgrading efforts. 
Here I am thinking of firms that maintain CMT contract in order to maintain wage payments and employ workers in 
periods when seasonal contracts decline (often at no profit). This represents an indirect form of economic upgrading 
as wage and employment maintenance functions as a necessary condition for other kinds of process and product 
enhancements. 
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Figure 20 Horizontal and vertical upgrading framework 
(Source: compiled by authors) 
 
Case A: Peace Bird and GXG 
Peace Bird started as a family workshop producing men’s suits in the 1980s and 
expanded drastically in the 1990s as domestic demand for garments rocketed in China’s 
transition to a market economy. After its transformation from a small family workshop to a 
registered enterprise in 1995, Peace Bird focused production on medium-value casual menswear, 
a decision that gave Peace Bird a competitive advantage over other state-owned and private 
apparel enterprises most of which relied on mass production and a low-cost strategy (Figure 16). 
In 1999, Peace Bird added ladies’ wear production in a men’s-wear dominated apparel cluster. 
Unlike many companies in Ningbo, Peace Bird did not seek contracts from global brands. 
Production was first carried out in-house targeting medium or high-quality, own brand products 
for domestic markets. Over the past three decades it invested intensively in innovation and 
upgrading, gradually became a lead firm focusing on OBM production. It now concentrates on 
its core competences (R&D, branding, marketing and sales), while the rest of production (cutting, 
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sewing, ironing, and trimming) are increasingly carried out in smaller factories in Ningbo and 
elsewhere (Figure 21). In 2006, it still directly produced 80% of its production, while today 
outsourced production makes up around 80% of its total output. The share of outsourcing is 
likely to increase in the near future as the company’s focus has been increasingly switching 
towards R&D, branding and marketing. 
In the second round of industrial restructuring, Peace Bird embarked on a new phase of 
upgrading. Although fluctuations in global demand had little effect on the domestic-market-
oriented Peace Bird, rising labor costs did have an impact on its strategy. In 2003, it invested 
0.1 billion Yuan to build up a new manufacturing base located inland in Yichang, Hubei. This 
westernization of part of its production allowed more direct access to the rapidly growing inland 
markets and to lower cost labor markets (see (Zhu and Pickles, 2014) on the broader role of 
Chinese relocation strategies). In addition, as Peace Bird shed its non-core operations, it adopted 
an open bidding process in outsourcing orders, announcing its needs and letting 
subcontractors bid. Whoever offered the best bids in terms of price, volume, quality, and delivery 
time became one of its subcontractors.  
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Figure 21 Upgrading trajectories of Peace Bird 
(Source: compiled by authors) 
 
Compared with Peace Bird, GXG has gone even further along the OBM road (Figure 22). 
GXG was established as an OBM company marketing causal menswear in its own retail stores. It 
targeted the youth market and has aimed to upgrade consistently since it was established. Its 
sales reached 8 million Yuan in its first year (2007), and increased to 3.5 billion Yuan in 2011, 
generating a four-hundred-fold growth within five years. It continued to expand as business 
increased, with the number of its stores growing rapidly from less than 100 in 2008 to above 600 
in 2011. In August 2010, GXG started its “walking on two legs” initiative (on-line and off-
line businesses), and by November 11, 2011, its online daily sales had risen to 40 million Yuan.
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23November 11 is also known as ‘Double Elevens’, which is China’s equivalent of the Cyber Monday. 
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GXG exemplifies the second generation of firms by exclusively specializing in domestic-
oriented, OBM production. It has become a manufacturer without a factory with a ‘dumbbell-
style’ production, focusing on both ends of the value chain (R&D, branding, marketing and sales) 
and outsourcing the middle part.  
 
 
Figure 22 Upgrading trajectories of GXG 
(Source: compiled by authors) 
 
Case B: Seduno 
Peace Bird and GXG represent one extreme of firms that have concentrated on or started 
from OBM production and that have become lead firms in their own value chains. As a 
result, beyond changes in input costs and broader regulatory and labor market dynamics, these 
domestic-oriented Peace Bird and GXG are barely affected by shifts in the global economy or by 
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the changing dynamics of apparel global value chains. By contrast, Seduno represents the other 
extreme in which asymmetric relationships between global buyers and local suppliers 
predominate, creating captive suppliers in a low-wage economy (Gereffi, 1994; Humphrey and 
Schmitz, 2002b). Emerging out of a state-owned enterprise (Zhejiang Dongfang), Seduno 
underwent a process of partial privatization and became a joint-venture in the 1990s. Starting 
with assembly and CMT (cut-make-trim) production, Seduno now focuses on assembly and 
OEM production, although in 2012 it did begin to develop its own brand—C.O (Figure 23). 
Around 90% of its production is carried out in-house, which makes Seduno the second largest 
apparel producer in Ningbo. Seduno is weak in OBM production, concentrating instead on basic 
assembly. Seduno’s more than 150 clients are made up by two categories: one group comprise 
fast fashion retailers like H&M and Zara accounting for 70% of its output; the remaining 30% of 
its customers are sportswear lead firms such as Adidas and Reebok. By focusing on cost-
sensitive production (low-cost assembly and OEM production) Seduno is particularly vulnerable 
to further rounds of restructuring and rising labor costs. As its general manager argued: 
“Increasing costs are eroding the profit margin drastically. First, the price of cotton 
increased 100% in 2009; second, Chinese currency appreciated 20%; third, labor 
cost increased from 1000 Yuan a month [in 2000] to 3000 [in the coastal regions in 
2012]. Since cotton prices and exchange rates are relatively stable this year, 
the biggest concern is the rising cost of labor. Ningbo’s labor cost has already 
increased 15% in 2012.”  
(General Manager of Seduno, translated from Chinese) 
He also emphasized that owning an overseas manufacturing base was already a prerequisite for 
receiving orders from global buyers. In these cases, global buyers are increasingly pressuring 
their suppliers to relocate to lower cost locations. As a captive producer, Seduno felt it had to 
comply with these imperatives from global buyers and –in 2012- it opened a new 
manufacturing base in Cambodia, where it employs 500 local workers and plans to recruit 
another 1500 in the next five years. Although wages in Cambodia are only one fourth of that in 
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China, Seduno views the lack of local supporting facilities in Cambodia as a limit to this off-
shoring, forcing Seduno to relocate only CMT production oversea, while keeping OEM 
production in Ningbo.  
 
 
 
Figure 23 Upgrading trajectories of Seduno 
(Source: compiled by authors) 
 
Case C: Baimu 
Established in 1998 as a small family business performing assembly production on behalf 
of global brands, Baimu gradually strengthened its position in the GVC and established a strong 
position in OEM and ODM production. Like Seduno, it started with assembly and CMT 
production (Figure 24).  Unlike Seduno, it stopped taking low-end and low-value-added orders 
from global buyers like Wal-Mart as it planned to upgrade. Now it only supplies medium- and 
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high-end brand firms, such as Abercrombie, VANS, Tommy Hilfiger and Diesel. As its founder 
indicated, “Otherwise, we are not competitive compared with low-cost suppliers in Bangladesh 
and Vietnam.”  
In 2006, Baimu initiated the ‘irreplaceable’ strategy.  This refers to not only rejecting 
low-end and low-value-added orders from global buyers like Wal-Mart, but also upgrading from 
assembly to OEM and ODM production while supplying medium- and high-end brand firms. 
First, fewer subcontractors can meet the requirement of Abercrombie and Tommy Hilfiger since 
they demand higher-quality of service, quicker response and shorter lead time. This has ruled out 
numerous suppliers with low capacity. In other words, the asymmetries faced by firms like 
Seduno are weaker in Baimu’s case and buyers like Abercrombie and Tommy Hilfiger cannot 
easily play off Baimu and other low-cost suppliers against each other. Second, Baimu actively 
invested in new equipment, particularly in a new automatic assembly line which raised 
productivity levels 30% with the same labor inputs. In addition, its cooperation with 
Abercrombie and Tommy Hilfiger has evolved towards a model where global buyers contribute 
only their brand names. For example, Abercrombie and Tommy Hilfiger send orders to Baimu 
with general requirements, but Baimu is in charge of nearly all operations in the value chain 
including design, procurement of fabric, manufacturing, and logistics management. Baimu shows 
its designs to the buyers or their representatives and revises them accordingly. Baimu expanded 
its OEM and ODM production, receiving orders from global brands, while offering to them 
integrated product development and design services.  Other parts of the production process were 
then outsourced to subcontractors. In this process, shipping and logistics were strictly 
monitored by Baimu. In the second round of restructuring, Baimu further expanded its sourcing 
network from one largely made up by local subcontractors to one increasingly spread across 
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neighboring provinces, resulting in a regional sourcing system regulated and monitored by its 
head office in Ningbo. With its new role as an intermediary between buyers and manufacturers 
Baimu typifies the third generation of enterprises. 
 
 
Figure 24 Upgrading trajectories of Baimu 
(Source: compiled by authors) 
 
A tentative analytical framework of upgrading  
The central argument in this chapter is that three key assumptions about upgrading 
remain problematic and need to be unpacked more carefully than they have been to date. The 
upgrading trajectories of these four ‘ideal typical’ apparel firms demonstrate that upgrading 
trajectories are often not linear and unidirectional, and acquiring new functions does not 
necessarily lead to the abandoning old functions (Pickles et al., 2006). Instead, firms branch out 
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in multiple directions without withdrawing from profitable, old activities, such as assembly and 
CMT production. ‘Wearing multiple hats’ may be more prevalent business strategy than the 
linear, unidirectional upgrading, because, as Tokatli (2013: 1000) argued “firms enhance their 
activities in one area by utilizing knowledge and experience gained in another area.” What 
lessons can we draw from these examples? 
Functional upgrading equals success 
I have suggested that GVC analyses have tended to privilege the role of functional 
upgrading in capturing value for enterprises and regions. Such forms of value capture are seen to  
represent successful upgrading paths, paths that have been conventionally associated in GVC 
analysis with the rise of East Asian suppliers (CMTOEMODMOBM) (Gereffi, 1999, 
2005, 2009; Kaplinsky and Farooki, 2010a; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001). In their work, Pickles 
et al (2006) attempted to show how this focus on functional upgrading had several negative 
effects on public policy in Central and Eastern Europe by under-estimating the relative 
importance of functional downgrading in successfully sustaining employment and profitability, 
or of shifting from export to domestic markets as a viable strategy to strengthen a firm’s 
competitiveness. This was particularly important when state or regional industrial policies 
encouraged firm upgrading to OBM and ODM production as a path for successful competitive 
development. In this sense, and in the cases in Ningbo, ‘wearing multiple hats’ is a much more 
prevalent business strategy than linear, unidirectional upgrading.   
More importantly, GVC analyses of upgrading have yet to clarify what could be an end 
point of upgrading. Tokatli (2013) has pointed out that one problem of the current upgrading 
literature is its focus on ‘entry.’ If one firm or region functionally upgrades into OBM and ODM, 
the firm or regional economy is then seen to be successful.  However, since the entry of suppliers 
into design is sometimes more a result of the willingness of global brands to shed these functions 
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than it is of achievements of suppliers to add core competences, it remains an open question 
whether additional value is captured in the process (Ozatagan, 2011). By outsourcing these kinds 
of services to their suppliers, global brands relieve themselves of risks and responsibilities that 
entail potential costs as well as benefits. Not all export producers can take on these functions or 
assume the risks they may bring with them, and several have to retreat from ODM production to 
survive (Pickles et al., 2006). Can we say that this retreat is a form of downgrading or upgrading? 
By the same token, functional upgrading to OBM production can also yield no added value 
unless it is accompanied by other changes that ensure that the specific brand stands out in the 
crowd (Tokatli, 2013). As Seduno’s general manager argued with respect to its own brand (C.O. 
developed in 2012): 
“We have not seen one penny back from C.O. On the contrary, we are losing money. If 
you want to start a new brand in apparel, the ideal path is “losing money in the first two 
years, making ends meet in the next two years, and starting to make profit in the fifth 
year”. This is the best outcome one firm can expect, and most give up in the first two 
years and go back to OEM and assembly production. Now, we are actually using profit 
made from OEM and assembly production to maintain the operation of OBM production.” 
(General Manager of Seduno, translated from Chinese) 
In Seduno’s case, functional upgrading did not mean that more value is automatically 
captured, but instead it has resulted in process and product downgrading.  
Tokatli (2013) has drawn attention to the potential drawbacks of the ‘entry’ problem, but 
she did not provide any recommendations about how to deal with them. By deploying the simple 
device of horizontal and vertical axes I provide a parsimonious framework that addresses some 
of these drawbacks. First, this framework alters the end point of upgrading. The inclusion of the 
horizontal dimension is important because an increasing number of developing country firms 
have either already entered into OBM/ODM production or they have begun operations with 
OBM production. Does this mean that these firms have already started or arrived at the 
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conventionally defined endpoint of upgrading and have no further opportunities for functional 
upgrading? Obviously it does not and my simple model allows for that possibility.  
GVC analyses typically assume that suppliers that adopt OBM production capture more 
value. While such analyses certainly recognize the importance of different types of upgrading 
they also under-estimate process and product upgrading.  In this reading, process and product 
upgrading do not fundamentally change the power asymmetry of buyers and suppliers (suppliers 
remain in a relatively weak position in regard to their more 'powerful' buyers). One result 
has been that there are relatively few analyses that have focused on how an OBM firm 
or 'weak' buyer in a developing country actually carries out process and/or product upgrading to 
make its own brand or its position in the value chain more competitive.  
The broader framework I suggest focuses much more on the ways in which a wide range 
of opportunity structures shape the diversity of firm upgrading pathways.  For firms which 
upgrade vertically to ODM production, this long road means they have to keep upgrading 
horizontally in order to withstand risks and uncertainties related to their design functions.  For 
firms which achieve OBM production, they must still manage process and product upgrading 
through which their brands can stand out from the crowd and start to make profits. In other 
words, the entry problem and the tying of value capture to functional upgrading is here adjusted 
to take account of the endless forms of upgrading and downgrading that firms make to sustain 
competitiveness. It is inter-firm and inter-regional competition that necessitates a much more 
differentiated model of value capture, and precisely how value capture and upgrading are 
articulated remains a thoroughly contingent and context specific relation.  
High Road VS Low Road 
Even though process and product upgrading are well-defined and recognized in GVC 
analyses, the normative expectation in these works tends to overemphasize functional upgrading 
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as ‘high road’ and implicitly relegates process and product upgrading to secondary or ‘low road’ 
upgrading. As I have just argued, with the growing complexity of emerging market 
manufacturing enterprises, we need to pay much more attention to the broader context of both 
the business environment within which upgrading is situated (e.g., conditions in the domestic 
market, economic regulations and regional polices) and the local clusters in which vertical and 
horizontal relationships generate collective efficiencies (Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2004; Schmitz, 
1995).  
Firms in developing countries are too often conceptualized as ‘generally-acknowledged 
weak’ suppliers which start from assembly and CMT production and rely on lead firms from the 
North (Tokatli, 2008; Wei, 2011). Where developing country suppliers are characterized as weak 
suppliers focusing on assembly and CMT production, the starting point for upgrading is assumed 
to be around the origin (0, 0) in Figure 20. Two upgrading trajectories are therefore projected 
from the beginning: either upgrading from CMT to OBM (along the Y axis), or improving 
productivity gains (along the X axis). However, if we focus on the diverse upgrading 
trajectories between X and Y axis we have a different language for understanding non-linear 
upgrading strategies, one that re-balances the relationship between different forms of upgrading 
pursued by individual forms.   
For developing country suppliers (starting from around (0,0)), no matter how far they are 
able to move along the X axis (process and product upgrading), they remain assembly and OEM 
suppliers stuck in the type of production where competition is fierce and barriers to entry are low. 
The only promising pathway seems to be one that involves moving to OBM and ODM 
production through functional upgrading. But, while this ‘high road’ and ‘low road’ dichotomy 
may have been more accurate several years ago, as more developing countries firms have either 
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already adopted OBM and ODM production or have started business as OBM producers 
it becomes a less useful model. It would certainly be unwise if we simply characterized Peace 
Bird’s product upgrading within OBM production and Baimu’s process upgrading from local 
sourcing to regional sourcing within ODM production as ‘low road’. 
This issue has become particularly important as firms in developing countries are 
increasingly able to begin their operations from OBM or ODM production by targeting the rising 
domestic market and imitating successful predecessors within the same cluster (Wei, 2011).  The 
result is increasing complexity within developing country firms. Depicting all developing 
country firms as weak assembly suppliers tends to rule out the possibility that process/product 
upgrading can happen to OBM and ODM firms in developing countries and can function, itself, 
as a ‘high road’ development strategy. 
While horizontal upgrading for OBM and ODM firms can be ‘high road’, assembly and 
OEM suppliers’ process/product upgrading is not necessarily ‘low road’. Appelbaum (2006) has 
pointed out that the rise of giant contractors and suppliers in developing countries portends a 
potential shift of organizational power within GVC, as suppliers with larger factories provide a 
possible counterweight to the growing power of global buyers. The objective here is to observe 
the main dynamics at work during this process in a manner similar to Appelbaum (2006), less 
from the perspective of buyers in the North and more from the perspective of manufacturing 
suppliers in developing countries. If we focus overly on how many suppliers are taken captive by 
global buyers, we are unable to see the agency in suppliers who constantly strive to change the 
power asymmetry in GVCs. For instance, Mobi-garden, another firm in Ningbo, ensures that 
each customer makes up less than 30% of its total outputs in order to avoid becoming a captive 
supplier. 
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“The ‘less than 30%’ rule is set to give us more bargaining power against each of our 
customers. Wal-Mart has contacted us many times to discuss about subcontracting. We 
said no. Wal-Mart is so big that its demand easily outstrips half of our production. We do 
not want to be like those firms who ‘live on Wal-Mart’.” 
(Founder of Mobi-garden, translated from Chinese) 
Today’s global production networks are increasingly more nuanced and GVC models need to 
reflect this dynamic with more complex analyses of upgrading trajectories. As Mobi-garden’s 
founder argued, “it is hard to decide whether Foxconn relies on Apple or the other way around.” 
In other words, process/product upgrading for assembly and OEM suppliers (e.g., increasing 
factory size and adjusting each customer’s share) can subtly alter their captive role in GVCs and 
lead to a ‘high road’ development. 
Finally, functional upgrading can also be ‘low road’. For instance, “more often than not, 
the entry of a manufacturing supplier into design is just another means by which the buyer 
extends its power, in this case by passing the costs and risks of design onto the supplier” (Tokatli, 
2013: 1000). The power asymmetries in GVCs continue to exist, and simply acquiring a higher-
value-added function does not guarantee the capture of additional value (Ozatagan, 2011). 
Functional upgrading to OBM production also can be meaningless if the specific brand does not 
stand out in the crowd or if functional upgrading is simply conducted to take advantage of certain 
government policies.  
Functional upgrading=‘local’ VS process/product upgrading=‘global’ 
The third constraining assumption I identified above tends to attribute functional 
upgrading to ‘local’ factors and process/product upgrading to ‘global’ factors. I make three 
points in this regard. First, ‘global’ factors can stimulate functional upgrading. As Tokatli (2013: 
1000) has argued, “the fast and continuous production schedules of fast fashion make it 
impossible for design to be exclusively the domain of the buyer, basically because the pace 
rarely allows time for designs to go back and forth between countries as suppliers turn designs 
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into finish goods.” As fabrics and product needs are developed, apparel suppliers interpret ideas 
and designs in developing countries, show them to representatives traveling from the North 
on behalf of global buyers, receive advice from them, and then reinterpret those designs. OEM 
and ODM production increasingly includes not only procurement of the raw materials but also 
preparation of collections of various designs and ideas. In this scenario, upgrading from CMT 
into OEM and ODM production remains in the interests of buyers, and therefore buyers welcome 
and encourage this type of functional upgrading. However, such functional upgrading is driven 
more by the needs of global buyers to relinquish these functions than it is by the success of 
suppliers in encroaching upon these once core competences of their customers. The power 
asymmetries in GVCs continue to exist, and upgrading barriers may be re-set around new 
functions (e.g., branding).  
Second, local sources of innovation promote both functional and process/product 
upgrading.  These are created by knowledge spill-overs and inter-firm synergies within local 
clusters, and policy networks of public and private actors (Barnes and Gertler, 1999; Scott, 1996; 
Storper, 1997). Some types of product/process upgrading are more reliant on ‘local’ factors than 
‘global’ factors, particularly where market risk is managed through long-term stable relationships 
(Pickles et al., 2006). Here, local social networks with common cultural backgrounds and 
friendship ties can enhance information exchange, communication and cooperation between 
enterprises, help manage uncertainty and short-term instabilities through trust, and boost 
process/product upgrading. As one entrepreneur from Ningbo argued: 
“We were only able to manufacture suits. But as we are embedded in Ningbo’s apparel 
cluster, we imitated local lead firms’ success to diversify production. We cooperate with 
local coat firms to learn how to make coats; we work with local shirt firms to learn how 
to make shirts; we have also learnt how to make woollen overcoats through collaboration 
with local firms. The inter-firm linkages remain, even after we have mastered the new 
know-how. We outsource part of production to them in rush season.”  
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(Chairman of Kangnan, translated from Chinese) 
In this way, GXG and Peace Bird’s process/product upgrading within OBM production is 
also due more to ‘local’ factors than to inter-firming learning within GVCs. 
 Third, while the upgrading literature tends to assume that both ‘global’ and ‘local’ factors 
have a major influence on the type of upgrading trajectories that are open to suppliers (Giuliani 
et al., 2005; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002b), this overlooks certain types of upgrading driven by 
regional production networks (RPNs) (Lyberaki, 2010; Pickles et al., 2006). In this scenario, the 
sources of capabilities that lead to moving up the value chain and to increasing competencies 
come from neither ‘global’ factors nor ‘local’ factors. For some firms with previous experience 
of supplying global buyers, relocation of their own low-value-added processes to lower-wage 
locations may become an option. In so doing, these firms either develop their own brand or 
engage in triangular trade where the former suppliers become intermediaries or full-package 
producers as they further outsource orders to second-tier subcontractors (or their new plants) in 
lower-cost locations (Smith et al., 2008). When such outsourcing occurs while logistical costs 
need to be managed carefully, firms tend to relocate to geographically proximate regions with 
the result that they deepen their embeddedness in regional production networks (RPNs) 
(Abernathy et al., 2006; Tewari, 2006). Baimu’s regional sourcing strategy and Peace Bird’s 
relocation to inland China exemplify the importance of such geographically proximate RPNs in 
the process of a firm’s upgrading (also see (Zhu and Pickles, 2014)). Relocation and the regional 
sourcing it generates therefore offers another source of upgrading other than GVC and local 
context (Lyberaki, 2010).  While much GVC literature has relegated geography to the 
empirical background of value chain network, the more recent engagement of GVC researchers 
with industrial district analyses illustrates the increasing recognition that geographical 
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complexity within developing countries is a becoming a more central feature of successful RPN 
development (see Bair and Gereffi 2014 on such regional linkages in the Nicaraguan and 
Honduras apparel and textile industries).  
The beauty of ‘wearing multiple hats’ is that firms can take advantage of all sources of 
upgrading: knowledge transmission from global buyers, inter-firm synergies in local clusters, 
and regional sourcing systems. Traditional GVC claims that power asymmetries in GVCs limit 
functional upgrading opportunities for suppliers tend to overestimate the buyer’s capability to set 
up obstacles to supplier functional upgrading (Tokatli and Kizilgun, 2004). They also tend to 
under-estimate the agency and autonomy of suppliers. Indeed, it may simply be impossible for a 
global buyer to prevent one supplier from investing in functional upgrading if the latter knows 
how to master other capacities and sources of investment that enable it, whether these 
capabilities revolve around managing multiple buyers to reduce dependency and increase 
supplier autonomy, or whether they relate to the additional capacities that regional and local 
factors and networks may provide. For instance, Seduno’s functional upgrading to OBM 
production, on the one hand, could be attributed to its strategic intent and a group of young, 
aggressive high-level managers who considered such a strategy to be necessary for long-term 
development. On the other hand, it is also due largely to Seduno’s capability to master and 
exercise other sources of capabilities and, in particular, to learn from neighboring predecessors in 
the same cluster who had already succeeded in OBM production  (i.e., local sources). In this case, 
even though its customers (global buyers such as Zara, H&M and Adidas) tended to place 
obstacles in its way to functional upgrading, it was not possible for them to make Seduno act in 
certain ways or prevent it from encroaching on their core competencies. 
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Conclusion and discussion 
In this chapter I have formulated a two-dimensional framework that combines horizontal 
(process/product) and vertical (functional) upgrading. By drawing on ideal typical cases, I realize 
the potential limitations of my analysis. However, the case of Ningbo provides a number of 
insights to the interpretation of firm upgrading, and our findings echo with other recent studies 
(Pickles et al., 2006; Tokatli, 2013). 
I have argued that contemporary changes in emerging economies necessitate a strong 
focus on the endless processes of competition that mark the upgrading process. One form of this 
constraining assumption is the entry problem identified by Tokatli. Furthermore, even though 
process/product upgrading are well-defined and recognized in GVC analyses, I have argued that 
their normative assumptions tend to overemphasize functional upgrading as ‘high road’ and 
implicitly relegate process/product upgrading to secondary or ‘low road’ upgrading. However, 
the correspondence between functional upgrading and ‘high road’, process/product upgrading 
and ‘low road’ is not one that is set in stone. In reality functional upgrading can be a ‘low road’ 
strategy and process/product upgrading is not necessarily ‘low road’. Finally, I have argued that 
global, regional and local factors operate in more complex ways in shaping firm-level upgrading 
strategies than current upgrading theory addresses.  
In this sense I argue that GVC  analyses need to be more sensitive to the strategic nature 
of  firm strategies and the open nature of the consequences on firm performance of any specific 
upgrading (or downgrading) strategy. As the World Bank, UNCTAD, OECD, and WTO each 
embark on ambitious plans to incorporate GVC analyses into their policy frameworks, 
this becomes ever more important. Especially in developing countries, industrial policies have 
already been unrealistically encouraging firms to adopt the view that upgrading to OBM and 
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ODM production is a high-road path to value capture and economic growth and sustainability. 
This may well be true for some firms. But, as one firm manager in Ningbo complained, “most 
government policies are issued to encourage and support functional upgrading to OBM and 
ODM production, but can all firms do this? Even if we can, who will do the assembly and OEM 
production afterwards?” These industrial policies clearly envision that all firms can achieve 
functional upgrading to OBM and OEM production, but they also assume or imply that 
functional upgrading is the only, ‘high road’ strategy that leads to long-term industrial and 
regional development. Tokatli (2013) and Selwyn (2012) have cast doubts on this type of 
industrial policy by pointing out that it is difficult to generalize functional upgrading across 
space and firms flooding into OBM and ODM production, a process that itself devalues the 
functional upgrading they achieve. This is a fundamental issue in a competitive environment, but 
without some clearer answers to these questions industrial policy encourages a kind of dog-
chasing-its-tail process in which the costs of entry and participation rise, squeezing out more 
producers and regions, risks increase, and actors experience enhanced not reduced uncertainty.  
Of course, this may, indeed be the outcome of competitive capitalism—the trampling of others in 
the race to upgrade, where increasing competencies come with increasing scale of production 
and control over distributed production systems. But the regional consequences of such 
competitive upgrading logics are different from those currently being sold to manufacturers and 
workers (Brewer, 2011; Tokatli, 2013). 
I have argued that functional upgrading is not the only route to business success or 
viability, that viability that sustains contracts and employment may—under certain conditions—
have more important regional consequences than upgrading strategies that squeeze out 
competitors, and that even where regional production systems experience generalized economic 
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upgrading, expanded competencies and capacities, and improved market position, such models 
of upgrading—in presupposing a linear trajectory—may be temporary.  In this chapter, I have 
argued for a more diverse understanding of firm and inter-firm strategies in articulating (or not) 
with upgrading practices in GVCs. In this approach, functional upgrading does not guarantee that 
more value will be captured and process/product upgrading is not necessarily a less valuable 
‘low road’. 
Although in recent years global buyers seem to be shifting design functions and other 
services to their suppliers, Ozatagan (2011) remains skeptical that these shifts will change the  
power asymmetries in GVCs. Instead, he argues that upgrading barriers have been re-set around 
new functions (such as branding) by the very shift of design from global buyers to their suppliers. 
Of course, the issue is not whether to participate in the global economy that operates in this 
manner, but how to do so. Firms need to keep in mind that ‘global’ factors can be one source of 
upgrading and sustainable growth but that they are not the only one. The success of developing 
country firms is increasingly dependent not only on knowledge and information flow within 
GVCs from lead firms to their suppliers, but also on knowledge spill-overs and inter-firm 
synergies within local cluster, supportive business environment, rising domestic market, firm’s 
strategic intent and investment activities, and the formulation a geographical proximate RPNs. 
Furthermore, most of these cannot be achieved without governments and industry associations 
playing an active role in fostering conditions that reinforce competitive advantages and expand 
opportunities, rather than fixating on functional upgrading and closing down the paths and 
geographies of opportunity. 
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CHAPTER 7 PATH DEPENDENT AND PATH BREAKING: AN AGENT-BASED 
MODEL OF EVOLUTION, CO-EVOLUTION, AND LOCK-IN IN A CHINESE 
APPAREL CLUSTER 
Introduction 
In economic geography much has been written about the robust growth of certain 
industrial districts, clusters or regional innovation systems (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Saxenian, 
1994; Storper, 1997). Industrial clustering has been seen to be important because it deepens 
social networks and inter-firm linkages among proximate firms, especially if those linkages 
involve complicated forms of interaction and trust (Barnes and Gertler, 1999; Storper, 1997). 
Interpretations on geographical clustering of industries thus have tended to focus on the sources 
of competitiveness driven by local economic agents and their vertical and horizontal 
relationships which generate collective efficiency and knowledge spillovers (Marshall, 1920 
[1890]), institutional thickness (Amin and Thrift, 1994), embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985) and 
traded and untraded interdependencies (Scott, 1988; Storper, 1997). 
Much of this literature assumes that geographical clustering of industrial activities 
positively affects competitiveness. However, recent studies focusing on the role of path 
dependence and lock-in have pointed more explicitly to the negative effects of clustering, 
particularly in explaining the decline of old industrial districts or clusters and the inability of 
firms to respond adequately (Cho and Hassink, 2009; Grabher, 1993; Schamp, 2005; Stam and 
Martin, 2012; Yang, 2012). As Grabher (1993: 256) argued, ‘the initial strengths of the industrial 
districts of the past—their industrial atmosphere, highly developed and specialized infrastructure, 
the close inter-firm linkages, and strong political support by regional institutions—turned into 
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stubborn obstacles to innovation.’ Such obstacles have given rise to what Hassink and Shin 
(2005) have termed  the ‘rigid specialization’ trap, where geographically concentrated 
clusters become insular and inward-looking systems. Here, the notion of ‘lock-in’ has been 
coined to describe those situations where the processes that cause path dependence gradually 
lead to increasing fixity or rigidities in the patterns of industrial activity (Arthur, 1989; Martin 
and Sunley, 2006).  
The line between successful and vigorous cluster and insular, inward-looking and 
inflexible cluster can be very thin (Hassink and Shin, 2005; Saxenian, 1994). Indeed, although 
the idea of lock-in has usually been assigned a negative interpretation, path dependence and 
lock-in, broadly defined, may have both negative and positive effects on regional economic 
performance (Henning et al., 2013; Martin and Sunley, 2006). On the one hand, lock-in may 
contribute to economic performance as increasing returns and positive externalities reinforce 
local industrial dynamism. On the other hand, the same forms of lock-in may subsequently 
contribute to economic decline as established structures and configurations that once offered 
positive effects to firms lead to growing fixity or rigidity. 
The thinness of the line between negative and positive lock-in has resulted in the rise and 
fall of regional economies and restructuring of industrial areas (Hassink and Shin, 2005; Stam 
and Martin, 2012), and we now have several examples of where such negative effects have 
forced the restructuring of regional economies in Europe, North America and Japan (Grabher, 
1993; Hassink, 2007; Schamp, 2005), the Asian newly industrialized economies since the mid-
1990s (Cho and Hassink, 2009; van Grunsven and Smakman, 2005), and emerging regional 
economies such in mainland China since the 2000s (Li et al., 2011; Wei et al., 2007; Wei et al., 
2009). Even many of the classical industrial clusters in Italy have experienced serious declines 
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recently (Dunford, 2006; Dunford and Greco, 2006; Dunford and Greco, 2007).  This chapter 
seeks to contribute to this emerging body of work on industrial restructuring by focusing 
specifically on the restructuring of the apparel industry cluster in Ningbo, China.  
The rise of China’s export-oriented apparel industry since the 1990s has been driven 
largely by global sourcing practices intent on capturing the cost advantages of a development 
model predicated, in part, on unskilled or semi-skilled migratory labor flows linking inland labor 
pools to coastal production sites (Gereffi, 2009; Wang and Mei, 2009). Production and 
employment of the apparel industry have been heavily concentrated in a number of clusters in 
the coastal regions of East and Southeast China (He et al., 2008; Wang, 2010; Wei et al., 2007; 
Wen, 2004). Since the early 2000s, coastal clusters have progressively had to confront 
difficulties generated by the increasing social and economic costs of this regionally concentrated 
low-wage growth model, which has resulted in not only poor working condition but also 
increasing pressure for higher quality and higher wage opportunities (Henderson and Nadvi, 
2011). Alongside these significant and rapidly changing labor market dynamics, other factors 
have also been important, including the appreciation of China’s currency and slackening global 
demand especially after the outbreak of the financial crisis (Li & Fung Research Centre, 2008; 
Zhu and Pickles, 2014). These exogenous shocks have, in turn, triggered industrial restructuring 
in China’s coastal clusters.  
The chapter documents how a cluster becomes progressively locked-in and how the 
knowledge-base of an industry becomes homogenized resulting in a loss of innovative dynamism 
and a slowdown in the growth, and even stasis, of the cluster. These rigidities and inflexibilities 
amongst a cluster’s firms become especially apparent once the cluster is subjected to an external 
shock, leading to new rounds of far-reaching restructuring. The chapter also investigates some of 
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the ways in which different kinds of agents are co-evolving in response to the external shock and 
the dilemmas it pose. It does so by portraying the co-evolution of governments and firms as a 
process fraught with tensions and divergences. Section two presents a conceptual account on 
evolutionary economic geography (EEG) and lock-in. Section three investigates how the apparel 
industry cluster in Ningbo has become progressively locked-in and now experiences a kind of 
homogenization of the knowledge base. The fourth section seeks to examine the co-evolution of 
governments and firms in the process of industrial restructuring. 
Lock-in and lock-out 
Before examining industrial restructuring of Ningbo’s apparel cluster through the lens of 
evolutionary economic geography (EEG), it may be useful to make some clarifications of the 
notion of lock-in, which is arguably the core concept of the path dependence model and EEG 
(Boschma and Martin, 2007; Martin, 2010; Martin and Sunley, 2006, 2007). It is the notion of 
lock-in ‘that most fully captures the idea that the combination of historical contingency and the 
emergence of self-reinforcing effects steers a technology, industry, or regional economy along 
one ‘path’ rather than another’ (Martin, 2010: 3). In other words, it is the notion of lock-in that 
does the ‘evolutionary’ work in the path dependence model. Furthermore, it is the duality of 
lock-in (negative and positive lock-in) that gives rise to the rise and fall of industrial clusters.  
Two trajectories of path dependence, openness of cluster and lock-in 
The standard canonical path dependence model portrays the spatial industrial evolution as 
a four-phase development: (1) path creation, where historical accidents initiate a new path and 
have significant long-run effects on the technological, industrial and institutional structure of an 
economy; (2) path development, where emergence and development of local increasing returns 
and externalities assists the development of the path (positive lock-in); (3) path rigidification, 
characterized by increasing rigidification of knowledge, networks and structures of firms 
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(negative lock-in); (4) path de-locking, where an exogenous shock disrupts or dislodges the 
regional economy resulting in a cluster atrophy or restructuring (Arthur, 1989, 1994; David, 
1985; Martin, 2010; Martin and Sunley, 2006).  
After criticizing the standard canonical path dependence model’s overemphasis on 
continuity and stability, Martin (2010) has suggested a second type of trajectory which is more 
open and allows for constant endogenous change and evolution. His model diverges from the 
canonical one in the third step, and proposes a new phase three where industry changes slowly 
over time leading to an incremental, path dependent evolution. Local industry is able to adapt 
and mutate constantly and gradually, which prevents it from being trapped in a stable, inflexible 
and rigid state that only can be destabilized by an external shock. This idea has been further 
developed by Martin and Sunley (2011) when they employ a modified cluster adaptive cycle 
model and introduce much more diverse trajectories of cluster evolution. The gist of their 
argument for my present purposes is that apart from being stuck in a state of fixity and 
rigidification and waiting for an unpredictable external shock to set it free, a cluster can evolve 
along another trajectory where firms in the cluster are able to innovate more or less continuously 
and the cluster constantly mutates and adapts.  
This second trajectory can be realized by keeping the cluster relatively open (Hassink, 
2005). The openness of a cluster is partly supported by the diverse overlaps between 
organizations and institutions inside and outside cluster, and the subsequent information, 
technology and knowledge exchange across cluster borders (Sydow et al., 2010). In this way, 
EEG distinguishes between two kinds of information exchange and learning process. That which 
occurs in the cluster as a consequence of being in the cluster, by being embedded in the 
community is referred to as ‘buzz’. The kind of understanding and learning that derives from 
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participation in various kinds of links with others beyond the cluster (buyer-supplier relations, 
input suppliers, participation in global value chains, industrial association linkage programs, etc.) 
is referred to as ‘pipelines’ (Bathelt et al., 2004). Bathelt et al. (2004) are more focused on global 
pipelines that encompass firms from different parts of the world and are embedded in different 
socio-institutional and cultural environments. I do not necessarily see pipelines as ‘global’ and 
flowing across national border. Instead pipelines may be intra-national and regional, and this is 
particularly true in the case of such large-scale regional networks and clusters as those in China. 
Consequently, I use the term trans-local pipelines, rather than global pipeline, and local buzz.
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‘Pipelines’ which connect agents inside and outside cluster may be important in enabling 
firms in the cluster to avert tendencies towards rigidification and negative lock-in in cluster 
evolution, thus enabling cluster to remain innovative and competitive (Bathelt and Li, 2013; 
Bathelt et al., 2004; Sturgeon et al., 2008; Sydow et al., 2010). The idea that nurturing 
connections with distant actors may help prevent systematic negative lock-in is also supported by 
Maskell and Malmberg (2007) who have argued that, from a micro-level perspective, localized 
learning and knowledge development often lead to overreliance on localized routines and over-
embeddedness in existing structure, what Maskell and Malmberg called ‘spatial myopia’. The 
potentially devastating long-run effects of spatial myopia may be avoided as long as some firms 
actively invest in establishing pipelines to external knowledge pools with dissimilar routines or 
institutional patterns. Negative lock-in is therefore alleviated by rejuvenation processes where 
externally connected local firms are able to keep importing fresh knowledge and state-of-the-art 
technology. As Pickles and Smith (2011) have also shown, such externally connected firms are 
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I am aware of the parallelism between some of these claims about inter-firm learning in pipelines and global value 
chain research on buyer-supplier upgrading, as well as claims about local buzz and the longer-standing claims about 
inter-firm learning in industrial clusters. I have engaged with these traditions elsewhere. My purpose here is to 
explore the advantages of thinking through the approach of evolutionary economic geography to consider what it 
offers to and beyond these frameworks.  
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also, as a result, better able to sustain their markets, add additional functions and capacities 
devolved from their external partners, and benefit from state-of-the-art learning, especially where 
technology and fashion products require rapid adaptations strategies. 
By deliberately investing in building pipelines to distant communities some firms may be 
able to increase the variety of knowledge, resources, and capabilities available to them and 
escape the potential rigidification stemming from myopia and negative lock-in. However, the 
association between the openness of a cluster and Martin’s second trajectory characterized by 
constant adaptation and mutation is not always straightforward. There are different types of 
pipelines to external knowledge pools, and each potentially plays different roles in cluster 
evolution. It is to this heterogeneity of forms of pipeline, the different ways in which they link 
firms and clusters to external knowledge pools, and the ways in which they are associated with 
lock-in and cluster evolution that I now turn.  
Agents, multi-scalar co-evolution and lock-out 
Not only has the canonical path dependence model overlooked Martin’s second trajectory 
of cluster evolution, but it also rarely pays attention to the role of individual agency in affecting 
path-dependent processes (Arthur, 1989, 1994; David, 1985; Henning et al., 2013; Martin, 2010). 
Once a cluster or regional economy enters into the third phase in the traditional path dependence 
model, it is assumed that it will remain or be trapped in that stable state until it is disturbed or 
liberated by some unpredictable and unexpected exogenous shock (Martin, 2010; Martin and 
Sunley, 2011). The role of individual agency is implicitly ruled out from the process of path 
dependence, and seemingly has nothing to do with path disruption and new path creation. The 
idea that a stable, inflexible and rigid state of a cluster cannot be dislodged except by an external 
shock is certainly a questionable one. Instead, while the rigidification of firms, networks, and 
structures in a cluster may weaken the vitality and adaptability of the cluster resulting in cluster 
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atrophy it may also encourage or enable  a reorganization of resources and greater opportunities 
for surviving firms (Martin and Sunley, 2011) or it may force purposeful action by individuals 
(firms, industry associations and governments) who are deliberately trying to de-lock themselves. 
The result can be that the entire system can dislodge itself from an old path and create a new one 
(Sydow et al., 2010). As a result, there are reasons to consider path-dependent process of cluster 
evolution as being created both unintentionally (e.g., by external shocks) and by purposeful 
action of agents.  
Here by agents, I refer to not only firms, but also different levels of governments. The 
former inflect cluster evolution through corporate strategy, while the latter play an important role 
in affecting path dependent processes through government policies and political institutions. My 
inclusion of political institutions heeds the call for incorporating the political dimension in an 
evolutionary approach to economic geography (Boschma and Frenken, 2009), and responds to 
the challenge that the prevalent evolutionary approach to economic geography has been 
relatively isolated from approaches and perspectives from institutional economic geography 
(Boschma and Frenken, 2006; Martin, 2010). One way to demarcate the role of institutions in an 
EEG framework is to explain the interplay between industrial dynamics and institutional change, 
since institutions are normally co-evolving with firms, technology, networks and structures 
(Nelson, 1994, 1995). There is increasing awareness that institutional change is able to disrupt 
the situation of negative lock-in and rigidification (Hassink, 2005; Pike et al., 2009), and is 
required to enable the emergence of new industries and cluster repositioning, since individual 
initiative alone is sometimes unable to do so (Lowe, 2009). This awareness of state institutional 
action is of central importance particularly in the context of China where the state remains a 
heavy-handed actor in regulating industrial activities (Wei, 2000, 2001b). Furthermore, not only 
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has China’s central government been heavily involved in local economic development, China’s 
decentralization has also empowered local governments to participate directly in the 
development process as planners, developers and policy-makers, far beyond providing just 
public goods (He et al., 2008; Wei, 2001b; Wei et al., 2007). In the Chinese case in particular it 
is vital that the co-evolution of institution and industry should be examined in a way which 
recognizes the complicated interactions not only between firms and states but also different 
levels of governments.  
Using an agent-centered approach, Sydow et al. (2010) have examined the ways in which 
agents intentionally choose to inflect cluster evolution, pointing out the potential benefits of the 
concerted actions of a variety of agents within the path-dependent processes. On the other hand, 
Yang (2012) has argued that industry restructuring in the Pearl River Delta of south-eastern 
China has been greatly hindered by the conflicts between various agents (such as governments 
and firms), and difficulties of restructuring have been heightened by emerging tensions between 
the state and firms. The dominant interpretation of such conflicts between governments and firms 
is based on negative political lock-in (Grabher, 1993) or hysteresis, where institutional inertia 
and dependence on past linkages and practices (including routines, conventions and traditions) 
change slowly over time, deepening forms of path dependence (Martin and Sunley, 2006; 
Setterfield, 1997). Once institutions become firmly established, the further growth of a cluster 
may be obstructed by the very institutions which supported it, creating a form of institutional 
hysteresis. My case study of Ningbo is even more nuanced, where the processes of co-evolution 
are fraught with both harmonies and disharmonies between a variety of agents (different kinds of 
firms and different levels of governments). In addition, the underlying mechanisms that have 
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given rise to conflicts between governments and firms have been more complicated than is 
suggested by notions of institutional inertia and hysteresis. 
Pipelines to external knowledge and negative lock-in 
The Reform and Opening-up policies dislodged Ningbo’s old path, which was centered 
on  family business units and town and village enterprises supplying domestic markets in a 
shortage economy, and triggered the first round of industrial restructuring. This path was 
characterized by a private-sector-led export-oriented industrialization. Rapid expansion was also 
supported by the Reform and Opening-up policies from the central government and specific 
policies from Ningbo’s local government. Political institutions were deliberately created 
to bolster and sustain the further growth along this path. In the 1990s, export-oriented production 
surpassed domestic-oriented production and accounted for the majority of Ningbo’s apparel 
industry.  
Transformation from small family business units to shareholding enterprises or limited 
liability corporations facilitated apparel firms’ productivity increases and economies of scale. 
Access to GVCs increased rapidly with the Opening-up policies as apparel producers were able 
to draw on low-wage and unskilled or semi-skilled labor and the leveraging of domestic 
advantages, including the comparatively low cost of other factor inputs, land, electricity and 
other raw materials (Gereffi, 2009; He et al., 2008). This combination of national reforms and 
international demand led to rapid expansion in the industry. As firms in the cluster began 
to benefit from following such a path, other entrepreneurs tended to imitate and learn from their 
successful neighbors. Given the thick, historically rooted inter-firm synergies in the region, it 
seems to have been relatively easy for knowledge on export-oriented production to spread within 
the cluster through business and personal relationships (Li et al., 2011; Wei et al., 2007). As 
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export production boomed and the enormous demand from international buyers at times 
outweighed the capacity of Ningbo’s apparel firms to meet their orders, many were forced to 
outsource or subcontract part of production to inland China especially in the rush season. In 
addition, apparel firms in Ningbo also outsourced part of their production to better endowed 
regions. For instance, manufacturing of jeans was outsourced because high-quality water for the 
washing processes was not available in Ningbo. However, to minimize additional logistical costs 
and lead time, firms tended to outsource to geographically proximate regions (e.g., 
manufacturing bases in the same province or neighboring provinces), further deepening their 
integration into regional production networks (RPNs) (Abernathy et al., 2006; Tewari, 2006).  
By actively participating in the GVCs, apparel enterprises in Ningbo gradually acquired 
new capabilities and increased competencies in the process of supplying global buyers. This 
global pipeline to external knowledge allowed advanced knowledge and information to flow 
from global lead firms to apparel suppliers located in Ningbo cluster. The upgrading process 
unfolded in Ningbo’s apparel cluster in classic GVC terms as firms gradually moved from low-
value cut-make-trim production to relatively high-value activities such as full package and 
original equipment manufacturing (OEM) production (Gereffi, 1994, 1999, 2005). The local 
social network with its common social networks and friendship ties made information exchange, 
communication and cooperation between enterprises within the cluster much easier. It also 
enabled firms to imitate strategies and learn from local pioneers. These networks were 
particularly important in the context of Reform Ningbo. Prior to 1978 enterprises lacked 
knowledge about export-oriented production and, as a result, imitation practices were crucial for 
the survival and revival of a cluster as a largely family business dominated domestic-oriented 
industry shifted  towards enterprise-led export-oriented production. In the process, RPNs 
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formed by Ningbo’s apparel firms allowed Ningbo’s firms to shed low-value production by 
outsourcing to subcontractors elsewhere, diversify their regional footprint, deepen their 
manufacturing skills, and focus on relatively high-value production. This regional pipeline eased 
Ningbo’s under-capacity in rush seasons and facilitated upgrading. In summary, the prosperity of 
Ningbo’s apparel cluster between the first and second round industrial restructuring was partly 
supported by a combination of ‘local buzz’ and ‘trans-local pipeline’ (Figure 25).  
However, as time went by, it was this very combination that led to a progressive lock-in 
or homogenization of the knowledge base which resulted in a loss of innovative dynamism and a 
slowdown in the growth, or even stasis, of the cluster. When local buzz and trans-local pipelines 
were formed alongside new industries, they fulfilled a specific need, but once they were firmly 
established, they ran a risk of turning the positive lock-in into a negative one, resulting in 
homogenization of the knowledge base. First, in a buyer-driven GVC like apparel which is often 
characterized by the asymmetric relationships and the captive role of producers in low-wage 
economies, particular attention has been draw towards how the action and motivation of global 
buyers are the key causal forces in the organization of global contracting systems (Gereffi, 1999; 
Schmitz and Knorringa, 2000). Although global buyers are willing to help suppliers improve 
productivity and efficiency and the former may even gradually transfer certain relatively high-
value functions to the latter, upgrading barriers are still set and re-set around core competencies 
by global buyers (Ozatagan, 2011; Tokatli, 2013). Therefore, the very global pipeline which 
initially facilitated inter-firm knowledge transmission from global buyers to Ningbo’s apparel 
firms can be quickly converted into shackles, inhibiting apparel firms from making further 
upgrading once they started to encroach upon the core competencies of global buyers. Second, as 
the global pipeline switched from enabler to constrainer of further development, the now well-
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established regional pipeline compounded the problem. If the global pipeline was the one that 
trapped Ningbo’s apparel firms into low-cost and peripheral production, the regional pipeline 
was the one that created flexibility for the industry allowing Ningbo’s apparel firms to maintain 
low-cost production in the face of increasing cost squeezing and manage peak season orders as 
export contracts became an ever more important part of their production. RPNs that were 
originally established to solve the under-capacity issue in rush seasons started to create a form of 
negative lock-in as wages increased and labor market competition enhanced the positional power 
of workers. In these circumstances, Ningbo’s apparel firms were able to survive and remain low-
cost producers only if they could outsource parts of their production to lower-cost inland China 
through the regional pipeline. But the expansion of RPNs into Western areas of the province or 
to other provinces also creates a series of its own rigidities and risks, including more costly 
extended supply chains, increased uncertainty around delivery time, and greater quality control 
and compliance problems. Finally, the local buzz homogenized the local knowledge base and 
limited the exploration of alternative possibilities. These imitation practices resulted not only in a 
cognitive lock-in with little innovation and creativity (Grabher, 1993), but also—in some 
instances—in low quality products, particularly where the opportunities generated by export 
growth encouraged firms to mimic other successful firms’ products rather than develop their own 
products or brands. 
The only promising trans-local pipeline to external knowledge that kept importing fresh 
knowledge and diversifying regional economy was inter-cluster linkages where know-how 
exchange occurred between Ningbo’s apparel firms and counterparts in other clusters 
specializing in the same or related industries, such as textile and apparel clusters in Guangdong, 
Jiangsu and Shandong as well as other apparel clusters in the same province, Zhejiang. Thus, to 
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the extent that firms that were locked into global and regional pipelines built on vertical input-
output linkages were able to access inter-cluster pipelines they benefitted. Unfortunately, most of 
my interviewees pointed out that their only chance to communicate with firms in other clusters 
specializing in the same or related industries was through the two factory tours every year 
organized by the NGA. In other words, inter-cluster pipelines were weak and thin (Figure 25). 
 
Figure 25 Trans-local Pipeline and Local Buzz of Firms in Ningbo’s Apparel Cluster 
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The historically evolved combination of local buzz and trans-local pipeline can thus 
sometimes lock the entire cluster into specific, initially successful, ways of doing things that later 
convert into shackles, which inhibit or block further progress. By deliberately investing 
in building pipelines to distant communities some firms may be able to increase the variety of 
knowledge available to them and escape the potential rigidification stemming from myopia and 
negative lock-in. However, the association between trans-local pipelines and the second 
trajectory is not pre-determined, because different types of trans-local pipelines may have 
different effects in cluster evolution, and pipeline may become clogged over time.  
Harmonies and disharmonies in the processes of co-evolution 
When the local buzz and trans-local pipeline malfunctioned or even started to restrain 
further progress, positive lock-in was gradually overtaken by negative lock-in and spatial myopia, 
leading to loss of innovative dynamism and a slowdown in the growth, or even atrophy, of the 
cluster. Martin and Sunley (2006) have summarized five possible strategies to escapes negative 
lock-in. However, all of their strategies tend to stress technological development, innovation and 
upgrading, with little attention to industrial relocation (Schamp, 2005; Wei et al., 2007). Both 
upgrading and relocation will be taken into account in my analysis of industrial restructuring, as 
well as the co-evolution of different levels of government and different kinds of firms.  
Before I turn to specific de-locking strategies implemented by governments and firms, it 
is necessary to clarify the different role of exogenous shocks and endogenous change in the 
process of cluster lock-out and industrial restructuring. The canonical path dependence model 
not only overlooks the second trajectory of cluster evolution, but it also pays little attention to the 
role of individual agency in affecting the path-dependent process. Even though Ningbo’s apparel 
cluster seemingly evolves according to the canonical path dependence model, the whole process 
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of industry restructuring and lock-out is also shaped by exogenous shocks and endogenous 
change, rather than realized by the former alone. Exogenous shocks, such as dwindling 
international demand and rising production costs, contributes to the process of path 
disruption, but this only creates an unknown and uncertain future in which cluster decline, stasis, 
atrophy, disappearance and revival can each occur. Here I argue that exogenous shocks, while 
important, should not be overrated since they only give rise to path disruption. Instead, 
endogenous change is the real driver of path creation. Thus, even though the evolution of 
Ningbo’s apparel cluster may follow the canonical path dependence model, exogenous shocks 
merely trigger the process of lock-out while endogenous change determines if Ningbo’s apparel 
cluster will decline, disappear or revive after their further restructuring and upgrading. 
Harmonies and disharmonies in the process of upgrading and relocation 
Central government strategies play significant roles in shaping industrial policy in the 
Ningbo apparel industry, pushing and encouraging labor-intensive and low-value enterprises to 
relocate from the higher-cost coastal regions to release space and resources for higher-value 
apparel and other industries while simultaneously promoting economic development in less 
developed inland China (Table 3). For instance, in order to variously support and compel apparel 
firms to upgrade, the Adjustment and Revitalization Plan of Textile and Apparel Industry 
released by the State Council in 2009, included new investments in autonomous innovation and 
independent brand development, support for key enterprises and consolidation in the small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SME) sector, and enhanced credit and other financial support for 
SMEs. In addition, in 2010 the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology released the 
Guideline on Pushing Forward Relocation of Textile and Apparel Industry, to propel and 
facilitate the shift of apparel from coastal regions to inland China. In 2007, less direct impacts 
were seen when China’s Ministry of Commerce and China Customs promulgated the List of 
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Restricted Commodities in Processing Trade, differentiating between allowed low-cost, labor-
intensive processes inland and those that are now restricted in coastal regions. Importantly for 
my purposes, apparel products made up most of the restricted low-cost process and products. The 
Ministry of Commerce also designated fifty priority relocation destinations in inland China to 
attract apparel firms that would relocate from coastal regions. The State Development Bank 
provided loans and tax incentives.  
Local governments and apparel firms have also responded to the call of the central 
government and participate in industrial restructuring such as relocation and upgrading directly 
or indirectly. Ningbo’s local government has been especially active in assisting its apparel 
industry by offering generous financial and technological support to key enterprises, bolstering 
the Annual Ningbo International Fashion Fair (ANIFF), coordinating inter-firm relations, 
and building up a vocational school specifically for apparel (Zhejiang Textile & Fashion 
College). Ningbo’s apparel firms have responded by taking advantage of the new institutional 
arrangements. Some managers, especially those from large firms, indicated that over the past few 
years they had invested intensively in innovation and upgrading, gradually upgraded from low-
value assembly and cut-make-trim production to relatively high-value activities such as full 
package, OEM production, and even original design manufacturing (ODM) and 
original branding manufacturing (OBM) production. For instance, Peace Bird directly owned 80% 
of production in 2006, while today it outsources around 80% of its total production. The share of 
outsourcing is likely to increase in the near future as the company’s focus continues to switch 
towards R&D, branding and marketing. Baimu, as an OEM and ODM supplier, moved from 
supplying low-end buyers such as Wal-Mart towards supplying only medium- and high-
end brand firms, such as Abercrombie, VANS, and Tommy Hilfiger. Ningbo’s second largest 
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producer, Seduno, branched out into branding, designing and retailing while it still focused on 
low-value assembly and OEM production. All of these upgrading efforts could not occur without 
taking advantage of the new institutional supports such as tax incentives and financial aid. 
Additionally, for apparel firms planning to partly relocate to inland cities, the Ningbo 
government and NGA normally convened them, researched the investment 
environment beforehand, and bargained with local governments on their behalf. These tight firm-
government relationships were crucial for some enterprises. For example, Rouse’s relocation to 
Zigui, Hubei resulted directly from the negotiation between Ningbo and Zigui governments. 
The picture of coordinated governmental and firm action must also be located in a more 
complex set of industrial restructuring dynamics, some of which are highly conflictual. 
According to the Guideline, national political institutions were supposed to help accelerate 
industrial upgrading and the shift to high-end apparel, develop OBM and ODM production in 
coastal regions, and relocate low-cost, labor-intensive OEM and assembly production to inland 
regions. The blueprint may have had good intentions but its implementation has had indirect 
consequences. For example, some policies were applied in such a way as to encourage every 
firm in the coastal regions to upgrade from low-end assembly production to OBM and ODM 
production. This obsession of pushing all firms to upgrade into high-value production was 
carried even further by Ningbo government. First, financial aid and tax incentives were 
disproportionately assigned to key apparel enterprises, since the implicit and overarching spirit 
of Ningbo’s local policies was to invigorate large apparel enterprises and to leave the SMEs to 
fend for themselves. Some apparel managers from SMEs complained that purportedly industry-
wide policies were being applied preferentially to favor large enterprises. Second, an increasing 
share of government aid was channeled towards the so-called high-tech and high-value-added 
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industries, such as the electronic industry, even though Ningbo was still known as an Apparel 
City. Most interviewees took issue with this central government fixation on upgrading and its 
subsequent policies. In their view, the local government was unrealistic in hoping that every firm 
could upgrade to OBM and ODM production immediately. As one firm manager in Ningbo 
complained,  
Most government policies are issued to encourage and support upgrading to OBM and 
ODM production, but can all firms do this? Even if we can, who will do the assembly and 
OEM production afterwards? 
     (Chairman of Kailian, translated from Chinese) 
They also disliked the local government’s abandonment of apparel SMEs as well as its obsession 
with so-called high-tech industries, and considered its policies to be irresponsible, running 
counter to Ningbo’s industrial strengths and capacities. These disharmonies between different 
levels of government and different kinds of firm were clearly reflected in the region’s industrial 
dynamics. SMEs that did not have the financial and technological capabilities to upgrade to 
OBM and ODM production or move to the so-called high-tech industries remained trapped in the 
low-margin labor-intensive OEM and assembly production. It was extremely difficult for them to 
obtain bank loans, tax credit and low-price land from either central or local governments. As one 
interviewees remarked, 
It may take Youngor (China’s leading menswear manufacturer based in Ningbo) one 
phone call to get several billion [Yuan] bank loan, while it takes us forever to even get in 
touch with the bank. 
                                                       (Assistant President of Progen, translated from Chinese) 
As the exogenous shocks that followed the 2008 financial crisis took effect, profit margins in 
these firms were squeezed to such a degree that some were forced to downsize or close 
altogether. In 2011, 16.18% of Ningbo’s apparel firms were making negative profits, 50% more 
than 2010 (Xia et al., 2012).  
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Not all large firms benefitted from these policies in productive ways.  While a number of 
large firms actively invested intensively on innovation and upgrading, some large apparel firms 
gradually adopted accumulation strategies that depended heavily or entirely on their beneficial 
access to central and local governments’ supports for cheap land, tax credits and bank loans. 
Rather than stimulating restructuring, this excessive dependence encouraged passive behavior by 
local entrepreneurs even in the face of deepening exogenous shocks. Enjoying such preferential 
access to government supports, particularly government programs that granted access to land at 
abnormally low prices, other large apparel firms avoided risk-taking ventures and, instead, 
sought to capture rents from land speculation. 
Tension also emerged in the relocation process. As indicated above, China’s central 
government not only urged the shift of low-cost OEM and assembly production from coastal 
regions to inland China, but also designated priority relocation destinations in inland China. First, 
this government-led relocation sometimes exacerbated the traditional ‘race to the bottom’. By 
relocating to lower-cost regions in inland China and by extending RPNs Ningbo’s apparel firms 
were able to survive and remain as low-cost producers even though labor costs surged in coastal 
regions. Relocation policies also triggered a new type of strategic ‘race to the bottom’ where 
apparel firms took advantage of government relocation policies by searching for the most 
favorable policies, cheapest land, and best tax credits and playing off local governments in inland 
China against each other. As a result, while above I have shown how large, key enterprises 
become captured in speculative arrangements because of the favorable policies granted by the 
Ningbo government, rejecting relocation as a result, here in the process of relocation to inland 
China, firms play off local governments against each other to leverage favorable policies and 
cheap land. As a result, they became less interested in investing in production and more focused 
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on capturing rents from subcontracting and land speculation. Second, in some cases, even though 
Ningbo’s local government relaxed controls over relocation, apparel firms sometimes were 
forced to relocate to specific inland cities because of the personal relationships that 
existed between the political leaders of two cities. For instance, Peace Bird’s relocation to Hubei 
partly resulted from local government intervention. Third, firms in Ningbo considered the 
government-designated priority relocation destinations to be inappropriate because, as a top-
down policy, it barely paid attention to any of the main factors affecting location and relocation 
decisions, such as supplying facilities, infrastructures, cultural circumstances, labor quality and 
logistical costs. As one interviewee explained, 
The supplying facilities in some government-designated relocation destinations are so 
poor that we have to purchase raw materials [e.g., fabrics] and accessories [e.g., buttons 
and zippers] elsewhere and transport the finished products back to Ningbo for distributing 
and retailing.  
                                (General Manager of Alphabet, translated from Chinese) 
Path-dependent and path-breaking 
The dominant interpretation of such disjuncture in the co-evolution of state policies and 
firm strategies is based on institutional inertia and hysteresis (Martin and Sunley, 2006; 
Setterfield, 1997). This interpretation argues that institutions that are initially conducive for the 
growth of clusters may evolve into shackles that restrict on-going regional development, 
particularly during the process of industrial restructuring. In my case, the rise of Ningbo’s 
apparel cluster between the first and second round of industrial restructuring was driven by 
apparel producers dependent on low-wage and unskilled or semi-skilled labor and the leveraging 
of domestic advantages, including the comparatively low cost of other factor inputs, land, 
electricity and other raw materials which allowed them to expand their role in export markets. As 
production costs in coastal regions surged and international demand declined, local governments 
and some apparel enterprises avoided risk-taking investments. Local governments, seeing 
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aggressive relocation to other provinces weakening their own plans for local economic 
development, hoped to keep key enterprises in situ by offering land, electricity and labor at 
abnormally low price. For some more mercantilistic entrepreneurs rent-seeking through land 
speculation followed. These forms of institutional inertia gave rise to conflicts between China’s 
central government and local administrations, but also between firms that were genuinely 
interested in improving their learning capability through relocation and upgrading and firms that 
either clung to old path or sought rents through speculation. 
Institutional hysteresis is only part of this story. Once a new path is established, it may 
gain momentum and sustain a particular trajectory, especially where initial fixed set-up costs are 
large and where there are dynamic learning effects, network externalities and self-reinforcing 
mechanisms (Martin and Sunley, 2006). New institutions that formed alongside such paths tend 
to fulfill specific needs, supporting and sustaining its further growth (Boschma and Frenken, 
2009). However, while the coordination between various agents along an established path 
has been the focus of many studies, little attention has been directed towards the 
relationship between different agents at the turning point from the disruption of the old path and 
the turn to a new path. Where no entrenched path has emerged, the conjuncture is full of 
possibilities. A variety of agents may actively strive to capture rents from or escape the 
rigidification into which they have been locked. As old, established paths fall apart, so does the 
underlying self-reinforcing mechanism that forces agents to follow one specific path. It is 
therefore highly possible that, at this conjuncture, different agents with different financial, 
political and technological capabilities and strategic intentions make different decisions based on 
different interests. Network coordination between diverse agents along one certain path may be 
therefore replaced by a new type of situation where there are conflicts and tensions, but no one 
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obvious or dominant path. In this scenario, the institutional inertia and hysteresis plays little role 
since all agents are proactively seeking to de-lock and find new pathway, perhaps in different 
directions.  
In the case of the firms in Ningbo, although institutional inertia may have emerged as a 
result of both government policies and corporate strategies, it is also important to point out the 
heterogeneity of different agents’ intentions and capabilities and their uncoordinated and 
conflictual actions in the process of path disruption and creation. The central government saw 
this conjuncture as not only an urgent signal that coastal regions should shed low-cost, low-value 
and low-tech, export-oriented production, but also an opportunity to relocate such production 
from the higher-cost coastal regions to release space and resources for higher-value apparel and 
other industries while simultaneously encouraging economic development in less developed 
inland China. Such a relocation and upgrading plan also met the national government’s goal of 
alleviating regional disparity. Ningbo’s local government, seeing aggressive relocation to other 
provinces as weakening their own plans for local economic development, tended to encourage 
large enterprises to upgrade in situ while relaxing controls on the relocation of SMEs, thus 
releasing space and resources for high-tech industries.  
The intentions and actions of firms were even more diverse. Although some large apparel 
enterprises became increasingly addicted to land speculation, other large firms invested 
intensively in innovation and upgrading. Some SMEs remained export-oriented by 
subcontracting even as their profit margins were squeezed drastically. Others were more 
ambitious. For instance, apart from some large firms that were able to innovate and 
upgrade based on internal strategic decisions and external government support, some medium-
sized firms also succeeded in improving their learning capability and locking-out. They escaped 
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political lock-in because medium-sized firms normally had no substantial government assistance 
to rely on. They escaped cognitive lock-in because they were often managed by young 
entrepreneurs either trained outside or who had moved from outside Ningbo’s apparel cluster. 
They tended to break the functional lock-in by moving from export-oriented OEM production to 
domestic-oriented OBM production. In addition, they proactively embraced risk-taking ventures 
and initiated new businesses, such as ladies’ wear and men’s casual wear, in a men’s suit 
dominated apparel cluster. GXG, starting from domestic-oriented, OBM production 
and becoming a manufacturer with no factory with ‘dumbbell-style’ production that focuses 
on both end of the value chain (R&D, branding, marketing and sales) and outsourcing production, 
is a case in point and possessed all these characteristics. 
Henning et al. (2013) have argued that at this stage, as an external shock sets in, or if 
stasis and rigidity itself sets off internal processes of decay or atrophy, the cluster enters a 
‘release’ phase. Resources built up around an old path start to be lost, and disinvestment and 
destruction may take place (such as relocation). This is then followed by a ‘reorganization’ phase 
of reconfiguration and restructuring characterized by various experiments initiated by a wide 
range of agents. This new path has not been fully consolidated yet the relationship established in 
the old path is weakened. As a result, conflicts become more common as attempts increase to 
find new viable path. The variety of firm strategies and organizational forms is increased as 
options open. 
In summary, by applying an agent-based approach to the analysis of path dependence I 
am able to disclose a dimension of disharmonious industrial restructuring which has been 
overlooked, if not completely ignored, by traditional institutional inertia and hysteresis theory. 
Instead of negating the effects of institutional inertia, I am suggesting that two types of 
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mechanism co-exist and that all agents can be both path-dependent and path-breaking, 
especially between the release (path disruption) and reorganization (path creation) phase.  
Conclusion 
Recent studies in EEG have critiqued the four-phase development of clusters in the 
standard traditional or canonical path dependence model formulated by David (1985) and Arthur 
(1989, 1994), and have suggested a second type of trajectory which is more open and allows for 
constant endogenous change and evolution (Martin, 2010; Martin and Sunley, 2011). The second 
trajectory can be realized by keeping the cluster relatively open (Hassink, 2005). It has been 
argued that some ‘extrovert’ entrepreneurs who have deliberately developed pipelines to trans-
local networks may be able to increase the variety of knowledge available to them, escape the 
potential problem of rigidification stemming from myopia and negative lock-in, and rejuvenate 
the cluster (Martin and Sunley, 2011). However, the idea that nurturing connections with distant 
actors may help prevent systemic negative lock-in is not always the case. In the case of Ningbo’s 
apparel cluster, the historically evolved global pipeline, regional pipeline and regional buzz 
rendered the entire cluster locked into specific initially successful ways of doing things that later 
emerged as shackles that inhibited further progress. Different types of trans-local pipelines may 
have different effects in cluster evolution, and pipelines may become clogged over time. 
In addition, this canonical path dependence model has perhaps focused too much on 
exogenous shocks in the process of path disruption and on ‘historical accidents’ in the early 
stages of path creation, implying that managers and policy-makers have few choices left 
thereafter. I have suggested that path dependence is a socially dynamic process, forcing us to 
look at structure as well as the action of agents. The agent-based approach helps researchers to 
understand exactly the ways in which a diverse range of agents are implicated in the construction 
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and constitution of interdependent sequences of events and decisions. In this process of co-
evolution, collaboration among agents (such as firms and governments) leads to certain process 
of path creation and maintenance, by facilitating intentional network coordination and generating 
collaborative and deliberate planning. However, such a process of co-evolution and network 
coordination does not always emerge, and industrial restructuring may be fraught with conflicts 
and tensions between various actors. By applying an agent-based approach in path dependence 
analysis, I have suggested that all actors can be both path-dependent and path-breaking, 
especially between the release (path disruption) and reorganization (path creation) phases. 
Conflicts in the process of co-evolution can be driven not only by institutional inertia and 
hysteresis, but also by the heterogeneity and divergence of various agents’ actions. This type of 
divergence exists all the time, because the interactions between structure and purposeful actions 
constantly give rise to both on-path and off-path changes and innovations. But during the release 
and reorganization phase, intensive conflicts and tensions between different actors may emerge 
in a more phenomenal way (in my case, different levels of governments and different kinds of 
firms). 
As for the future development of Ningbo’s apparel cluster, I argue that the emergence of 
a new path may not be stimulated or enabled by happenstance or by historical accident, but 
may be based, at least in part, on the preexisting resources, technological capabilities and skills, 
competencies, and experiences that have been inherited from old paths (Martin, 2010). These 
inherited conditions form the context in which purposive actions and intentional experiments 
take place. In this respect, the obsession of national and local governments with high-value and 
high-tech industries and their rush into encouraging every firm in the coastal regions to upgrade 
to OBM and ODM production may be unrealistic and possibly even self-defeating. Moreover, 
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where policies imply a total abandonment of the apparel industry or apparel SMEs in favor of 
high-tech or higher value-added industries, they do so regardless of the existing infrastructural 
capacities in apparel and the absence of parallel capabilities in the new industries. On the other 
hand, the most promising enterprises are those that either upgrade gradually based on existing 
resources and competences, or branch out into new areas that build on existing capacities and 
know-how. For instance, some firms proactively embraced risk-taking ventures and initiated 
new business, such as ladies’ wear and men’s casual wear, in a men’s suit dominated apparel 
cluster. This idea of ‘dependence between successive paths’(Martin and Sunley, 2006) thus 
suggests that incremental industry policies based on existing resources may be most helpful in 
effecting the efficient coordination between various agents and capitalizing on existing capacities. 
Finally, I argue that EEG is an emerging paradigm in economic geography, yet it 
currently remains to some extent isolated from developments in other theoretical approaches. An 
agent-based EEG approach not only provides genuine new interpretations for the main debates in 
economic geography, such as the co-evolution of a wide range of actors, the spatial evolution of 
industries and clusters, and harmonies and disharmonies in spatial systems, but also offers 
interfaces with other theoretical approaches in economic geography as well as economic 
sociology and development studies. Recent studies have led to innovative theorizing at the 
interface between EEG and institutional economic geography and at the interface between EEG 
and analysis on industrial districts and clusters (Boschma and Frenken, 2009; Boschma and 
Frenken, 2006; MacKinnon et al., 2009; Martin, 2010). The interface between agent-based EEG 
approaches and global value chain (GVC) approaches could be a fertile area for further 
consideration. GVC analyses have—at least until recently—tended to freeze complex and 
diversified circuits of economic activity into fixed territorial frameworks where consumption is 
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presumed to be located in the North and production has been increasingly outsourced to cheap 
labor markets in the South (Leslie and Reimer, 1999). In other words, the GVC literature, which 
links local suppliers in the ‘periphery’ on the one end and global buyers in the ‘core’ on the other, 
has implicitly portrayed global sourcing systems in terms of the interactions of lead firms in 
advanced economies and ‘generally-acknowledged weak’ manufacturing suppliers from 
developing countries (Gereffi, 1994, 1999; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002b; Tokatli, 2007a). This 
focus reflected the structure of global sourcing relations and the relative power of actors in the 
value chain throughout the 1980s and 1990s. More recent GVC analysis has started to take a 
more dynamic and evolutionary perspective, in which the effects of the emerging economies, 
new patterns of consumer demand in the South, the emergence of regional production chains, 
and the growing importance of domestic sourcing are central to the analysis of GVC dynamics 
(Cattaneo et al., 2010; Tokatli, 2013). It is the interplay between GVC and EEG that illustrates so 
well how this North-South dualism is now re-shaping models of local industrial development and 
their changing relationships with global value chains.  
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CHAPTER 8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Based on recent insights in economic geography and economic sociology on industrial 
relocation/delocalization, upgrading, governance, global value chains and global production 
networks, this dissertation strives to understand the articulation between changing industrial 
policies and corporate strategies in China’s apparel industry. Specifically, the central thesis of 
the research demonstrates the ways in which, as competitive pressures increase, new government 
policies and emerging firm strategies are restructuring the geography and organization of the 
Chinese apparel industry. It is divided into three sections: (1) changing industrial policies from 
various levels of governments, (2) firm strategies to increasing competitive pressures, and (3) 
articulation between changing industrial policies and firm strategies.  
China’s emergence as a key exporter to the world has relied on low-wage and unskilled 
or semi-skilled labor. The apparel industry exemplifies this export-oriented development model. 
Production and employment have become heavily concentrated in the coastal regions of East and 
Southeast China. With growth in other sectors, prices, land costs, wages, and competitive 
pressures have all risen. As production costs and competitive pressures both rise, the flexible 
business environment that export-led production used to embed in has undergone dramatic 
restructuring and this has further pushed forward new rounds of spatial restructuring, upgrading 
and relocation, especially in China’s highly export-oriented apparel industry. The ‘race to the 
bottom’ that typified the ‘China price’ and the rapid rise of China as a global supplier of clothing 
over the past decade is now changing in ways that are having profound effects on the industrial 
organization and spatial structure of production and employment, and will change the ways in 
207 
which we understand China’s role in global and regional export markets in the coming years. 
This dissertation focuses on the interaction between the different and related roles of 
governments and firms and their complementary and/or conflicting effects in restructuring the 
geography and organization of the Chinese apparel industry. In doing so, it seeks to demonstrate 
that the model of inward investment, global sourcing, and export orientation is already 
undergoing fundamental restructuring, producing new geographies of production and 
employment, with the consequent need to re-assess the policy implications of China in the global 
production networks.  
Changing industrial policies from various levels of governments 
China’s central government has been extremely pro-active in responding to these 
pressures and has approved a series of policy initiatives to encourage and support enterprises to 
implement industrial upgrading and relocation in three ways: GO UP (industrial upgrading), GO 
WEST (relocation to inland China) and GO OUT (relocation overseas). ). The central 
government has designated funds to support relocation, improve infrastructure, simplify 
relocation approval procedures, provide information about foreign apparel markets, increase 
investments and support for technological transformation, increase financial support and provide 
subsidies and support research on apparel-related technological innovations.  
Local governments do not always share the concerns that motivate central government 
policies and as a result, they have, at times, responded differently. In recognizing that aggressive 
relocation to other provinces could harm the local economy and affect employment, local 
governments in coastal provinces creatively adapt relocation incentives to impede inter-
provincial relocation in favor of relocation within a province or upgrading locally. By contrast, 
Western regions increasingly offer competitive advantages on wages, infrastructural costs and 
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logistical support and their governments actively recruit enterprises away from established 
production centers to often well-provisioned green-field industrial parks by offering incentives 
and supports, such as tax breaks and subsidies.  
The result is the emergence of a much more spatially extended and functionally 
articulated series of regional production networks. Whether these regional production networks – 
with their higher-value cores, regionally extended assembly plants, and overseas outsourcing of 
low-value added contracts – will resolve the challenges of China’s dominant role in GVCs 
remains an open question. For the moment, the rapid expansion of domestic consumption acts as 
a stimulus and subsidy while global markets remain turbulent and price sensitive. 
Firm strategies to increasing competitive pressures 
Delocalization/Relocation 
At the present time, while efforts to explain new firm formation and industrial relocation 
have attracted increasing scholarly attention, a great deal of attention is directed towards 
analyzing industrial relocation and new firm formation in either global, regional or local context 
and most extant studies have fallen short in disclosing the full picture where all three aspects 
(global, regional and local) have profound impacts over the processes of industrial relocation and 
new firm formation in interactional and collective ways. This dissertation hence formulates a tri-
polar analytical framework that combines all three aspects, and further demonstrates its 
usefulness by using it to interpret the geographical dynamics and industrial relocation in China’s 
apparel industry. First, firms are deeply embedded in their original locations and keep benefiting 
from local vertical and horizontal linkages they have cultivated over time in cluster. Second, the 
global factors emphasize cross-border linkages between global buyers from the North and local 
suppliers from Ningbo, and have been acting as a centrifugal force while driving firms to 
delocalize and relocate to lower-cost locations. Third, regionalization draws attention to the 
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assemblage of a range of forces including geographical proximity, delivery time, supply chain 
management as well as labor costs, all impacting on the geographies of sourcing decisions and 
production networks. Combining these important pillars, my tri-polar framework interprets 
industrial relocation through systematic interrelationships and ongoing interaction between 
globalization, regionalization and localization.  
In addition, the extent to which firm relocation processes are affected by globalization, 
regionalization and localization is determined by firm’s characteristic. For instance, firm’s 
embeddedness into local cluster, its horizontal and vertical linkages with other firms co-locating 
in the same cluster, and reliance on local supporting facilities largely explains its degree of 
localization and capability to resist relocation. Furthermore, firm’s core competencies, main 
products, and business mode disclose its position in GVC and extent to which global buyers are 
able to affect its sourcing strategy and relocation processes. These characteristics also decide 
firm’s need to handle quick response, short lead time, quick replenishment and therefore its 
tendency to embrace geographical proximity and regional production network. My argument is, 
therefore, not only simply about industrial relocation in the global, regional and local context 
where advantages of some untraditional factors can outweigh profit generated by lower labor 
cost, but about also the diversity of trajectories of relocation, some of which may not be 
reducible to a singular logic. 
The statistical results also confirm that, as labor cost surges and competitive pressures 
intensifies in coastal region, employment and production of the apparel industry start to diffuse 
from over-concentrated coastal region towards central region which is moderately distant from 
China’s coastline. While the vast majority of low-capability apparel firms follow this trend, their 
high-capability counterparts which manufacture high-end and time-sensitive items are resistant 
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to the intensified competitive pressures in general and rising labor cost in particular. The latter’s 
persistent preference of coastal region over central region is due in large part to its strong 
dependence on high-quality labor, the Jacobsian externalities, as well as geographical proximity 
to oversea end markets, all of which can only be realized by locating in coastal region.  
Upgrading 
First, I focus on the development and dynamism of functional, process and product 
upgrading in China’s apparel industry, and investigate the ways in which and the extent to which 
different types of upgrading have been co-shaped by both global and local forces. While process, 
product and functional upgrading may be apparent in China’s apparel industry, these have been 
articulated with a range of other causal mechanisms that relate to wider and changing economic, 
institutional and historical conditions which are central in assessing the extent to which a process 
of upgrading is even possible. This means the articulation between various types of firm 
upgrading and global/local factors needs to be not only understood as dynamic, contingent, and 
fluid, but also interpreted in ways which take into account the specific historical development of 
China’s apparel industry, the evolution of institutional arrangements for apparel, and the ups and 
downs of globalization and global economy. Furthermore, statistical results also confirm that, in 
these debates on upgrading, it is also important that we take seriously the heterogeneity, 
complexity and variety of the relationship between upgrading and global/local factors.   
Second, contemporary changes in emerging economies necessitate a strong focus on the 
endless processes of competition that mark the upgrading process. One form of this constraining 
assumption is the entry problem identified by Tokatli. Furthermore, even though process/product 
upgrading are well-defined and recognized in GVC analyses, I have argued that their normative 
assumptions tend to overemphasize functional upgrading as ‘high road’ and implicitly relegate 
process/product upgrading to secondary or ‘low road’ upgrading. However, the 
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correspondence between functional upgrading and ‘high road’, process/product upgrading and 
‘low road’ is not one that is set in stone. In reality functional upgrading can be a ‘low road’ 
strategy and process/product upgrading is not necessarily ‘low road’. Finally, functional 
upgrading is not the only route to business success or viability, that viability that sustains 
contracts and employment may—under certain conditions—have more important regional 
consequences than upgrading strategies that squeeze out competitors, and that even where 
regional production systems experience generalized economic upgrading, expanded 
competencies and capacities, and improved market position, such models of upgrading—in 
presupposing a linear trajectory—may be temporary. In this dissertation, I have argued for a 
more diverse understanding of firm and inter-firm strategies in articulating (or not) with 
upgrading practices in GVCs. In this approach, functional upgrading does not guarantee that 
more value will be captured and process/product upgrading is not necessarily a less valuable 
‘low road’. 
Articulation between changing industrial policies and firm strategies 
Recent studies in Evolutionary Economic Geography have critiqued the four-phase 
development of clusters in the standard traditional or canonical path dependence model, and have 
suggested a second type of trajectory which is more open and allows for constant endogenous 
change and evolution. The second trajectory can be realized by keeping the cluster relatively 
open. It has been argued that some ‘extrovert’ entrepreneurs who have deliberately developed 
pipelines to trans-local networks may be able to increase the variety of knowledge available to 
them, escape the potential problem of rigidification stemming from myopia and negative lock-in, 
and rejuvenate the cluster. However, the idea that nurturing connections with distant actors may 
help prevent systemic negative lock-in is not always the case. In the case of Ningbo’s apparel 
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cluster, the historically evolved global pipeline, regional pipeline and regional buzz rendered the 
entire cluster locked into specific initially successful ways of doing things that later emerged as 
shackles that inhibited further progress. Different types of trans-local pipelines may have 
different effects in cluster evolution, and pipelines may become clogged over time. 
In addition, this canonical path dependence model has perhaps focused too much on 
exogenous shocks in the process of path disruption and on ‘historical accidents’ in the early 
stages of path creation, implying that managers and policy-makers have few choices left 
thereafter. I have suggested that path dependence is a socially dynamic process, forcing us to 
look at structure as well as the action of agents. The agent-based approach helps researchers to 
understand exactly the ways in which a diverse range of agents are implicated in the construction 
and constitution of interdependent sequences of events and decisions. In this process of co-
evolution, collaboration among agents (such as firms and governments) leads to certain process 
of path creation and maintenance, by facilitating intentional network coordination and generating 
collaborative and deliberate planning. However, such a process of co-evolution and network 
coordination does not always emerge, and industrial restructuring may be fraught with conflicts 
and tensions between various actors. By applying an agent-based approach in path dependence 
analysis, I have suggested that all actors can be both path-dependent and path-breaking, 
especially between the release (path disruption) and reorganization (path creation) phases. 
Conflicts in the process of co-evolution can be driven not only by institutional inertia and 
hysteresis, but also by the heterogeneity and divergence of various agents’ actions. This type of 
divergence exists all the time, because the interactions between structure and purposeful actions 
constantly give rise to both on-path and off-path changes and innovations. But during the release 
and reorganization phase, intensive conflicts and tensions between different actors may emerge 
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in a more phenomenal way (in my case, different levels of governments and different kinds of 
firms). 
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